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 The risk convergence model (RCM) was developed as a theoretical framework 
to organize research on media effects and narrative persuasion (So & Nabi, 2013). The 
model identifies social distance to a fictional character as a key mechanism through 
which narrative engagement variables impact media users’ personal risk perceptions. 
However, the model has only been tested twice (So & Nabi, 2013; So & Shen, 2015). 
This dissertation expands the RCM by adding parasocial relationship (PSR) with the 
character to the model. Additionally, the study tests the effects of character valence and 
affective disposition on social distance with an at-risk character. This dissertation also 
explores the influence of narrative ending types on risk perceptions. Finally, the study 
examines the duration of effects for personal risk perceptions. 
An experiment was conducted in which participants (N = 272) were randomly 
assigned to a character valence condition (positive or negative) and a narrative ending 
condition (uncertain, denial, or apology). Results indicated that a reduction in social 
distance to an at-risk character led to risk convergence. The study supported the 
addition of PSR with the character to the RCM because social distance mediated the 
relationship between PSR and character- and self-risk discrepancy. Character valence 
did not work with the narrative engagement variables, whereas results for affective 
disposition indicated a future role it could play in the RCM. Finally, narrative ending 
types did not significantly affect risk perceptions. Overall, this study’s results offer 
support for the RCM and offer new components to consider when testing the model in 
the future. 
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
People face a number of risks every day and are consistently reminded of those 
risks to an overwhelming extent (Berry, 2004). Despite this constant communication 
about risk, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC, 2014) report that, in 
the United States, 20 to 40 percent of premature deaths from each of the five leading 
causes of death—diseases of the heart, cancer, chronic lower respiratory diseases, 
cerebrovascular diseases (stroke), and unintentional injuries— could have been 
prevented. Modifiable risk factors are primarily responsible for each of the five causes 
of death (CDC, 2014). Modifiable factors include lifestyle behaviors such as tobacco 
use, poor diet, alcohol use, lack of seatbelt use, and lack of physical activity (CDC, 
2014). Effective risk communication can play a role in reducing this death toll. Risk 
communication is communication that focuses on risk-related knowledge, perceptions, 
attitudes, and behaviors (Edwards & Bastian, 2001). This type of communication does 
not have to be face-to-face, and often occurs through mass media. Research 
demonstrates that media can influence risk perceptions (Binder, Cacciatore, Scheufele, 
& Brossard, 2015; Snyder & Rouse, 1995) and because of this, many media effects 
theories (e.g., cultivation theory, impersonal-impact hypothesis) have been proposed to 
explain how mediated depictions of risk affect risk perceptions. However these theories 
primarily focus on social risk perception rather than personal risk perception (So & 
Nabi, 2013). Research on narrative media has brought a focus to individual risk 
perceptions by identifying narrative engagement conditions (e.g., transportation, 
identification, parasocial interaction) that impact personal risk perceptions when 
individuals are exposed to a mass mediated risk narrative. However, much of the 
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research on media and risk perception does not provide a cohesive explanation for why 
media influence personal risk perceptions. 
 In an effort to organize disjointed research on media effects and narrative 
persuasion, So and Nabi (2013) proposed the risk convergence model (RCM). The 
process model posits that reduction of perceived social distance to a fictional character 
serves as a mechanism to explain how different forms of narrative engagement 
influence media users’ personal risk perceptions. A variety of narrative engagement 
processes reduce the social distance between viewers and an at-risk character. This 
reduction in distance then prompts viewers’ personal risk perception to converge or 
move closer to the high-risk level of the at-risk character. Although the RCM has 
received empirical support from past tests (So & Nabi, 2013; So & Shen, 2015), limited 
research has been conducted with the model, and there is room for expansion, as the 
RCM has only been tested on perceived risk of acquiring a sexual transmitted disease 
(STD). 
This dissertation seeks to improve understanding about the mechanisms 
involved in the RCM model and test how its principles work with a different health 
issue. This project advances research on the RCM in multiple ways. First, this 
dissertation tests the convergence process of the RCM using a different health issue, 
drinking and driving, which is a salient health problem in the United States. According 
to the National Center for Statistics and Analysis (NCSA; 2015), a driver is considered 
to be “alcohol-impaired” when his or her blood alcohol concentration (BAC) is .08 
grams per deciliter (g/dL) or higher. In 2014, almost ten thousand (9,967) people died in 
alcohol-impaired driving crashes, accounting for 31 percent of all motor vehicle traffic 
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fatalities in United States. Of these fatalities, 64 percent were alcohol-impaired drivers, 
15 percent were passengers riding with those drivers, 12 percent were occupants of 
other vehicles, and 8 percent were non-occupants such as pedestrians and cyclists 
(NCSA, 2015). Additionally, in the same year, 1,764 people died in crashes in which a 
driver had been drinking (BAC between .01 to .07 g/dL) but was not considered to be 
alcohol-impaired (NCSA, 2015). Thus, drinking and driving is a major health issue in 
the United States.  
Testing the RCM with a different health issue is important because previous 
tests of the model used the issue of STDs exclusively. As So and Shen (2015) noted, 
although STDs are contagious, they are easily treatable, and rarely fatal. The findings 
from previous RCM studies may not generalize to noncontagious health issues or issues 
that are more deadly. One of the contributions of this study is to observe if the RCM 
works differently due to differences in level of involvement in the risk event and the 
severity of consequences associated with the event. The expectation is that the model 
performs similarly with a different issue. 
Second, the project also considers the role of the RCM’s five narrative 
engagement variables on the relationship between narrative exposure and personal risk 
perception. In this reconsideration of variables, self-referencing replaced personal 
relevance because self-referencing is associated more with message content than with 
personal relevance.  
Third, this dissertation proposes adding parasocial relationships (PSRs) with 
characters to the RCM as an additional narrative engagement variable. PSRs occur 
outside the viewing process but can influence other narrative engagement variables, 
4 
particularly parasocial interactions (PSIs; Schramm & Hartmann, 2008). People’s long-
term relationships and background knowledge of characters experiencing risk behaviors 
could decrease their social distance and increase their perceived personal risk because 
the viewers with a PSR already have a connection with the character and could be more 
affected by the character’s experience of the risk event.  
Fourth, another addition to the model is the consideration of character valence 
and affective disposition toward the character as moderators in the relationships 
between perceived social distance and the parasocial variables and perceived social 
distance and identification, respectively. Often, narrative engagement research focuses 
on interactions with likeable characters. However, researchers have emphasized the 
significance of considering how engagement with negative characters impacts narrative 
persuasion theories (Konijn & Hoorn, 2005). The addition of these moderators will 
contribute to the RCM because they account for both positive and negative engagement 
with the character. This study aims to test if these moderators influence social distance 
and the subsequent convergence process in different ways. 
Fifth, this project explores how different narrative endings affect risk perception, 
specifically examining at the role of explicit or implicit consequences and the 
character’s acceptance of those consequences portrayed in the narrative. This study uses 
the same narrative storyline but ends the stimuli with different outcomes: uncertainty 
regarding the character’s fate, denial of responsibility from the character, and 
acceptance and apology from the character concerning the need to change the risky 
behavior. Narrative endings are important to consider because they may impact the 
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level of social distance a viewer perceives between themselves and the character, which 
could, in turn, influence risk convergence. 
Finally, this project also considers the duration of media effects on risk by 
including a posttest follow-up two weeks after the initial stimulus exposure. Most media 
effects studies measure attitudes after immediate exposure (Green & Clark, 2013). More 
scholars are considering media’s long-term influence on attitudes toward health 
behaviors (e.g., Moyer-Gusé & Nabi, 2010; Vaughan, Rogers, Singhal, & Swalehe, 
2000). The follow-up posttest component of the project attempts to add to research on 
the durability of risk convergence effects in a narrative format. 
This dissertation begins with a literature review of narrative persuasion, media 
effects and risk, the theoretical foundation of the RCM, and the explanation of the RCM 
itself. Next, additions to the model are proposed, culminating with a series of 
hypotheses. Then the hypotheses are tested in an experimental setting, described in the 
method. Finally, the dissertation concludes with a summary of the results and a 
discussion of the findings’ theoretical and practical significance. 
Chapter 2: Narrative Persuasion 
 A narrative is “a representation of connected events and characters that has an 
identifiable structure, is bounded in space and time, and contains implicit or explicit 
messages about the topic being addressed’’ (Kreuter et al., 2007, p. 222). A large body 
of research has established that both written and audiovisual fictional narratives can 
impact media users’ attitudes, beliefs, intentions, and behaviors (e.g., Appel & Richter, 
2007; Green, 2004; Green & Brock, 2000; S. E. Morgan, Movius, & Cody, 2009; 
Moyer-Gusé & Nabi, 2010; Strange & Leung, 1999; Wang & Calder, 2006). This 
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chapter will cover a specific area of narrative persuasion that focuses on changing social 
and health behaviors, entertainment-education (E-E). With this frame of reference, the 
chapter will then cover the specific frameworks of narrative persuasion. Entertainment-
education is relevant to the RCM because it demonstrates how entertainment can affect 
attitudes and behaviors toward a variety of social and health issues using narrative 
engagement processes. The strategy’s success has led to a growing body of research on 
how people’s connection to the narrative and characters influence persuasion. 
Entertainment-Education 
 Entertainment-education is an intervention strategy that intentionally embeds 
educational content into entertainment programming (Singhal & Rogers, 2004). This 
strategy has been used in over 40 countries to create awareness of and change attitudes 
and behaviors regarding a vast amount of social and health issues such as HIV/AIDS 
prevention, domestic violence, and reproductive health (Sherry, 2002; Singhal, Cody, 
Rogers, & Sabido, 2004). E-E “programming” can include radio and television series, 
talk radio, music, participatory theatre, interactive websites, and video games (Singhal 
et al., 2004). However, most research has concentrated on the use of radio and 
television serials (Cody & Sabido, 2008).  
Traditional E-E campaigns originate from Miguel Sabido’s E-E programing in 
the 1970s, which used long-running telenovelas to encourage adult literacy and family 
planning in Latin America, using Bandura’s (1986) social cognitive theory (Singhal & 
Rogers, 2004). Traditional E-E interventions specifically create entertainment 
programming using message design and persuasion theories and rigorously test the 
programming (Singhal et al., 2004). Many of these programs have demonstrated 
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positive results. An example of a successful E-E program is Tinka Tinka Sukh 
(Happiness Lies in Small Things), a 104-episode, radio soap opera that aired from 1996 
to 1997 in India. An estimated 36 to 40 million people listened to the program which 
focused on a message of promoting community harmony and women’s causes like 
antidowry, women’s empowerment, and gender equality (Papa et al., 2000). In a case 
study on a community that listened to the program, researchers found that the show 
inspired interpersonal discussion about issues depicted in the show, and motivated some 
listeners to come together to solve community problems (Papa et al., 2000). The United 
States has only had a small number of coordinated, cross-media campaigns (Hether, 
Huang, Beck, Murphy, & Valente, 2008). For instance, the Harvard Alcohol Project 
sought to reduce drunk driving by advocating the use of designated drivers through a 
coordinated E-E campaign. The campaign, which began in 1998, embedded messages 
into over 160 entertainment television series. Survey results demonstrated a 10 percent 
increase in respondents’ reports of using a designated driver all or most of the time 
(Winsten & DeJong, 2001).  
E-E programming in the United States often does not use the traditional model 
of E-E campaigns in which message designers carefully construct a program around a 
health issue (Singhal & Rogers, 2004). Rather, in the United States, educational stories 
are often embedded in already established entertainment programming by advocacy 
groups or the show’s writers (Greenberg, Salmon, Patel, Beck, & Cole, 2004). This 
form of E-E appears in countries like the United States where the government has little 
control over media content, and where there are a large number of media outlets 
competing for viewers’ attention (Moyer-Gusé & Nabi, 2010; Sherry, 2002). Although 
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traditional E-E programing has a long running storyline regarding a health or social 
issue, E-E in the United States could consist of just one educational scene, an episode-
long storyline, or a brief story arc because the story is at the discretion of the writers and 
producers (Greenberg et al., 2004). These types of E-E differ in their goals as well. 
While traditional E-E works to change durable attitudes and behaviors, E-E in the 
United States may have a smaller scope that can focus on merely informing viewers 
about an issue, or seeking to change attitudes and behaviors (Moyer-Gusé & Nabi, 
2010).  
Evidence demonstrates that health messages embedded into entertainment 
programming can change media users’ knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors (Bae & 
Kang, 2008; Brodie et al., 2001; Hether et al., 2008; Murphy, Frank, Moran, & Patnoe-
Woodley, 2011). However, because implementers assess E-E studies through mass 
surveys and content analyses, the results usually do not provide detailed evaluations that 
explain which specific mechanisms of E-E lead to persuasive effects. Thus, Slater and 
Rouner (2002) recommended that scholars attempt to understand E-E better through 
experiments that examine how E-E content impacts beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. 
Current narrative persuasion research follows this suggestion and focuses on the 
underlying mechanisms of narrative persuasion (e.g., transportation, identification). 
Frameworks of Narrative Persuasion 
Narrative persuasion does not function in the same manner as non-narrative or 
analytical persuasion (Dal Cin, Zanna, & Fong, 2004). Scholars examine analytical 
models of persuasion using frameworks such as the elaboration likelihood model (ELM; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and the heuristic-systematic model (HSM; Chaiken, 1980, 
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1987). These models explain that an individual decides whether or not to accept a 
message’s claim by carefully evaluating arguments or relying on heuristic or superficial 
cues. The individual’s level of scrutiny depends on his or her motivation and ability to 
process the message. In contrast, narrative persuasion works to involve people 
affectively in a message so that they focus on the story rather than counterarguing (van 
Laer, de Ruyter, Visconti, & Wetzels, 2014). While analytical persuasion involves 
overtly persuasive messages, narrative persuasion embeds the persuasive messages in a 
story so that they are not as obvious (van Laer et al., 2014). Current literature proposes 
two principal models of narrative persuasion: the extended elaboration likelihood model 
(E-ELM; Slater, 2002; Slater & Rouner, 2002) and the entertainment overcoming 
resistance model (EORM; Moyer-Gusé, 2008; Moyer-Gusé & Nabi, 2010).  
 Slater and Rouner (2002) proposed the E-ELM to advance E-E theorizing. The 
E-ELM suggests that while issue involvement is an important factor in non-narrative 
persuasion theories like the ELM, involvement in the narrative is an important element 
in narrative persuasion (Slater & Rouner, 2002). Specifically, persuasive narratives can 
reduce resistance to persuasion by facilitating absorption in the narrative. This idea of 
absorption involves both narrative and character involvement. Narrative involvement 
refers to transportation, which is sometimes referred to as narrative absorption. 
Transportation is a concept of engagement that describes how a media user can get so 
involved in a narrative that he or she becomes unaware of his or her surroundings 
(Green & Brock, 2000). Character involvement refers to identification, which occurs 
when a media user temporarily adopts a media character’s identity and perspective 
(Cohen, 2001). The E-ELM asserts that transportation into the story and identification 
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with characters results in people being in a less critical state, which reduces 
counterarguing of and resistance to persuasive messages (Dal Cin et al., 2004; Slater & 
Rouner, 2002).  
 In an effort to consider how E-E programs can overcome other forms of 
resistance besides counterarguing, Moyer-Gusé (2008) proposed the EORM. The 
EORM incorporates the E-ELM’s proposition regarding counterarguing while also 
considering other forms of resistance that might cause persuasive messages to fail. For 
instance, the EORM considers entertainment features of E-E narratives that may reduce 
different types of resistance (e.g., psychological reactance and selective avoidance) and 
overcome optimistic bias (Moyer-Gusé, 2008). Similar to the E-ELM, the EORM 
identifies narrative engagement processes like transportation, identification, and PSI as 
mechanisms to overcome resistance to persuasion (Moyer-Gusé, 2008). For instance, 
the EORM posits that the narrative structure of E-E messages reduces a media user’s 
perception of persuasive intent because he or she views the intent of the message is to 
entertain, which, in turn, minimizes reactance (Moyer-Gusé, 2008; Moyer-Gusé & 
Nabi, 2010). Additionally, the EORM asserts that reactance can be reduced through PSI 
with a character (Moyer-Gusé & Nabi, 2010). PSI, which will be discussed in greater 
detail in relation to RCM, is a character engagement variable that describes a media 
user’s positive, “seemingly face-to-face” interaction with a media figure (Horton & 
Wohl, 1956, p. 215). According to the EORM, PSI reduces reactance because the media 
user feels like the character with whom he or she has a PSI is more similar to a peer 
(Giles, 2002), and, therefore, less authoritative and threatening to their attitudinal and 
behavioral freedom (Moyer-Gusé & Nabi, 2010).   
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 To change social and health behaviors, narrative persuasion frameworks have 
identified the importance of overcoming people’s resistance. These types of resistance 
can include counterarguing and reactance (Moyer-Gusé, 2008; Slater & Rouner, 2002). 
Media research pinpoints the importance of narrative structure and engagement as keys 
to overcoming this resistance. The risk convergence model takes these assertions and 
suggests how engagement variables work through social distance to influence personal 
risk perceptions. However, it is important to understand past research on media and risk 
perceptions prior to discussing the RCM. 
Chapter 3: Media Effects and Risk 
Risk judgment or perception is conceptualized as the way a person characterizes 
and assesses danger (Slovic, 1987). These judgments contain two dimensions: cognitive 
and affective. The cognitive dimension pertains to how people assess the likelihood of 
experiencing a hazard, and the affective dimension describes the concern that arises 
from that assessment (Dunwoody & Neuwirth, 1991). In addition to involving 
individuals’ beliefs, feelings, attitudes, and judgments, social and cultural values and 
norms impact risk perceptions (Pidgeon, Hood, Jones, Turner, & Gibson, 1992). Health 
communication researchers have emphasized the importance of understanding and 
influencing individuals’ perceived risk because behavior change theories and research 
demonstrate that people’s risk perceptions are greater determinants of their behaviors 
than their actual risk levels (Turner, Skubisz, & Rimal, 2011). As mentioned in the 
introduction, there are two types of risk perceptions: social and personal. Perceived 
social risk refers to an individual’s belief about the risk to society or “others,” whereas 
perceived personal risk refers to an individual’s perceived personal vulnerability 
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(Roberto, Goodall, & Witte, 2009). This difference is important because perceived 
personal risk, as opposed to social risk, is more likely to motivate people to take action 
to defend against possible risk (Aiken, Gerend, & Jackson, 2001; Janz & Becker, 1984). 
This chapter reviews media effects theories that relate to social and personal risk 
perceptions. 
Cultivation Theory 
Gerbner (1969) presented cultivation theory as a way to study the persistent, 
dynamic interplay between television and culture (Morgan, Shanahan, & Signorielli, 
2009). This theory views television as society’s main institutional storyteller. As such, 
television provides a system of messages to a mass audience, however these messages 
present a distorted reality. For instance, a number of constructs (e.g. crime, violence, 
chances of surviving cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), stereotypical 
representations of women, and occupations like doctors) are overrepresented and 
exaggerated on television (Busselle, 2003; Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, Signorielli, & 
Shanahan, 2002; Gerbner & Gross, 1976; Van den Bulck, 2002). Cultivation research 
demonstrates that long-term exposure to television’s messages can have a small, but 
significant effect on how people perceive their social world or reality (Bilandzic, 
2006; Morgan & Shanahan, 2010). Therefore, the more people watch television, the 
more their perceptions, values, and beliefs align with the messages portrayed on 
television. In regard to risk perception, cultivation research has found that heavy 
viewing is correlated with increased anxiety and fear (Bryant, Carveth, & Brown, 
1981). 
Cultivation does not focus solely on television’s influence on risk perceptions 
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but, as a theoretical foundation, has spurred a lot of risk research. In particular, the 
relationship between television’s portrayal of violence and people’s fear of crime, is a 
major research area of cultivation theory (Morgan & Shanahan, 2010). Cultivation 
effects can be separated into two process-indicators: first- and second-order. First-
order effects signify media consumers’ perceptions, or quantitative estimates, of real 
world parameters (e.g., overestimating crime rates in society, social risk perceptions). 
Second-order effects represent viewers’ attitudes, values, and perceptions about 
society (e.g., the world is a mean place and people cannot be trusted; Shrum, 2009; 
Shrum & Bischak, 2001; Weimann, 2000). Although some cultivation studies 
examine personal risk perceptions, cultivation theory primarily focuses on social risk 
perceptions. This concentration on social risk perception fits the cultivation 
perspective that television is more likely to impact a person’s view of society, in 
general, than directly influence one’s personal perceptions of his or her life, which is 
more intimate and known to that person (Morgan & Shanahan, 2010). Cultivation 
researchers still care about the effect television has on personal risk perception. 
However, early research did not distinguish between the two types of risk perception 
in their measures and, therefore, cannot offer evidence of how media affect social and 
personal risk perceptions separately (e.g., Gerbner, 1969; Gerbner, Gross, Jackson-
Beeck, Jeffries-Fox, & Signorielli, 1978). Recently, media researchers have started 
comparing cultivation’s influence on the different types of risk perception (i.e., social 
and personal risk). For instance, Ye (2010) found that television viewing was positively 
correlated with both personal and social risk perceptions of health issues, such as 
cancer, stroke, diabetes, HIV/AIDS, and infectious diseases. 
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Additionally, cultivation researchers are beginning to look at how narrative 
variables impact risk perceptions. For example, Bilandzic and Busselle (2008) 
attempted to examine transportation’s role in facilitating cultivation. Despite their 
operationalization issues, the overall results suggested narrative engagement variables 
could affect cultivation. Additionally, Custers and Van den Bulck (2013) found Flemish 
women’s perceived personal risk was positively associated with exposure to Flemish 
crime dramas, negatively related to news viewing, and not significantly related to 
exposure to American crime dramas. This finding is interesting because it suggests that 
narrative engagement processes, such as identification with characters, could play a role 
in cultivation effects of risk perception. Also, for Flemish viewers, Flemish characters 
may generate more identification than American characters, which would account for 
the differences in perceived risk (Custers & Van den Bulck, 2013). 
Cultivation is an important theory that connects media effects to risk 
perceptions. Traditionally, cultivation research focuses on media’s influence on social 
risk perception. However, some scholars have considered media’s impact on personal 
risk. This limited amount of research in these two areas merits more attention, 
especially given that perceived personal risk is more likely to motivate people to act 
than perceived social risk is (Aiken et al., 2001) . More recent cultivation research is 
moving beyond just studying cumulative effects of how frequency of media exposure 
affects risk perceptions but to considering how intensity of media exposure influences 
personal risk perceptions. Cultivation theory informs this dissertation by providing 
further evidence for the importance of narrative engagement in changing personal risk 
perceptions. Past cultivation research supports the predictions in this study that the 
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intensity of media exposure (i.e., narrative engagement), positively influences personal 
risk perceptions. 
Impersonal and Differential Impact Hypotheses 
The impersonal impact hypothesis (Tyler, 1980; Tyler & Cook, 1984) differs 
from cultivation theory by focusing on media’s effect on risk perceptions and 
establishing a clear difference between social and personal risk perception. The 
impersonal impact hypothesis postulates that mass media have a greater influence on 
people’s social risk perceptions than personal risk perceptions (Shrum & Bischak, 2001; 
Tyler & Cook, 1984). Additionally, the hypothesis proposes that, while mass media 
influence perceived social risks, interpersonal communication (which is more likely to 
focus on more personal stories of risk) influences perceived personal risk. This 
hypothesis has been supported in contexts like crime (Hughes, 1980) and drunk driving 
(Tyler & Cook, 1984). 
However, not all research on the impersonal impact hypothesis supports the 
assertions that mass media only influence social risks (Coleman, 1993; Snyder & 
Rouse, 1995). For instance, Coleman (1993) found that mass media affected both social 
and personal risk perceptions. Building on this research, Snyder and Rouse (1995) 
proposed that, when media are separated into informative and entertainment categories, 
media effects on personal risk emerge. Their study found that entertainment media 
viewing significantly predicted perceived personal risk. These two studies’ findings 
support the differential impact hypothesis, which proposes that, under certain 
conditions, media can influence perceived personal risk. Snyder and Rouse (1995) 
argued that the level of drama and vividness in media portrayals affects risk judgment. 
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More specifically, they emphasized that entertainment media’s dramatic presentation 
could impact personal risk perceptions, whereas more informative media (e.g., news) 
would be more likely to influence social risk perceptions. So, Cho, and Lee (2011) 
expanded Snyder and Rouse’s (1995) work and reported that genre-specific media 
exposure (e.g., entertainment, news, health infotainment, and medical documentary) 
differentially affected participants’ social and personal risk perceptions about smoking 
risks.  
Additional research supports the differential impact hypothesis by suggesting 
that certain conditions and individual differences influence risk perceptions. For 
example, Basil and Brown (1997) found that identification with a celebrity diagnosed 
with HIV/AIDS positively correlated with personal and social risk perceptions. Also, 
variables like personal relevance can affect personal and social risk perceptions 
(Sussman et al., 1989) by allowing individuals to relate to the issue portrayed in the 
narrative (Tyler & Cook, 1984) and seeing how the issue applies to them. These 
variables will be discussed in more detail in chapter five. 
Although, the impersonal impact hypothesis proposes that interpersonal 
communication has a greater role in influencing personal risk perception than media, 
the differential impact hypothesis suggests that message differences and individual 
differences play a key role in risk perception. These conclusions emphasize the 
importance of narrative engagement variables’ influence on personal risk perceptions. 
For instance, many studies have found that parasocial relationships are similar to 
interpersonal relationships in formation, feelings of attachment, and termination 
(Cohen, 2009). Further, media can take the connection with media figures beyond a 
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feeling of kinship and connection, through mechanisms such as identification and 
transportation. These variables can give a media user the feeling he or she is like the 
character or is in the narrative, respectively. This immersion could allow a media user to 
feel a connection to a risk event beyond what he or she could experience through 
interpersonal communication. Media’s ability to facilitate personal connections between 
media characters with users, and potentially influence personal risk perceptions is a key 
consideration of the RCM. 
Chapter 4: Background of Risk Convergence Model 
In 2013, So and Nabi introduced the RCM to explain why narratives affect 
personal risk perceptions. The authors argued that social distance worked as the 
common mechanism to explain how narrative engagement processes influenced 
audiences’ personal risk perceptions. The RCM proposes that narrative engagement 
processes can reduce perceived social distance with an at-risk character. This reduced 
social distance then allows audience members’ perceived personal risks to converge 
with the character’s risk, which personalizes the risk for the audience member. Given 
the model’s recent introduction, understandably, only a few scholars have tested its 
premises (So & Nabi, 2013; So & Shen, 2015). Therefore, this project will further 
explore the components and boundaries of the RCM. This section provides a review of 
the theory behind the RCM by tracing the model’s foundation in construal-level theory 
(CLT; Trope & Liberman, 2010) and connections to optimistic bias and third-person 
effect.  
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Construal Level Theory 
CLT (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 2003) is a theory examining 
psychological distance’s effects on thinking, decision making, and behavior. CLT is 
based on the idea that people use schematic mental models when thinking and making 
decisions; psychological distance affects the formation of these models (Trope & 
Liberman, 2010). When something (e.g., an object or event) is psychologically distant, 
that means it is beyond a person’s direct experience of the present reality (Liberman, 
Trope, & Stephan, 2007). That direct experience serves as the psychological distance’s 
reference point and anything beyond an individual’s direct experience of the here-and-
now is psychologically distant (Liberman et al., 2007). A person can recall or imagine 
something, but he or she still does not experience it directly. According to the theory, 
there are four dimensions of psychological distance: social, temporal, spatial, and 
hypothetical. The different dimensions represent reasons for that distance. For instance, 
something may be socially distant because it belongs to another person (e.g., the way a 
friend or a stranger experiences an event). Things may be temporally distant because 
they happened in the past (e.g., high school graduation) or will happen in the future 
(e.g., me publishing this dissertation study as an article). Spatial distance refers to other 
places (e.g., Peru, the moon). Finally, hypothetical distance refers to alternate realities 
that could or might have occurred but did not (e.g., if I was invisible, if I switched jobs). 
CLT posits that psychological distance affects the level of mental representation, 
or construal, of something. More specifically, entities that are more psychologically 
distant activate higher, or more abstract, levels of construal than psychologically closer 
entities. This difference in construals could be because the more remote things are from 
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direct experience, the less information people have about these entities (Liviatan, Trope, 
& Liberman, 2008). This lack of knowledge leads a person to form representations on a 
higher level. A high-level construal is a simple, decontextualized mental representation 
that contains general, superordinate features of the entity. This level of construal 
emphasizes an overarching, more abstract “why” aspect of decision-making and 
behavior in which the individual focuses more on the outcome’s value or attractiveness 
than a low-level construal (Liberman & Trope, 1998). Conversely, a low-level construal 
is a more concrete representation that consists of subordinate and contextual features of 
the entity than a high-level construal. A low-level construal construal level focuses on 
the “how” element of decision-making and behaviors in which the individual 
concentrates on the feasibility of an action. For instance, Liberman and Trope (1998) 
asked participants to select a description for the action “making a list,” as a function of 
the dimension of psychological distance activated in the condition participants were 
assigned to within the study. Participants in the temporally distant condition (e.g., 
making a list next year) described the action as “getting organized,” whereas 
participants in the temporally closer condition (e.g., making a list tomorrow) described 
the action as “writing things down.” Thus, the activation of a high or low construal level 
results in systematic differences in how people comprehend objects and events, thus 
changing their evaluation, judgment, and behavior.  
The RCM centers on the social dimension of CLT; therefore, more detail will be 
provided on this aspect of distance. Park (1924) defined the concept of social distance 
as the amount of understanding and feelings of closeness that describe interpersonal 
relationships. Bogardus (1925; 1933) built on this research by operationalizing social 
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distance and suggesting that social distance levels were linked to personal contact and 
sympathy. CLT researchers have noted multiple types of social distance; unfamiliar 
others, out-group members, dissimilar others, and people of a different status can be 
viewed as socially distant others (Liberman et al., 2007). In terms of CLT, a socially 
distant entity is construed at a higher level than a socially close other. This construal 
difference occurs because people tend to have more contextual and specific information 
about socially close others, thus leading to more concrete mental representations as 
compared to socially distant others (Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Liviatan et al., 2008).  
For instance, a person has specific and contextual information on his or her 
orientation toward risk (e.g., likelihood of contracting an STD). If asked to judge a 
socially close other’s risk, a person can project or converge his or her personal 
experience with risk onto that other because he or she has relevant information about 
that person (e.g., it is not likely that I will get an STD, therefore he or she probably will 
not, either). However, if asked to construe a socially distant other’s risk orientation, an 
individual will have a more difficult time making concrete judgments because his or her 
experiences are so distant from the other person’s experiences. Therefore, the individual 
will use higher-level schemas to make judgments about the distal other’s risk (e.g., 
based on statistics, he or she is likely to contract an STD), which generally deviate from 
personal experiences and self-assessments. The social distance aspect of CLT offers a 
reason how exemplars (like those often found in E-E messages) affect personal risk 
judgments; they bring the experience closer to home. For instance, in cases where 
narratives elicit high levels of transportation (i.e., narrative involvement) and 
identification, viewers feel as if they are a part of the story or are similar to the main 
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character, which would decrease the social distance between the viewer and character, 
thus potentially leading to convergence of risk perceptions between the self and other. 
The role of social distance in impacting self-other perceptions has also been noted in a 
number of different phenomena, such as optimistic bias and the third person effect. 
Optimistic Bias 
Optimistic bias (Weinstein, 1980, 1989) is the tendency for people to 
underestimate their likelihood of experiencing a negative event (e.g., divorce, car 
accident, illness) and overestimate others’ likelihood. So and Shen (2015) explain that 
in this phenomenon, people tend to judge social risk as greater than personal risk. 
Numerous studies have observed the optimistic bias operating in various contexts such 
as risk assessment of natural disasters (Gierlach, Belsher, & Beutler, 2010), cancer 
(Dillard, McCaul, & Klein, 2006), and H1N1 flu (Cho, Lee, & Lee, 2013; Rudisill, 
2013). Most optimistic bias research focuses on health risk perceptions (Ostman, 2008). 
Optimistic bias can be an issue in health risk contexts because if people underestimate 
their risk (e.g., risk of getting the flu), they could be less motivated to take preventative 
or precautionary measures (e.g., get a flu shot). 
There are many explanations for the optimistic bias. For instance, one 
explanation is that being pessimistically biased (i.e., believing that one is at more risk 
than other people) induces more anxiety and is, therefore, less likely to happen (Kirscht, 
Haefner, Kegeles, & Rosenstock, 1966). However, self-enhancement is a key 
underlying mechanism of optimistic bias. With self-enhancement, people protect and 
enhance their self-esteem and self-worth by holding unrealistically positive views of the 
self (Tal-Or, Tsfati, & Gunther, 2009). These positive views extend to people connected 
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closely to that person because it is more self-enhancing to think of those close to the self 
as special, which then results in smaller optimistic biases in comparison with those 
close people. Conversely, if a person views another person not as connected to the self, 
those self-enhancing views do not extend to that person.  
Self-enhancement ties into psychological distance, specifically social distance, 
which also connects to CLT (Harris, Middleton, & Joiner, 2000; Klein & Weinstein, 
1997). Individuals tend to make assessments of risk by comparing themselves to others. 
As social distance increases, perceptual bias increases as well (Liberman et al., 2007), 
which prompts peoples’ judgments about self- and other-risk to diverge (Chapin, 2000; 
Harris et al., 2000), meaning that people see others as more vulnerable to risk than 
themselves. Additionally, reduced social distance results in a convergence effect in 
which risk judgments between the self and others draw closer to each other (Klein & 
Weinstein, 1997). Based on this evidence, optimistic bias research supports the idea that 
social distance influences risk perceptions and risk convergence. 
Third-Person Effect 
 Another concept related to social distance and risk perception is the third-person 
effect (TPE; Davison, 1983), which describes the tendency for people to believe media 
content influences others more negatively than themselves. This effect occurs in two 
steps, one perceptual and the other behavioral. First, people exposed to persuasion 
through mass media, perceive it as affecting others more than themselves. Second, this 
perceived impact of media may lead these people to take action (Tal-Or et al., 2009). 
For example, if people believe violent depictions on television negatively influence 
others, they might be more in favor of reducing the violent content on television or 
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censoring it to limit those negative effects. Davison’s original work on TPE 
demonstrated support for the perceptual component, which was validated in a meta-
analysis (see Paul, Salwen, & Dupagne, 2000). However, Davison only offered 
speculation about the behavioral component. A small number of studies have focused 
on TPE’s behavioral component, but they present inconsistent results and limited 
explanatory power (Brosius & Huck, 2008). 
Davison’s (1983) work implicitly acknowledged the importance of social 
distance in the TPE. Research has found that TPE increases as the social distance 
between an individual and another group increases (Hoffner & Cantor, 1991). However, 
the target corollary challenged this explanation of the TPE by arguing that perceived 
media exposure is a better predictor of perceived effects than perceived social distance 
(Eveland, Nathanson, Detenber, & McLeod, 1999). For instance, McLeod, Detenber, 
and Eveland (2001) found that people’s assessment of how much “common sense” they 
had negatively predicted their estimates of the impact of antisocial (e.g., violent or 
misogynistic) rap or death metal lyrics on themselves. However, their assessment of 
lyrics’ influence on others was predicted by how much of that type of music they 
thought others listened to (i.e., media exposure). Early work on the target corollary 
exclusively tested for non-desirable messages. The target corollary argued that people 
view media as highly influential (similar to the “magic bullet” theory), therefore, the 
more a group is exposed to a message, the greater influence it will have on them. 
However, Meirick (2005) tested the target corollary with both undesirable (e.g., 
pro-smoking ads) and desirable (e.g., anti-tobacco ads and drinking and driving public 
service announcement [PSA]) messages. In that study, Meirick (2005) found that 
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perceived exposure of a group predicted perceived effects for the undesirable ads (i.e., 
more distant groups were viewed as more susceptible to cigarette ads), but not for the 
desirable ads. Interestingly, a group’s perceived predisposition toward the subject (i.e., 
smoking or drinking and driving) predicted perceived effects for both undesirable and 
desirable messages. Reid and Hogg (2005) explain this relationship between social 
distance and TPE through self-categorization. When an individual perceives a message 
to be appropriate or valued by the target group (for the individual or others), perceptions 
of media influence rise. Thus, first-person effects are heightened if the individual views 
the message as normative for his or her in-group. Conversely, if the person perceives 
the content as normative for an out-group, TPE occurs (Cohen, Tsfati, & Sheafer, 
2008). Similar to the optimistic bias, the third person effect also demonstrates how 
social distance can affect judgments of others. 
Chapter 5: Risk Convergence Model 
So and Nabi (2013) introduced the risk convergence model in an effort to 
explain why narrative engagement processes facilitate the risk personalization process. 
The model posits that reduced perceived social distance between a media user and an at-
risk character serves as the unifying mechanism to explain the relationship between a 
host of narrative engagement variables and risk personalization. CLT and the 
aforementioned frameworks argue that an increase in social distance between the self 
and other increases the discrepancy between judgments about the self and other. So and 
Nabi (2013) proposed in the RCM that the opposite should hold true as well, meaning 
that a decrease in social distance should cause self-other risk judgments to converge. 
The RCM claims that a media user’s reduced social distance to an at-risk character 
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increases personal risk perception through a convergence process with the character’s 
risk, meaning that audiences’ risk perceptions and perceptions of the character’s risk 
become similar (So & Nabi, 2013).  
  The original test of the RCM examined if perceived social distance mediated the 
relationship between five narrative engagement variables (identification, transportation, 
perceived realism, personal relevance, and parasocial interaction) and personal risk 
perception (So & Nabi, 2013). So and Shen (2015) presented a second test of the RCM 
in which they explicitly tested the risk convergence process, which was not examined 
by So and Nabi (2013). Additionally, So and Shen (2015) retested the influence of four 
of the five narrative engagement variables, excluding personal relevance. The next 
section below describes the risk convergence process in greater detail. Then, the 
following sections provide an explanation of how each narrative engagement variable 
relates to risk research and its role in the RCM. Hypotheses will also be introduced 
throughout the review. Finally, additional components to be added to the RCM (e.g., 
PSR with the character, valence of PSR, and nature of narrative endings) will be 
introduced. 
The Convergence Process 
 So and Nabi (2013) found empirical support for the theoretical arguments of the 
RCM, specifically the role of reduced social distance as a mediator of the relationships 
between the narrative engagement variables and personal risk perceptions. A limitation 
of the original test of the RCM was that the authors focused only on testing the 
influence of reduced social distance as a mediator between the narrative engagement 
variables and personal risk perceptions. So and Nabi (2013) did not test explicitly for 
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risk convergence (i.e., the gap between character and self risk). So and Shen (2015) 
advanced the model forward by finding support for risk convergence as the 
psychological mechanism of risk personalization. The RCM has been tested twice with 
personal risk perceptions as the main outcome variable, and only once with risk 
convergence as the outcome variable. Therefore, a reexamination of the model and its 
processes extends research on the RCM. 
The central idea of the model is that a decrease in social distance leads to 
convergence of risk (i.e., a smaller gap between character- and self-risk). Research on 
optimistic bias informs the three potential ways risk convergence could occur. 
Optimistic bias research routinely demonstrates that an individual consistently estimates 
his or her risk as lower than the risk of others (Weinstein, 1989). Therefore, there are 
three scenarios under which risk convergence happens: (1) perceived self-risk increases 
while character-risk remains high, (2) perceived self- and character-risk converge 
toward each other, meaning self-risk increases while character-risk decreases, and (3) 
perceived self-risk remains low, while perceived character-risk decreases. The first 
scenario is an implicit component of the RCM in which the narrative engagement 
processes lead to a reduction in perceived social distance with a character. Because a 
media user feels a social closeness to the at-risk character, he or she feels more 
vulnerable to the story’s risk event, meaning that he or she has increased his or her own 
risk perception, closing the self- and character-risk gap. So and Shen’s (2015) results 
supported the argument that risk convergence is a result of an increase in media users’ 
self-risk perceptions rather than a decrease in character-risk perceptions. This finding is 
important for risk communication as it shows that audiences can “overcome the illusion 
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of invulnerability and adjust their levels of personal risk to a more realistic level” (So & 
Shen, 2015, p. 15). The hypothesis below retests the convergence process hypothesized 
by So and Shen (2015) to gain further support for the RCM: 
Hypothesis 1: (H1a) Social distance to an at-risk character is positively related 
to discrepancy between perceptions of character-risk and self-risk, and (H1b) 
negatively related to social distance. 
Narrative Engagement Variables 
Identification 
Identification is a process in which an audience member temporarily adopts a 
media character’s identity (Cohen, 2001). This affective and cognitive process of 
psychologically merging identities allows media users to move from a detached position 
of observation to an immersed position of adopting the character’s perspective, 
emotions, and goals (Cohen, 2001, 2009; Oatley, 1999). Identification has four 
dimensions: empathy, sharing a character’s perspective, motivation, and absorption 
(Cohen, 2001). Mediated texts provide consumers with information about the 
character’s thoughts and actions so that consumers can empathize with the character and 
easily share the character’s perspective. Additionally, affinity for and similarity to a 
character influence the degree of empathy for a character (Hoffner & Cantor, 1991). 
Therefore, a text that provides characters a viewer can like and feel similar to can 
increase empathy. In addition to empathy and perspective sharing, motivation and 
absorption play key roles in identification. Motivation demonstrates that media 
consumers have a choice in whether they want to identify with a character. When 
individuals consume media, they choose whether to be a spectator or participant in the 
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narrative (Oatley, 1999). Spectators distance themselves from the narrative, whereas 
participants emotionally connect to it and allow themselves to be absorbed in the 
narrative. Participants can experience identification because they are motivated to 
suspend their identity to adopt another (Cohen, 2006).  
Media effects research demonstrates this concept’s connection to persuasion 
with evidence that identification with media characters can change attitudes (Brown, 
Basil, & Bocarnea, 2003) and facilitate lowered resistance to persuasion (Cohen, 2001). 
More specifically, So and Nabi (2013) highlight the importance of the empathic 
dimension of identification because it allows people to share a person’s experiences and 
form a deeper connection with that person’s situation, which, in turn, can prompt an 
understanding of the personal relevance of the portrayed risk (Campbell & Babrow, 
2004; Nathanson, 2003). Additionally, identification with characters experiencing a risk 
event can impact personal risk perceptions. Moyer-Gusé and Nabi (2010) found that 
identification with a character experiencing a risk event (e.g., unplanned pregnancy) in 
a dramatic narrative had a significant, positive effect on perceived personal 
vulnerability over time. This, in turn, was associated with increased safe sex intentions.  
So and Nabi (2013) found identification to be the strongest predictor of reduced 
perceived social distance in their test of the RCM. Further, perceived social distance 
completely mediated the relationship between identification and personal risk 
perceptions. In a second test of the RCM, So and Shen (2015) found that perceived 
social distance fully mediated the effects of identification on the convergence of 
perceived risk between self and character. Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
posited:  
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Hypothesis 2 (H2): Perceived social distance to an at-risk character mediates 
the relationship between identification with an at-risk character and the 
discrepancy between perceptions of character-risk and self-risk. 
Transportation 
 Green, Brock, and Kaufman (2004) describe transportation into a narrative as 
“the process of temporarily leaving one’s reality behind and emerging from the 
experience somehow different from the person one was before entering the milieu of the 
narrative” (p. 315). This idea of change developing from the transportation process is 
significant given that transportation is an important mediator of persuasion. As 
mentioned in a previous chapter, the E-ELM (Slater, 2002; Slater & Rouner, 2002) 
identifies transportation as a mechanism through which an entertainment narrative can 
influence media users’ attitudes and beliefs because users are less likely to counterargue 
the narrative’s persuasive messages due to their immense absorption. Additionally, 
Green and Brock (2000) argue that transported media users are more likely to see a 
narrative as a real experience. Therefore, this realism may allow the narrative’s lessons 
to have a stronger effect on transported individuals. Past studies demonstrate that 
transportation can influence perceptions of social risk (Green & Brock, 2000) and 
personal risk (Dunlop, Wakefield, & Kashima, 2010). Research shows that individuals 
who are transported into a narrative are more likely to show attitude and belief change 
about social, health and consumer issues, than non-transported individuals (Green & 
Clark, 2013). For example Dunlop et al. (2010) found that current and former smokers 
who scored highly on the transportability scale were more likely to recall antismoking 
ads and to believe the advertisements had helped their attempts to quit smoking than 
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those who were low in transportability. In a study on health narratives about skin 
cancer, Dunlop et al. (2010) found higher transportation levels increased personal 
perceived risk of being affected by skin cancer. In another study, Murphy et al. (2011) 
reported that among other E-E variables, such as character involvement and emotional 
reaction, transportation was the best predictor of change in knowledge, attitudes, and 
behavior after viewing a lymphoma storyline on a television drama. 
Because media users feel intensely involved in a narrative, transportation may 
allow users to feel like they are in the same situation as the at-risk character, therefore 
making the character more familiar and reducing social distance. This decreased social 
distance leads to media users converging their perceived personal risk level to that of 
the at-risk character. So and Nabi’s (2013) test of the RCM found that perceived social 
distance fully mediated transportation’s effect on personal risk perceptions. However, 
with the exception of perceived realism, the connection between transportation and 
perceived social distance was weaker than the connection between other narrative 
engagement variables and perceived social distance. Further, in So and Shen’s (2015) 
test of the RCM, transportation was the only narrative engagement variable was a non-
significant path to social distance. So and Shen (2015) posited that the other narrative 
engagement variables may overlap with transportation and the simultaneous testing of 
the variables minimizes transportation’s contribution to the model. Additionally, 
because other forms of narrative engagement (e.g., PSR, identification) relate 
specifically to a character, they have a greater influence on social distance than 
transportation. As CLT posits, transportation has a more direct connection to reduce 
spatial and temporal distance, which, in turn, reduces social distance. Therefore, So and 
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Shen (2015) expected and found transportation to have a weaker association with social 
distance compared to the other engagement variables. Based on past tests of 
transportation’s role in the RCM, the following hypothesis is put forth: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Perceived social distance to an at-risk character mediates 
the relationship between transportation and the discrepancy between perceptions 
of character-risk and self-risk. 
Perceived Realism 
 Perceived realism is the degree to which an audience views a media portrayal to 
reflect real-life situations (Gerbner & Gross, 1976; Hall, 2003). Perceived realism 
includes multiple dimensions: plausibility, typicality, factuality, narrative consistency, 
and perceptual quality (Cho & Boster, 2008). Plausibility is the likelihood that the 
behaviors and events in a narrative could occur in real life (Hall, 2003). Perceived 
typicality is the degree to which the events in a narrative fall within the audience’s past 
and present experiences. Typicality is a more difficult criterion than plausibility because 
the events need to be within the realm of an audience’s everyday experiences (Hall, 
2003). Perceived factuality is the extent to which an audience views the narrative as 
depicting a specific person or event that occurred in real life (e.g., the movie Apollo 13 
portraying events based on factual information). Perceived narrative consistency is the 
extent to which a narrative is internally coherent and without contradictions (Hall, 
2003). This dimension is independent of plausibility, typicality, and factuality as its 
criteria are based on the story’s world rather than the real world. For instance, Harry 
Potter does not meet the criteria of plausibility, typicality, or factuality; however that 
series created a complex world with a congruent storyline (i.e., perceived narrative 
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consistency). Finally, perceived perceptual quality is the degree to which the structural 
components (e.g., audio, visual, and editing) of a narrative depict a convincing portrayal 
of reality (whether related to an individual’s real-life experience or not). 
Research shows that perceived realism plays an important role in media texts 
(e.g., Huesmann, Moise-Titus, Podolski, & Eron, 2003). Perceived realism stimulates 
emotional involvement, identification, and message evaluation, which, in turn, affects 
attitude change (Cho, Shen, & Wilson, 2013). Additionally, perceived realism is 
positively related to enjoyment of entertainment-education narratives (van Leeuwen, 
Renes, & Leeuwis, 2013). Perceived realism plays a role in risk research as well. 
Fishbein, Hall-Jamieson, Zimmer, von Haeften, and Nabi (2002) found that perceived 
realism of health PSAs was a strong predictor of message effectiveness. Additionally, 
Cho and Boster (2008) found that perceived realism was a significant predictor of 
perceived effect on self and message quality of mediated health content. 
 In regard to the RCM, perceived realism is thought to reduce indirectly social 
distance by minimizing perceptions of hypothetical distance, which is correlated with 
social distance (Trope & Liberman, 2010). The first test of the RCM (So & Nabi, 2013), 
found that perceived realism had no significant relationships with perceived social 
distance and personal risk perceptions in the model. However perceived realism did 
have significant negative and positive, respectively, bivariate correlations with social 
distance and personal risk perceptions. So and Nabi (2013) surmised that perceived 
realism’s operationalization (which did not include all five dimensions of the concept) 
could have caused the variable to share variance with other engagement variables, 
which, then, minimized perceived realism’s effects. Similar to personal relevance, 
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perceived realism did indirectly reduce perceived social distance by increasing 
transportation, identification, and PSI (So & Nabi, 2013). This result aligns with Cho et 
al.’s (2013) finding that certain dimensions of perceived realism (i.e., typicality, 
factuality, and perceptual quality) predict identification, with typicality being the most 
likely dimension to predict identification. Perceived realism’s influence on 
transportation is supported by Cho, Shen, and Wilson’s (2014) study, who found that 
four dimensions of perceived realism (i.e., plausibility, factuality, narrative consistency, 
and perceptual quality) predicted emotional involvement, which Cho et al. (2014) 
described as being akin to transportation. So and Shen (2015) tested perceived realism’s 
role in the RCM again and found that its effects on risk convergence were completely 
mediated by perceived social distance, and realism demonstrated a weaker association 
with social distance than identification and PSI. Based on this information, the 
following hypothesis is posited: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Perceived social distance to an at-risk character mediates 
the relationship between perceived realism and the discrepancy between 
perceptions of character-risk and self-risk. 
Personal Relevance 
Personal relevance describes the amount of personal significance or personal 
consequences a person attributes to a topic or issue (Sherif & Hovland, 1961). This 
concept is often studied in media effects and risk research but under numerous labels 
such as issue involvement (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979), personal involvement (Sherif, 
Kelly, Rodgers, Sarup, & Tittler, 1973), and personal salience (Chaffee, 1967), that tie 
closely to personal relevance. The RCM included personal relevance as an audience 
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engagement variable because past research has suggested that this concept lets 
audiences relate to the issue portrayed in the narrative (Tyler & Cook, 1984). By 
relating to a depicted problem, audience members can see how the issue applies to 
them, which can impact risk perceptions. In line with this idea, Sussman et al. (1989) 
found that when individuals were exposed to health warning messages about smokeless 
tobacco, greater personal relevance led to increased personal risk perceptions. The 
RCM predicts that increased personal relevance influences risk perceptions because it 
can reduce the perceived social distance a media user has with the at-risk media 
character (So & Nabi, 2013). This social distance is reduced when the character 
experiences a problem relevant to the user because the media user views the media 
character as similar and more familiar. This reduced social distance results in 
convergence of risk perceptions between the self and the at-risk media character. 
So and Nabi’s (2013) test of the RCM found that personal relevance was the 
third strongest predictor of reduced social distance after identification and 
transportation. Perceived social distance partially mediated the relationship between 
personal relevance and perceived personal risk, showing that personal involvement with 
a health issue faced by a character can reduce social distance and lead to risk 
convergence (So & Nabi, 2013). However, unlike identification and transportation, 
personal relevance also directly influenced personal risk perceptions. Personal 
relevance’s positive, significant influence on perceived personal risk suggests that there 
may be another mechanism, in addition to reduction of social distance, that influences 
the relationship between personal relevance and personal risk perceptions. Unlike PSI, 
identification, and transportation, personal relevance is related to involvement with the 
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topic, rather than direct connection with the character or the narrative. This involvement 
is a function of the subject matter and the characters in the story; therefore, a user can 
view the situation as relevant but may not always see the character as socially close (So 
& Nabi, 2013). The authors tested personal relevance as an exogenous variable with 
paths to PSI, identification, and transportation because narrative persuasion research 
suggests that message feature variables can facilitate character and story variables (Cho 
et al., 2013; Green, 2004). So and Nabi (2013) found that personal relevance did 
indirectly influence social distance reduction through transportation and identification. 
Personal relevance may not have reduced PSI due to a measurement issue, which will 
be discussed in the PSI section.  
Interestingly, So and Shen (2015) did not include personal relevance in their test 
of the RCM and did not explain why. This exclusion might be because personal 
relevance is a relatively stable view an audience member has about a message, whereas 
other variables such as self-referencing are affected to a greater extent by a message (de 
Graaf, 2014). Given this difference, self-referencing may be a more appropriate variable 
to consider in the RCM than personal relevance. 
Replacing Personal Relevance with Self-Referencing 
Self-referencing (Burnkrant & Unnava, 1989, 1995) is a process whereby 
individuals relate message information to oneself and personal experience during 
message processing to give the incoming messages new meaning. Both personal 
relevance and self-referencing involve the process of recognizing if a message is 
relevant or important to oneself and one’s goals. In fact, viewing a topic as personally 
relevant may result in self-referencing (de Graaf, 2014). However, self-referencing also 
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includes the process of associating incoming information with information and 
experiences already stored in one’s memory (de Graaf, 2014). Self-referencing is used 
in advertising to promote more positive attitudes to narrative ads and products, 
consequently allowing for more favorable purchase intentions (Ching, Tong, Chen, & 
Chen, 2013; Debevec & Romeo, 1992). Research demonstrates that individuals who 
engage in self-referencing use details from the narrative ads to anticipate situations in 
which the product might be beneficial (Escalas, 2004). This process of anticipating 
situations due to self-referencing can apply to risk messages. Research shows that self-
referencing can increase the effectiveness of low-fear appeal messages by stimulating 
cognitive elaborations of smoking risks (Keller & Block, 1995). Additionally, in an 
experiment comparing responses to narrative and advocacy health messages about skin 
cancer, Dunlop et al. (2010) found that self-referencing was positively associated with 
perceived personal risk and, for individuals in the narrative condition, perceptions of 
risk likelihood. Research demonstrates the role self-referencing can play in risk 
perceptions. Because self-referencing is more affected by message content than 
personal relevance, which is related more closely to stable, personal views, it is a more 
appropriate variable than personal relevance to consider as part of the RCM. While 
viewing a narrative, a self-referencing individual relates messages about a character’s 
risk to his or her personal risk situations. By relating personal experiences with those of 
the character, perceived social distance between a media user and the at-risk media 
character could decrease, which can then result in convergence of risk perceptions. 
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Hypothesis 5 (H5): Perceived social distance to an at-risk character mediates 
the relationship between self-referencing and the discrepancy between 
perceptions of character-risk and self-risk. 
PSI, PSR, and Valence 
 PSI is concept that describes a communicative interaction between a media user 
and a media figure (Horton & Wohl, 1956). In this interaction media users feel like the 
media figure is addressing them (Auter & Davis, 1991) and adjusting his or her 
behavior toward the media user even though they know the relationship is illusionary. 
This feeling of reciprocal engagement is called paracommunication (Hartmann, 2008). 
Another facet of PSI is called parasocial processing, which describes media users’ 
cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses toward media figures (Schramm & 
Hartmann, 2008). In this processing, media users do not have to feel like they are part 
of a reciprocal encounter as they do in paracommunication. While parasocial 
processing, viewers can have a range of processes occur at the same time, such as 
taking an interest in the persona, reacting to the persona’s actions, and having thoughts 
about the media figure (Schramm & Hartmann, 2008). Distinct from PSI is the concept 
of a PSR. PSRs describe a cross-situational relationship between a media user and 
figure that exists outside of the mediated event (e.g., watching the figure on television), 
whereas PSI describes the interaction during media exposure (Cohen, 2009). As a 
result, a PSI can lead to a PSR, which can influence media use motivations (e.g., 
watching a show to see a particular character) and future PSI processing (Gleich, 1997 
as cited in Hartmann, Stuke, & Daschmann, 2008). Media users can have PSIs and 
PSRs with a variety of media figures such as celebrities like sports stars (Brown & 
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Basil, 1995), newscasters (Levy, 1979), television show hosts (Lim & Kim, 2011; 
Rubin & Step, 2000), and reality stars (Tian & Yoo, 2015). 
 Past research has established the impact that parasocial phenomena with media 
figures experiencing health risks can have on audience members’ personal risk 
perceptions. In studying the effect of Earvin “Magic” Johnson’s HIV/AIDs disclosure, 
Brown and Basil (1995) noted a stronger involvement with Johnson was associated with 
greater personal apprehension about HIV/AIDs, and greater intention to change risky 
sexual behaviors. Brown and Basil measured involvement with Johnson using items 
used to assess PSI (e.g., Rubin & McHugh, 1985; Rubin, Perse, & Powell, 1987). 
However, recent studies suggest that these items designated to measure PSI are actually 
more appropriate for measuring PSR (Dibble, Hartmann, & Rosaen, 2016). 
Additionally, Papa et al. (2000) state that media users who develop PSIs with characters 
in E-E programs may engage in behavior change such as taking precautionary action 
towards risk. The RCM argues that PSI influences personal risk perceptions by reducing 
perceived social distance (So & Nabi, 2013). So & Nabi (2013) argue that, 
“if we see media personalities as our close friends, we perceive them to 
be familiar, similar to us in important ways […] and part of the same 
social group—all of which are dimensions of social distance. Therefore, 
formation of a close friendship with a mediated character should reduce 
social distance felt to the character, which in turn should increase 
personal risk perceptions of the same adverse life events experienced by 
those media characters.” (p. 320) 
 
This quote illustrates a conceptual flaw in the model as their rationale for PSI’s place in 
the RCM sounds closer to an argument testing how PSR, rather than PSI, reduces social 
distance. So and Nabi (2013) describe how a relationship with a media character 
reduces social distance rather than explaining a mediated interaction. This 
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misconceptualization is also evident through operationalization as they measured PSI 
using Rubin and Perse’s (1987) 10-item PSI scale. Although the scale is widely popular 
and has high reliability, researchers have argued that some items lack discriminant 
validity (e.g., some items measure realism and attraction) and should not be used for 
fictional characters given that it was developed for nonfictional characters (Cohen, 
2009). Additionally, the PSI scale does not match the current conceptualization of 
parasocial phenomena. When the scale was developed, researchers did not distinguish 
between PSI and PSR. However, now they do. As Schramm and Hartmann (2008) 
explain, the PSI scale items tend to focus more on PSR than PSI and also mix in other 
media user-figure relationships such as identification.  
 In the first test of the RCM, So and Nabi (2013) found that “PSI” was the 
second strongest predictor of reducing social distance but the variable had mixed effects 
in terms of its effects on personal risk perception. While PSI had a positive, indirect 
effect on risk perception, its direct effect was negative. In the second test of the RCM, 
So and Shen (2015) corrected the measurement issue by using Schramm and 
Hartmann’s (2008) parasocial-process scale and found that social distance fully 
mediated the effects of PSI on perceived risk convergence between self and character 
risk judgments.  
Although the most recent test of the RCM found support for PSI’s place in the 
model, the impact of PSI valence should be tested. Valence describes the direction 
(positive or negative) of an attitude or affective response (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994). 
Parasocial research predominately focuses on interactions or relationships with liked 
characters (Tian & Hoffner, 2010), with participants being asked to answer a parasocial 
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scale about their favorite media character or figure. However, media users can be 
involved with media figures that are not that likeable or attractive (e.g., Frank 
Underwood played by Kevin Spacey on House of Cards), which could alter the nature 
of parasocial bonds with these types of characters (Rubin & Rubin, 2001). Researchers 
have stressed the importance of considering audience engagement with “bad” characters 
(Konijn & Hoorn, 2005), as media users can develop relationships based on negative 
feelings, such as hatred or aversion for a character, and actively root against media 
figures with whom they have a negative PSR (Hartmann et al., 2008). Although 
exposure to entertainment media tends to be voluntary, media users may watch a 
program they like that includes disliked characters (e.g., villains, antagonists) that they 
interact with nonvoluntarily. Tian and Hoffner (2010) point to interpersonal research on 
nonvoluntary relationships (e.g., Hess, 2000) to explain these negative PSRs. People are 
often forced to have interactions and form relationships with people they dislike (e.g., 
family members, coworkers) due to shared circumstances or connections but tend to 
psychologically distance themselves from those disliked individuals (Hess, 2000). 
Although there is limited research on the role of valence in parasocial interaction, PSI 
valence could play a role affecting social distance and, subsequently, perceived risk 
perceptions. If a media user has a negatively valenced PSI with an at-risk character, he 
or she could seek to socially distance him- or herself from that character. This 
distancing could then lead to a divergence of perceived character- and self-risk. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are put forth: 
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Hypothesis 6 (H6): Perceived social distance to an at-risk character mediates 
the relationship between PSI with an at-risk character (controlling for valence) 
and the discrepancy between perceptions of character-risk and self-risk. 
Hypothesis 7 (H7): Valence moderates the relationship between PSI and social 
distance such that: (H7a) positively valenced PSI with an at-risk character is 
negatively related to perceived social distance toward the at-risk character, 
whereas (H7b) negatively valenced PSI with an at-risk character is positively 
related to perceived social distance toward the at-risk character. 
 Although the RCM has corrected its original misconceptualization of PSI, PSR 
may, nevertheless, play a role in the convergence process. Although PSI and PSR are 
distinct concepts, they still have important connections to each other. As Schramm and 
Wirth (2010) explained, a viewer’s first parasocial interaction with a media figure can 
establish a PSR after the initial media exposure ends or over time, after multiple 
exposures. In turn, this PSR impacts media selection processes and PSIs in subsequent 
media exposure (Klimmt, Hartmann, & Schramm, 2008). For instance, a media user 
could watch a television show he or she has never seen and have a PSI with a character 
(e.g., respond to the character during viewing or feeling like the character is talking to 
him or her). Once that episode ends, this PSI could transition into a PSR in which the 
viewer feels like he or she understands and is developing a relationship with the 
character. This PSR then influences a media user’s motivation to see the character 
again, thus leading the user to view another episode featuring the character, and have 
another PSI with that character. These repeated interactions aid relationship 
development as a media user can develop a shared history with and grow closer to a 
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media figure by understanding inside jokes or “callbacks” to past episodes, being 
familiar with a figure’s personality and past (Cohen, 2009).  
This reciprocal relationship between PSI and PSR could have implications for 
the RCM. If an individual views a narrative featuring a character with whom he or she 
already has a positive PSR, a stronger PSI could emerge, which then further lowers the 
social distance between the individual and the character, and, subsequently, influences 
risk perceptions. Conversely, if an individual views a narrative that has a character he or 
she has a negatively valenced PSR with, a stronger, negative PSI could result. This, in 
turn, would further increase social distance with the character, resulting in risk 
divergence. A strong, positive PSR with a character could also have a direct effect on 
reducing social distance, and thus increasing perceived personal risk. Therefore, the 
following hypotheses are posited: 
Hypothesis 8 (H8): Participants’ existing PSR with an at-risk character is 
positively related to strength of PSI with the at-risk character. 
Hypothesis 9 (H9): Perceived social distance to an at-risk character mediates 
the relationship between PSR with an at-risk character (controlling for valence) 
and the discrepancy between perceptions of character-risk and self-risk. 
Hypothesis 10 (H10): Valence toward an at-risk character moderates the 
relationship between PSR with an at-risk character and perceived social distance 
toward the at-risk character such that: (H10a) Positively valenced PSR with an 
at-risk character is negatively related to perceived social distance toward the at-
risk character, whereas (H10b) negatively valenced PSR with an at-risk 
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character is positively related to perceived social distance toward the at-risk 
character. 
Narrative Features and Risk Consequences 
 When considering the persuasive potential of health narratives, researchers often 
compare narratives with other kinds of messages such as statistical or informational 
messages (e.g., Dunlop et al., 2010; Greene, Campo, & Banerjee, 2010; Kopfman, 
Smith, Ah Yun, & Hodges, 1998). However, only a few studies have considered how 
different types of narrative framing influence persuasion for health behaviors (Banerjee 
& Greene, 2013). Noting this lack of research, Hinyard and Kreuter (2007) have 
suggested that researchers consider the effectiveness of narratives on dimensions such 
as fact versus fiction, first- versus third-person, interactivity, and length. Scholars have 
increased their research in this area. For instance, Nan, Dahlstrom, Richards, and 
Rangarajan (2015) examined the role of news narratives about the human 
papillomavirus (HPV) told in first-person (e.g., “I never thought I would be infected 
with HPV”) and third-person (e.g., Ashley never thought she would be infected with 
HPV”) on risk perceptions and intentions to get the HPV vaccine. Results showed that 
first-person narrative messages led to greater risk perceptions than third-person 
narratives, which indirectly increased intention to get the HPV vaccine when cost was 
not a barrier. 
 So and Nabi (2013) explored the effect narrative differences could have on risk 
perceptions in their initial test of the RCM by looking at different portrayals of risk. 
Specifically, they looked at how experienced and threatened risk events mediated the 
relationship between social distance and personal risk perceptions. Experienced risk 
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consisted of a narrative in which the at-risk character actually experienced the negative 
health event (e.g., testing positive for an STD). Threatened risk described a narrative in 
which the at-risk character felt the threat of experiencing a negative health event, but 
avoided the actual event (e.g., worried about having an STD but eventually tested 
negative for one). So and Nabi (2013) found that perceived social distance was 
negatively related to personal risk perceptions for both depictions of risk. However, 
they emphasized that threatened risk depictions could send a counterproductive message 
about risk, as the at-risk character did not experience negative consequences for 
engaging in risky behavior. Using the same stimuli to test the RCM, So and Shen 
(2015) found that narrative type did have an effect on risk convergence. Rather than 
referring to the differing narrative depictions as experienced versus threatened, So and 
Shen (2015) named the conditions positive versus negative, respectively, which 
described at-risk characters testing positive or negative for an STD. In a departure from 
So and Nabi’s (2013) results, So and Shen (2015) found that decreased social distance 
led to risk convergence in the negative condition but the predicted effect was not 
significant for the positive condition, although in the predicted direction. The authors 
suggested that the negative and taboo connotation of a positive STD test could have 
activated defense mechanisms, which, in turn, influenced convergence. 
There is not much research on how framing of narrative endings affects risk 
behavior. Moyer-Gusé, Jain, and Chung (2012) examined how explicit appeals in the 
form of a PSA from a narrative’s main character, placed at the end of a narrative 
persuasion message, impacted attitudes toward drinking and driving. Results showed 
that explicit appeals at the end of an E-E narrative resulted in significantly less positive 
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drinking and driving attitudes for males but did not have a significant effect for females. 
Banerjee and Greene (2012) conducted an experiment that manipulated a persuasive 
narrative to either have a progressive or regressive ending. A progressive ending is a 
“success” story that frames an ending so that the protagonist learns from his or her 
mistakes and demonstrates a redeeming behavior. This ending can directly or indirectly 
persuade an audience to behave similarly to the character (Banerjee & Greene, 2012; 
Smorti, 2004). A regressive ending is more negative than a progressive ending because 
it chronicles the failure of a character who realizes his or her poor choices led to his or 
her miserable state (Banerjee & Greene, 2012). Banerjee and Greene (2013) found that 
narratives with progressive endings were associated with more transportation than 
narratives with regressive endings. Additionally, greater transportation was connected 
to stronger, negative expectancies about the character’s risk behavior (cocaine use), 
which were linked to lower behavioral intentions to use cocaine. 
The way traditional E-E programs set up narratives is similar to progressive and 
regressive framing. E-E programs usually use three types of characters to demonstrate 
behaviors and subsequent consequences. Positive characters engage in prosocial 
actions, negative characters reject prosocial behaviors, and transitional characters move 
from negative actions to positive behavior through the series, after initially resisting the 
positive behavior (Singhal, Wang, & Rogers, 2013). By observing all of these 
characters and the outcomes of their actions, people can learn about the behavior at 
hand. Transitional characters are particularly important models because audience 
members may better identify with that character’s uncertainty about the action to take 
(Pajares, Prestin, Chen, & Nabi, 2009). By feeling similar to the character, audience 
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members may pay more attention to their behaviors, which can cause media users to 
internalize a character’s attitudes and behaviors. Through this internalization of 
behaviors, viewers increase their self-efficacy level and feel motivated to perform the 
modeled action (Bandura, 2004). This three character strategy has been used 
successfully in many E-E campaigns around the world (Singhal et al., 2004). However, 
this strategy is difficult to incorporate into media saturated environments such as those 
in the United States because the E-E messages are often single episodes rather than an 
entire series (Sherry, 2002). Given this difference of how characters and stories are 
presented in media saturated environments, further examination of how E-E storylines 
work in condensed format that does not include all three character roles is important.  
A common E-E narrative structure in U.S. television programs is the cautionary 
tale, in which a character engages in a negative or risky behavior and experiences 
consequences, as a result (Marett, 2015). This type of narrative can serve as a warning 
to media users that, to avoid negative outcomes, they must adopt a prosocial attitude or 
behavior. An example of a cautionary tale in entertainment media is an episode of 
Friends in which Rachel (played by Jennifer Aniston) became pregnant after a condom 
broke. This single episode demonstrates how people can learn from cautionary 
narratives. A survey found that adolescents who watched the episode reported lasting 
knowledge about condom efficacy and condom failure rates (Collins, Elliott, Berry, 
Kanouse, & Hunter, 2003). Although cautionary tales can promote learning, recently 
researchers have questioned how this prosocial learning works when a villain or 
disliked character is the one experiencing the consequences in a cautionary tale (Marett, 
2015).  
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Disposition theory (Raney, 2004) states that people’s dispositions toward 
characters impact their overall enjoyment of media content. Disposition research 
explains that media users serve as “moral monitors” that constantly evaluate whether or 
nor a character’s behavior is ethically sound or justified (Zillmann, 2000). Media users 
form positive dispositions (i.e., liking) toward characters whose actions are deemed 
justifiable and form negative dispositions (i.e., disliking) toward characters whose 
behaviors are not justified (Raney, 2004). Media users feel enjoyment when liked 
characters succeed or experience positive outcomes and disliked characters fail or 
experience negative outcomes (Zillmann, 2000). Additionally, affective disposition can 
influence media users emotional involvement with a character. For instance, people can 
empathize with liked characters, but are less likely to do so with disliked characters 
(Raney, 2004). Empathy is defined as sharing another person’s subjective experience 
(Campbell & Babrow, 2004). Empathy entails understanding a person’s situation by 
sharing his or her thoughts, emotions, and perspective, whereas emotions like sympathy 
involve being concerned for a person but not sharing his or her feelings (Campbell & 
Babrow, 2004). As mentioned when discussing a narrative engagement variable 
identification, empathy is a dimension of identification (Cohen, 2001). Therefore, 
because affective disposition affects empathy, it should influence identification with the 
character as well. Using this logic, Marett (2015) predicted and found that positive 
affective disposition toward a character in a cautionary tale positively influenced 
identification, which, in turn, was associated with increased perceived self-risk. 
Although this study did not explicitly test for social distance with the character, Marett 
(2015) suggested that negative affective disposition could cause people to distance 
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themselves emotionally from the character, which, in turn, could influence risk 
perceptions because people are also distancing themselves from the character’s 
consequences. This distancing would have important implications for how E-E 
messages choose characters for cautionary tales. The following hypotheses are put 
forth: 
Hypothesis 11 (H11): Identification with an at-risk character mediates the 
relationship between affective disposition toward the character and social 
distance to the character. 
Hypothesis 12 (H12): Perceptions that the at-risk character deserved the 
consequences of his or her risky behavior mediates the relationship between 
affective disposition toward an at-risk character and perceptions of personal risk. 
In addition to looking at character variation, this dissertation will explore how 
variations in narrative endings influence risk perceptions. This study will use the same 
narrative storyline about a character involved in a drunk driving accident but feature 
different endings: uncertain, denial, and apology. The first narrative depicts the at-risk 
character engaging in risky behavior (riding with a drunk driver) and the consequences 
of that action (getting in a car accident), but does not show whether the character 
survives the crash. The other two narratives show the risky behavior, the crash, and the 
injuries of the main character. The second narrative ends with the main character not 
accepting that her actions led to the negative event, but instead claiming it was an 
accident and no one’s fault. The third narrative depicts the evolution of the character by 
showing her engaging in risky behavior, suffering the consequences of the behavior, 
and, finally, accepting the need to change her behavior, and apologizing for her actions. 
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Although research on how narrative endings and character development influence 
persuasion is a growing area, there is not much research related to how this study 
frames the stimuli’s endings. 
Research Question 1 (RQ1): Is there a relationship between perceived social 
distance to an at-risk character and the discrepancy between perceptions of 
character-risk and self-risk across all three narrative conditions? 
Duration of Effects 
In addition to testing new components of the RCM, this project will examine 
long-term changes in attitudes and perceptions toward risk. Although most media 
effects studies measure attitudes after immediate exposure (Green & Clark, 2013), E-E 
research suggests that entertainment media can have a long-term influence on actions 
such as health behaviors (Vaughan, Rogers, Singhal, & Swalehe, 2000). Additionally, 
some studies have found evidence of the sleeper effect in humorous messages (Nabi, 
Moyer-Gusé, & Byrne, 2007). Narratives may play a key role in lengthening effects. 
Results from Moyer-Gusé and Nabi’s (2010) study showed that identification with 
characters in a narrative was positively related to an increase in perceived vulnerability 
to unplanned pregnancy two weeks after message exposure. However, in the non-
narrative condition, identification led to an immediate increase in perceived 
vulnerability but did not demonstrate a lasting effect. Given this limited evidence on the 
role of narratives in creating durable effects, it is warranted to look at the potency of the 
risk convergence process. Therefore, the following research question is proposed. 
Research Question 2 (RQ2): Do personal risk perceptions regress back to their 
original state over time? 
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Chapter 6: Method 
Study Design 
To test the hypotheses and answer the research questions described previously, a 
study was conducted to investigate how the RCM applies to negatively valenced 
characters and how storyline structure affects risk perception. Character valence was 
manipulated by having participants read either a positive or negative description of a 
main character prior to watching a video clip. Additionally, the ending of the video was 
edited to contain different endings to the same storyline. The study used a 2 (character 
valence: positive, negative) x 3 (narrative ending frame: uncertain, denial, apology) 
between-subjects experimental design, resulting in 6 experimental conditions. The 
stimuli were created from two episodes of the television show Parenthood and focused 
on the storyline of a teenage girl who was injured in a drinking and driving accident. 
Two weeks after the initial in-lab study, participants had the option to complete a 
posttest, which examined the duration of risk convergence effects.  
Pilot Study 
Participants  
A pilot study was conducted to pre-test reliabilities of certain measures, check 
survey flow, and test the experimental stimuli. The 234 participants ranged in age from 
20 to 69 years (M = 35.72 years, SD =10.84 years, Mdn = 33.00 years). Males (n = 120) 
comprised 51.3% of the sample and females (n = 114) made up the remaining 48.7%. 
One hundred eighty-nine were White/Caucasian, 10 were Black or African American, 
17 were Hispanic and 13 were Asian. Additionally two participants identified 
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themselves as some other ethnicity, and three preferred to not answer the question. The 
sample represented 38 different states, with 80 participants from the South, 57 from the 
West, 44 from the Northeast, 52 from the Midwest, and one participant preferred not to 
disclose their location. Two participants had not finished high school, 33 completed 
high school or a GED, 62 completed some college, 30 completed a two-year degree, 81 
had completed a four-year degree, 19 had a master’s degree, two had a doctoral degree, 
and five reported having a professional degree (e.g., a medical degree or juris 
doctorate).  
Procedures 
Participants were recruited using Mechanical Turk (MTurk), the crowdsourcing 
feature of Amazon.com. The Institutional Review Board (IRB)-approved study was 
advertised on MTurk as a Human Intelligence Task (HIT) available for MTurk users in 
the United States (“workers”) to complete in exchange for $1.00 (United States). The 
pilot filtered participants based on their past MTurk performance so that only workers 
with a 95 percent or higher HIT approval rate could participate in the pilot. Research 
indicates that MTurk is a valid setting for experiments (e.g., Eriksson & Simpson, 2010; 
Mason & Watts, 2009, June).   
 The pilot study’s procedures and requirements were advertised in its HIT 
description on MTurk. MTurk workers who accepted the HIT and clicked on a link 
were brought to the study on Qualtrics.com. The first page of the study was a consent 
form, which detailed the risks and benefits of participating in the study, study duration, 
a description of the study, and eligibility restrictions. Participants were offered one US 
dollar in exchange for their participation. At the end of the consent form, participants 
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could either agree or decline to participate in the study. Participants who declined to 
participate were directed to the end of the survey, while participants who agreed were 
then asked screening questions to determine eligibility. The screening questions ensured 
that participants were at least 18 years old and resided in the United States, but not 
Oklahoma (to reduce the chance that a student from the university where the main study 
was conducted could participate in both the pilot and the main study). Only two 
participants did not pass the screening questions and were not permitted to move on in 
the study.  
Participants who passed the screening questions completed a series of measures 
about social desirability, drinking demographics, personal risk perception, past exposure 
to stimuli, and parasocial relationship with the actress. Then, they were randomly 
assigned to read a short paragraph about the main character they were about to see in a 
video and indicate their feelings toward that character (i.e. character valence). Then, 
participants were asked to watch a randomly assigned video (uncertain, denial, or 
apology). The stimuli tested in the pilot study were 2-3 minute video conditions 
comprised of scenes from two final episodes of the second season of the television 
drama Parenthood. The episodes were edited to focus on the story arc of Amber Holt 
(played by Mae Whitman), a teenager who was injured in a drunk driving accident. The 
stimuli consisted of three video conditions that in this study featured three different 
endings.  After viewing the video, participants completed the posttest survey. The 
posttest measured character valence, perceived realism, PSR with the character, PSI 
with the character, perceived social distance, personal and character-risk perceptions 
related to the health topic, and asked some follow-up stimuli exposure questions.  
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Character Valence Manipulation 
Character valence was manipulated prior to viewing the stimuli. Participants 
were asked to read a paragraph describing Amber, the main character in the stimuli. A 
picture of Amber was positioned next to the paragraph. The paragraph was introduced 
with the following statement, “You are about to watch a video that focuses on the 
character Amber Holt. Please read the following background information about Amber 
before watching the video. You will be tested on how closely you read the paragraph.” 
Both paragraphs contained accurate statements about the character so that participants 
who had seen the show and were familiar with the character were not distracted with 
false information about Amber. 
Positive valence paragraph. The positive valence condition featured the 
following paragraph: “Amber is a good person. She is very close with her brother Drew 
and is a protective and supportive big sister. Also, Amber has Amber has made some 
poor choices in the past, but she owns up to them and attempts to rectify the situations 
and the people she has hurt. Amber is experiencing some tension with her mother and in 
the clip you are about to watch, decided to blow off some steam and hang out with a 
friend.” 
Negative valence paragraph. The negative valence condition featured the 
following paragraph: “Amber is an extremely rebellious teenager. For instance, she 
skipped her SATs and fights a lot with her mother. Additionally, Amber slept with her 
cousin Haddie’s boyfriend, which caused the two girls to get into a fight at school and 
created a lot of tension within the family. Amber has been acting out recently by 
smoking, drinking, and doing drugs. In the clip you are about to watch, Amber just got 
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into a huge fight with her mother and decided to hang out with a friend to avoid going 
home.” 
Video Stimuli 
Three videos were tested in the pilot study. All videos began with the scene of 
Amber’s friend Gary drinking and driving with Amber in the passenger seat. Gary 
speeds down an empty street while he and Amber talk and pass a flask back-and-forth. 
Gary runs a stoplight and a sports utility vehicle (SUV) violently t-bones into Amber’s 
side of the car. 
The uncertain condition cut from the crash to a scene in which Amber’s mother 
wakes up in the middle of the night due to a phone call, presumably from the hospital. 
The video then cut to Amber’s family gathered in the emergency room lobby crying. In 
this condition, participants or the audience do not know the status of Amber’s condition 
after the crash. 
The denial condition cuts from the crash scene to a scene showing Amber 
recovering from her injuries at home. In this scene, Amber’s mother talks to her about 
the consequences of drinking and driving but Amber is resistant during the conversation 
and does not acknowledge the role alcohol played in the crash, instead claiming that it 
was just an accident. 
The apology condition features the same scenes as the denial condition but also 
added a final scene of Amber demonstrating her understanding of the consequences of 
drinking and driving. Specifically, after talking to her mother, the video cuts to a scene 
in which Amber apologizes to her mother and promises to change and be safer. 
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Measures 
 The following measures were used in the pilot study. Table 2 lists the 
descriptive statistics for the pilot’s scales, whereas Appendix A presents the items used. 
 Social desirability. Social desirability is a control variable because participants 
answered questions about health behaviors that are socially frowned upon (e.g., drunk 
driving) and illegal. This variable was measured using the Crowne and Marlowe (1960) 
Form-C, 13-item, 7-point (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree) scale, which 
evaluates a person’s tendency to provide responses that depict oneself in a face-saving 
light. Sample items include, “I am always courteous, even to people who are 
disagreeable,” and “I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s 
feelings.” 
 Drinking demographics. Participants were asked about their general drinking 
habits. Participants answered the following questions, which defined “a drink” as a 12-
oz (360 mL) bottle or can of beer, a 4-oz glass of wine (120 mL), a 12-oz (360 mL) 
bottle or can of wine cooler, or a shot of liquor (1.25 oz or 37 mL) either straight up or 
in a mixed drink: (1) “How many times have you had five or more drinks on the same 
occasion?”, (2) “How many times have you had four drinks (but no more than that) on 
the same occasion?”, (3) “How would you best describe yourself in terms of your 
current use of alcohol?,” options included: Abstainer, abstainer—former problem 
drinker in recovery, infrequent drinker, light drinker, moderate drinker, heavy drinker, 
problem drinker, (4) “When did you last have a drink (that is more than just a few 
sips)?” The answer choices were: I have never had a drink, Not in the past year, More 
than 30 days ago, but in the past year, More than a week ago, but in the past 30 days, 
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Within the last week). Descriptive data for these demographics are reported below in 
Table 1. 
Table 1. Pilot Study: Drinking Demographics  
Item None Once Twice 3 to 5 6 to 9 10+ 
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Note. N = 234. 
 
Risk perception. Risk perception related to drinking and driving was measured 
similar to how So and Shen (2015) measured risk perception of contracting an STD. 
Participants were asked to make probability judgments of their and the at-risk 
character’s likelihood of experiencing negative repercussions related to drinking and 
driving. Participants filled out the risk perception measures related to their personal risk 
in the pretest and posttest. Participants indicated their perception of the at-risk 
character’s risk in the posttest. Estimates were made using a percentage scale that 
ranged from 0% (not at risk at all) to 100% (extremely high risk) for statements such as 
“I believe that my chances of: injury from drinking and driving are…,” and “injury 
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from riding in a car with someone who is drinking and driving are….” The statements 
were averaged. 
Past exposure to stimuli and character. Past exposure to both the television 
series Parenthood and the specific episode in the study were assessed. Participants were 
asked to answer, “How many episodes of Parenthood have you seen in total?” and 
“Have you seen the episode of Parenthood featured in the video before?”. Only 45 
(19.2%) participants had seen an episode of Parenthood. Additionally, only 10 (4.3%) 
people watched the whole series. Further, the majority (n = 220; 94%) of participants 
had not seen the specific episodes featured in the stimuli. These statistics provided the 
researcher with a rough idea of the television show’s popularity, which could indicate if 
most participants in the full study were familiar with the show. Additionally, 
participants were asked to answer, “How familiar were you with the character of Amber 
before viewing this clip?” The majority (n = 199; 85%) were not at all familiar with the 
featured character.  
Recognition of and familiarity with the actress. Prior to watching the stimuli, 
participants were asked to indicate their recognition of and familiarity with the actress 
Mae Whitman who was featured in the clips. Only 66 participants recognized the 
actress, whereas 17 (7.3%) were unsure, and 151 (64.5%) did not recognize her. 
Additionally, participants were asked to indicate their familiarity with the actress on a 
5-item, 5-point (1 = never; 5 = all of the time) scale. Sample questions included “I 
watch/have watched TV shows she is on,” and “I read about her online.”  
PSR with the actress. Due to the limited amount of research on valence and 
PSR, there is not an established scale specifically designed to measure positive and 
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negative parasocial relationships concurrently. However, Hartmann et al. (2008) 
designed two separate scales to measure positive and negative PSRs with sports figures. 
These two scales were developed from past research and demonstrated good reliability. 
These two scales were modified to measure PSRs with television actors on a 5-point (1 
= strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) scale. The positive PSR scale consisted of 13-
items, and the negative PSR scale inverted the statements from the positive scale, while 
also dropping two items that, when inverted, did not reflect negative PSR well. Sample 
items include, “I think Amber is like an old friend” and “I find Amber to be likeable.” 
Valence toward the main character. Character valence was measured after 
reading the paragraph about the character and after watching the stimulus video, using 
Dibble and Rosaen’s (2011) character liking scale. Sample items included “I like 
Amber” and “I admire Amber” and were rated on a 5-point (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = 
strongly agree) scale.  
Perceived realism. Perceived realism of the stimuli was measured using Cho et 
al.’s (2014) perceived realism scale, which measures the concept on five dimensions 
(plausibility, typicality, factuality, narrative consistency, and perceptual quality). The 
scale consists of 18 items on a 7-point (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree) scale. 
Cho et al.’s scale was developed to measure perceived realism in public service 
announcements, thus some wording was modified to fit this study’s stimuli. Sample 
items include, “Real people would not do the things shown in the video,” “The video 
portrayed an event that happens to a lot of people,” and “The acting in the video was 
realistic.” 
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PSR with character. PSR with the character was measured using Tukachinsky’s 
(2010) 13-item, 5-point (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) scale. The items 
used compose two dimensions, friendship communication and friendship support. 
Sample items include, “I think Amber could be a friend of mine” and “If Amber was a 
real person, I would be able to count on her in times of need.”  
PSI with the character. Parasocial interaction was measured using the shortened, 
English-language versions of the PSI-Process Scales (Schramm & Hartmann, 2008). 
The original scale consisted of 112 items, which was too long for this study. Instead, the 
researcher used a shortened version of the scale similar to how Dibble et al. (2016) did. 
The shortened scale consisted of six cognitive and eight affective items. Participants 
completed a 5-point (1 = not at all; 5 = very much) PSI scale. The PSI scale measured 
the cognitive (e.g., “I kept asking myself how things would evolve around Amber”), 
and affective (e.g., “Amber left me rather sober and unaffected” reverse-coded) aspects 
of PSI. 
Perceived social distance from the at-risk character was measured using So and 
Shen’s (2015) social distance scale and a modified version of Bogardus’ (1933) social 
distance scale. The So & Shen (2015) measure of social distance reflects the level 
perceived dissimilarity between the participant and at-risk character, whereas 
Bogardus’s (1933) scale operationalizes social distance as the level of desired physical 
distance from or closeness to people like the at-risk character. For both the So and Shen 
(2015) and Bogardus (1933) scales, responses were averaged to form a measure of 
perceived social distance so that a higher score reflected higher levels of perceived 
social distance. 
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Perceived social distance (So & Shen, 2015). Participants were asked to respond 
to five statements on a 5-point (1 = very similar; 5 = very dissimilar) scale. Participants 
were asked to rate the level of similarity between themselves and Amber in terms of 
lifestyle, daily experience, ways of interacting with other people, and health behaviors 
(specifically related to the stimuli).  
Perceived social distance (Bogardus, 1933). Perceived social distance from the 
at-risk character was measured using a modified version of Bogardus’ (1933) social 
distance scale. Participants were asked to respond to six statements on a 7-point (1 = 
definitely willing; 7 = definitely unwilling) scale. Sample statements items ask 
participants how willing they would be to have someone like Amber as a neighbor, 
work in the same office as Amber, or have their future children marry someone like her.  
Results 
Data Quality. A concern with using participant pools like MTurk is the quality 
of data provided by these respondents (Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013). The pilot 
study ensured data quality in two ways: high-reputation (95 percent or higher HIT) 
restrictions and attention check questions (ACQs). When a worker completes a HIT, the 
HIT requester can approve or reject the worker’s submission. Generally, requesters only 
reject submissions when the worker does not follow directions or submits wrong 
answers (Mason & Suri, 2012). The rejection means that the worker does not get 
compensated for the work and it affects the worker’s HIT approval statistics. Research 
suggests that high-reputation levels are a reliable indicator of data quality (Peer, 
Vosgerau, & Acquisti, 2014). Therefore, by setting the approval rate at 95 percent or 
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higher, this study was only available to workers who have a solid reputation for 
completing HITs properly.  
Research demonstrates that using ACQs can help filter out inattentive 
respondents and improve data quality (Aust, Diedenhofen, Ullrich, & Musch, 2013). 
While taking the survey, participants answered five ACQs to ensure that they actually 
read the survey questions, read the valence paragraph, and watched the video. Three 
reading checks consisted of statements like “select strongly agree for this answer.” The 
paragraph and video questions were content questions about the material the participant 
just read or watched. For instance, “What country did Amber talk about visiting in the 
video?” In total, 300 participants completed the pilot study, however 66 were excluded 
from analyses because they answered incorrectly at least one of the ACQs. 
Reliabilities. Scale reliability for the pilot measures was evaluated with 
Cronbach’s alpha to examine internal consistency. According to Kline (1999), scales 
with a Cronbach’s alpha value equal to or greater than .70 are considered acceptable.  
Table 2. Pilot Study: Descriptive Statistics and Cronbach’s Alpha for Variables 
Variables M SD Range α 
Social desirability 3.94 1.02 1-7 .86 
Personal risk perception 10.25 21.67 1-100 .96 
Familiarity with actress 1.25 0.42 1-5 .75 
PSR with actress (positive)a 2.53 0.58 1-5 .87 
PSR with actress (negative)b 2.86 0.28 1-5 .53 
Character valence (post-paragraph) 2.83 1.09 1-5 .95 
Character valence (post-video) 2.75 0.98 1-5 .93 
Perceived realism 5.69 0.85 1-7 .94 
PSR with character 2.28 0.93 1-5 .86 
PSI with character 2.57 0.64 1-5 .78 
Social distance (So & Shen, 2015) 5.85 1.20 1-7 .87 
Social distance (modified Bogardus) 4.65 1.55 1-7 .95 
Post personal risk perception 8.20 17.31 1-100 .96 
Character risk perception 71.40 25.83 1-100 .95 




Manipulation check and stimuli tests. The purpose of this pilot test was to ensure 
that the valence manipulation worked and that the video clips were comparable. 
Participants were exposed to video clips and answered questions assessing narrative 
involvement variables and social distance. Several ANCOVAs were conducted to test 
the comparability of the stimuli across engagement variables.  
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare character valence in 
the positive and negative paragraph conditions. There was a significant difference of 
character valence for the positive condition (M = 3.67, SD = .54) and negative condition 
(M = 1.93, SD = .77), t (232)= -20.03, p < .001, indicating that the paragraph’s valence 
manipulation worked.  
A 2 (paragraph valence) x 3 (narrative ending) ANCOVA on social distance, 
controlling for number of episodes seen and character familiarity was conducted to 
examine whether the paragraph valence and/or narrative ending conditions or the 
interaction of the two influenced perceived social distance with the character. Table 3 
below provides the descriptive statistics adjusted due to the covariates. Levene’s test for 
homogeneity of variance was not significant, F(5, 228) = 1.18, p = .32. Also, the 
covariates of number of episodes of Parenthood seen and character familiarity were not 
significant. The model did not have a significant interaction, F(2, 226) = 1.14, p = .322, 
η2 = .009. However, both main effects were significant. Paragraph valence accounted 
for 8 percent of the variance in the posttest, F(1, 226) = 21.71, p < .001, η2 = .08; 
narrative ending accounted for 5.6 percent of the variance, F (2, 226) = 7.43, p = .001, 
η2 = .056. Pairwise comparisons of estimated marginal means were explored for both 
main effects. For paragraph valence, the positively valenced paragraph condition was 
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associated with less perceived social distance than the negatively valenced paragraph 
condition (p < .001; see Table 3 for estimated marginal means). For narrative ending 
conditions, the denial condition was associated with more perceived social distance than 
both the uncertain (p = .10), which is not significant, and apology (p < .001) endings. 
The uncertain condition was associated with greater social distance than the apology 
condition, but the conditions were not significantly different (p = .42). 
Table 3. Pilot Study: Descriptive Statistics for Paragraph Valence and Narrative 
Endings 
  Narrative ending (video conditions)  
  Uncertain Denial Apology  








































Note. On the top row of each cell, the adjusted means and standard errors (parenthetical) 
are reported. The number of participants is noted on the bottom row.  
 
Another 2 (paragraph valence) x 3 (narrative ending) ANCOVA on PSI with the 
character, controlling for familiarity with the character was conducted. The purpose of 
this test was to examine whether any of the three conditions affected PSI. The Levene’s 
test for homogeneity of variance was not significant F(5, 228) = 0.99, p = .42. Character 
familiarity was not a significant factor influencing level of PSI with the character, F(1, 
227) = 2.65, p = .11. The model did not yield a significant interaction effect between 
paragraph valence and narrative ending on PSI, F(2, 227) = 0.01, p = .99. Neither main 
effect was significant: paragraph valence, F(1, 227) = .06, p = .80; and narrative ending, 
F(2, 227) = .97, p = .38. 
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Conclusions 
After observing that the video conditions did not interact significantly with PSI, 
the researcher considered whether the short video lengths might have affected the 
ability to engage with the character and the narrative. For the main study, the videos 
were lengthened so that the uncertain condition was 4:12 minutes, denial was 5:37 
minutes, and apology was 6:47 minutes. Lengthening the videos was challenging as 
most footage from the episodes leading up to the drinking and driving storyline 
portrayed Amber in a negative light. The researcher was careful about what footage was 
added so that Amber would still be semi-likeable. With this goal in mind, the added 
footage included scenes of Amber being sad and talking to her mom, her being 
irresponsible at her aunt’s law firm and quitting (which also mentions her not getting 
into college), and her arguing with her mom and showing regret for the actions at the 
law firm. These scenes were added to the beginning of all of the conditions and set the 
tone that Amber is acting out because she did not get into college. 
In addition to lengthening the video clips for each condition, two measures used 
in the pilot were changed for the final study. First, the factuality dimension of the 
perceived realism scale was removed because the questions (e.g., “the video was based 
on facts,” “what was shown in the video had actually happened”) did not seem 
appropriate given that the video was a fictional narrative. Second, the PSR with actress 
scale was changed from the Hartmann et al. (2008) scale to Bocarnea and Brown’s 
(2007) celebrity-persona parasocial identification scale (CPPI). The Bocarnea and 
Brown scale is “designed to measure how media consumers form parasocial 
relationships with celebrities or popular fictional characters” (p. 309). Although the 
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Hartmann et al. (2008) scale was designed to look at PSR strength and valence, the way 
the scale was originally used did not suit the nature of this study as the scale usually 
asks participants to evaluate favorite and least favorite actors on separate scales, rather 
than a combined scale. In the pilot study for this dissertation, participants were assigned 
to the positive and negative scales based on their liking of the actress (on a 6-point 
scale). However, because many participants did not have strong feelings about the 
actress either way, perhaps due to their lack of familiarity with her, the results of the 
separate scales seemed murky. The CPPI scale paired with a separate valence question 
were used in the main study because this scale measured strength of PSR on one scale.  
Main Study 
The purpose of this study was to test the theoretical model of the RCM. 
However, a college sample was chosen for this study due to the relevance of the health 
issue specific to this age group. Although drinking and driving occurs across ages and 
demographics, in fatal crashes, the highest percentage (30%) of drivers with BACs at or 
above the legal driving limit fall into the 21-24-year-old age group (NCSA, 2015). 
Additionally, in fatal crashes, 17 percent of drivers with BACs at or above the legal 
driving are in the 16 to 20-year-old age group (NCSA, 2015). 
Participants 
Participants in the study ranged from 18 to 61 years (M = 20.78, SD = 3.41). 
Males (n = 93) comprised 34.2% of the sample and females (n = 179) composed the 
remaining 65.8%. Two-hundred and five participants were White/Caucasian, 16 were 
Black or African American, 13 were Asian, and nine were Native American. 
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Additionally four participants identified themselves as some other race and three 
preferred to not answer the question. 
Procedures 
Interested students signed up for the first phase of the study online and came to 
an on-campus computer lab to participate. In the computer lab, participants were asked 
to read and sign the study’s online consent form. Participants then began the study using 
the Qualtrics survey software. First, participants completed the pretest study, which 
measured the following: social desirability, sensation seeking, experience with the 
health topic, past behaviors related to the health topic, familiarity and PSR with actress 
in stimuli, personal risk perceptions related to the health topic. Additional questions 
about health topics (e.g., prescription drug abuse, smoking habits) unrelated to the 
stimuli were included to distract from the study’s focus.  
After the pretest, participants were randomly assigned to a valence condition 
(positive or negative) and asked to read a short paragraph about the character they were 
about to see in the video, answer a verification question to ensure they read the 
paragraph, and indicate their feelings toward the character. The paragraphs were the 
same ones used in the pilot study. Participants then watched a randomly assigned video 
(revised from the pilot study) with either an uncertain, denial, or apology ending, 
answer a verification question to make sure they watched the stimuli, and indicate their 
feelings toward the character. The online survey software randomly assigned 
participants to one of the six experimental conditions: Positive valence/uncertain ending 
(n = 35), positive valence/denial ending (n = 51), positive valence/apology ending (n = 
49), negative valence/uncertain ending (n = 43), negative valence/denial ending (n = 
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41), and negative valence/apology ending (n = 53). After answering the video 
verification question, participants completed the posttest survey. 
The posttest measured the following: past exposure to the stimuli, self-
referencing, transportation, identification, PSI with the character, PSR with the 
character, affective disposition, deservedness, perceived realism, perceived social 
distance, risk perception of self and character, self-efficacy, experience with drinking 
and driving consequences (e.g., car accident, DUI), and demographics.  
To test for the duration of effects, Phase I participants who indicated interest in 
taking another survey for a chance to win a gift card in a raffle were contacted via email 
and asked to complete an online, follow-up posttest two weeks after completing the first 
portion of the study. A two-week delay was selected, as it is a standard period used for 
duration checks in media effects studies (e.g., Appel & Richter, 2007; Moyer-Gusé, 
Chung, & Jain, 2011; Moyer-Gusé & Nabi, 2010; Murphy, Frank, Chatterjee, & 
Baezconde-Garbanati, 2013). A total of 47 people participated in the delayed posttest. 
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 62 years (M = 21.94, SD = 6.63). Males (n = 11) 
comprised 23.4% of the sample and females (n = 36) made up the remaining 76.6%. 
Thirty-seven participants were White/Caucasian, two were Black or African American, 
one was Asian, and two were Native American. One identified as “other,” and another 
preferred not to answer. 
Those individuals who choose to participate in the follow-up posttest were 
directed to the study’s Qualtrics page for Phase II and asked to read a consent form. 
After consenting to participate, individuals were asked to recall the health topic in the 
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stimuli, to indicate whether they had discussed the message with anyone after the study, 
and to complete the risk perception and self-efficacy measures. 
Chosen Stimuli 
Character valence paragraphs. The paragraphs used to manipulate character 
valence prior to viewing the stimuli were identical to the paragraphs used in the pilot 
study. 
Video stimuli. As mentioned in the conclusions of the pilot study, the video 
stimuli were lengthened from 2-3 minutes to 4 to almost 7 minutes in length. The basic 
storyline and three conditions (uncertain, denial, and apology) remained the same. 
However, the same footage was added to the beginning of each condition to allow for 
more interaction with Amber and longer engagement in the narrative. 
Measures 
 Social desirability, drinking demographics, risk perception, past exposure to the 
stimuli and character, recognition of and familiarity with the actress, valence toward the 
main character, PSR with the character, PSI with the character, and perceived social 
distance were measured in the same way they were measured in the pilot study, 
although the scales for valence, PSR, and PSI were changed from 5-point scales to 7-
point scales. The scales described below include measures that were either not used in 
the pilot or were revised after the pilot study (i.e., PSR with the actress and perceived 
realism). See Appendix B and Appendix C for the specific scale items used in the main 
study and delayed posttest, respectively. 
Drinking demographics. Participants were asked about their general drinking 
habits, using the same questions included in the pilot study. Descriptive data for these 
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demographics are reported in Table 4. Please note that no participant indicated that they 
were an “abstainer—former problem drinker in recovery” when asked “How would you 
best describe yourself in terms of your current use of alcohol?” Therefore, the category 
was removed from the table for easier readability.  
Table 4. Main Study: Drinking Demographics 
Item None Once Twice 3 to 5 6 to 9 10+ 
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Note. N = 272. 
 
Experience with health topic. Participants were asked about their personal and 
indirect experience with drinking and driving. Participants were asked to report their 
alcohol use and driving practices using a measure of drinking and driving activities 
adapted from Wechsler, Lee, Nelson, and Lee (2003). Participants were asked the 
following questions: “In the past 30 days, how many times did you engage in each of 
the following drinking and driving behaviors?” (1) “Driving after drinking any alcohol,” 
(2) “Driving after having more than 5 drinks,” (3) “Riding with a driver who had been 
drinking,” and (4) “Riding with a driver who had too much to drink.”  
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Additional questions regarding safe transportation practices after drinking were 
also included. These questions were “In the past 30 days, how many times did you 
engage in the following behaviors?” (1) “Ride with a designated driver,” (2) “Serve as a 
designated driver,” (3) “Call a friend, taxi, Safe Ride, or Uber rather than drink and 
drive.” All questions were answered with the scale (1) None, (2) Once, (3) Twice, (4) 3 
to 5 times, (5) 6 to 9 times, and (6) 10 or more times. Descriptive data for these 
demographics are reported in Table 5. 
Table 5. Main Study: Experience with Health Topic 
Item None Once Twice 3 to 5 6 to 9 10 or 
more 
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Note. Items are preceded by the following statement, “In the past 30 days, how many 
times did you engage in the following behaviors… .” N = 272. 
 
Experiences with health topic consequences. Participants were asked if they, 
personally, had ever been arrested for a drinking and driving violation; 1.8% (n = 5) 
answered “yes,” whereas 98.2 % (n = 267) answered “no.” However, 73.5% (n = 200) 
indicated that they knew someone who had been arrested for a drinking and driving 
violation, whereas 26.5% (n = 72) did not. Additionally, 39.7% (n = 108) indicated that 
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they, a close friend, and/or family member had been in a car accident involving alcohol, 
whereas 60.3% (n = 164) had not. 
 Likelihood of drinking and driving. Likelihood of drinking and driving was 
measured using the 15-item, 7-point Jewell, Hupp, and Segrist (2008) scale (1 = 
extremely unlikely, 7 = extremely likely). The first five questions asked participants 
about their likelihood of driving a short (a few blocks to a mile) distance after drinking 
one, two, 3-4, 5-6, or over six drinks. The second set of questions asked the same 
question about a medium (over 10 miles) distance, and the third set asked about the 
likelihood of driving a long (over 20 miles) distance.  
Past exposure to the stimuli. A majority of participants (n = 211; 77.6%) had 
never seen the show in the stimuli. Almost 10% (n = 27; 9.9%) had seen five episodes 
or fewer, 2.6% (n = 7) reported having seen almost all the series, and 6.3% (n = 17) had 
watched the entire series. Concerning the episode used in the experiment, only 9.4% (n 
= 24) of participants had previously seen the episode, 88.6% (n = 226) had not, and 
2.0% (n = 5) were unsure if they had seen it.  
Character familiarity. The majority of participants (81.3%, n = 221) were not at 
all familiar with the character in the stimuli, 7.7% (n = 21) were slightly familiar, 3.3% 
(n = 9) were moderately familiar, 4.4% (n = 12) were very familiar, and 3.3% (n = 9) 
were extremely familiar with the character. 
Recognition of the actress. Prior to watching the stimuli, participants were asked 
to indicate their recognition of the actress Mae Whitman who was featured in the clips. 
A majority of participants (n = 154; 56.6%;) did not recognize her. Only 33.1% (n = 90) 
recognized the actress, whereas 10.3% (n = 7) were unsure.  
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PSR with actress. The main study measured PSR with the actress using 
Bocarnea and Brown’s (2007) CPPI scale. The 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = 
strongly agree) consisted of 12 items. Based on its title, one might think the CPPI 
measures PSI, however, as the authors state, the scale is “designed to measure how 
media consumers form parasocial relationships with celebrities or popular fictional 
characters” (Bocarnea & Brown, 2007, p. 309). The scales items include statements 
like, “I find myself thinking about her on a regular basis” and “Sometimes I feel like 
contacting her personally” which reflect a core component of PSR, a relationship with 
the media figure outside of media exposure.  
Sensation seeking. Sensation seeking is a personality trait that is defined as the 
tendency to pursue experiences and sensations that are exciting, new, intense, and 
complex, and the willingness to take social, physical, and financial risks in search of 
those feelings of arousal (Zuckerman, 1994). High sensation seekers tend to be drawn to 
illegal or risky activities such as alcohol use (Dunlop & Romer, 2010), illegal drug use 
(Newcomb & McGee, 1991; Palmgreen, Donohew, Lorch, Hoyle, & Stephenson, 
2001), reckless driving (Gonzalez-Iglesias, Gomez-Fraguela, & Luengo, 2014; Peer & 
Rosenbloom, 2013), and sexual risk-taking (Bancroft et al., 2004). Because this study’s 
stimuli included a high-risk activity, sensation seeking was used as a control variable. 
Traditionally, sensation seeking has been measured using the 40-item Form V of the 
Sensation Seeking Scale (Zuckerman, Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1978). However, the Brief 
Sensation-Seeking Scale (BSSS; Hoyle, Stephenson, Palmgreen, Lorch, & Donohew, 
2002) is a more economical measure of sensation seeking and has demonstrated 
reliability and validity (Hoyle et al., 2002) and been used in large scale surveys 
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(Stephenson, Hoyle, Palmgreen, & Slater, 2003). The BSSS is an 8-item, 7-point (1 = 
strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree) scale. Sample items include “I like to do 
frightening things,” and “I get restless when I spend too much time at home.”  
Self-efficacy. To measure self-efficacy, participants were asked how much they 
agreed with statements about their ability to engage or not engage in various behaviors 
depicted by the at-risk character. Items included: (a) “I am unable to abstain from 
driving after I have been drinking any alcohol,” (b) “I am unable to abstain from driving 
after having less than or equal to 5 drinks,” and (c) “I can avoid riding with a driver 
who is drunk” (reverse-coded). Responses to these items were measured on a 7-point 
scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Self-referencing. Self-referencing was measured using Dunlop et al.’s (2010) 
scale, which they adapted from Burnkrant and Unnava’s (1989) measure. The 7-point (1 
= strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree) scale consisted of four items: “This story 
reminded me of experiences in my own life,” “This story related to me, personally,” 
“This story made me think about me and my risk of being in an accident involving 
drinking and driving,” and “While watching the story, I thought about what it would be 
like if the events in the video happened to me.”  
Identification. Identification with a character was measured using five items 
from Tal-Or & Cohen (2010) and six items from Auter and Palmgreen’s (2000) 
audience-persona interaction (API) scale. Respondents were asked to focus on the main 
character from each stimulus video and answer statements such as, “While viewing, I 
felt like Amber felt,” and “I can imagine myself as Amber” on a 7-point scale (1 = 
strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). 
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Transportation. Transportation was measured with the 7-point (1 = strongly 
disagree; 7 = strongly agree) transportation scale (Green & Brock, 2000). The original 
transportation scale consists of 11 items, however, this study excluded “While I was 
reading the narrative, I could easily picture the events in it taking place” because it 
pertains to textual media. Sample items include, “The video affected me emotionally,” 
and “I was mentally involved in the show while watching it.” 
Perceived realism. Perceived realism of the stimuli was measured using the Cho 
et al. (2014) perceived realism scale, which measures the concept on five dimensions 
(plausibility, typicality, factuality, narrative consistency, and perceptual quality). Cho et 
al.’s scale was developed to measure perceived realism in PSAs, thus some wording 
was modified to fit this study’s stimuli. The scale consists of 18 items on a 7-point (1 = 
strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree) scale. The factuality dimension was removed 
from this measure after the pilot study. Sample items include, “Real people would no do 
the things shown in the video,” “The video portrayed an even that happens to a lot of 
people,” and “The acting in the video was realistic.” 
PSR with character (strength). PSR with the character was measured using 
Tukachinsky’s (2010) 13-item, 7-point (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree) scale. 
The items used consist of two dimensions, friendship communication and friendship 
support. Sample items include, “I think Amber could be a friend of mine,” and “If 
Amber was a real person, I would be able to count on her in times of need.”  
Affective disposition. Affective disposition toward the main character was 
measured using a 5-item, 7-point (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree) scale that 
assesses the morality of the character’s behaviors and liking of the character (Weber, 
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Tamborini, Lee, & Stipp, 2008). Sample items include “Amber is a good person,” and 
“I approve of the actions of Amber.” 
Deservedness. The perception that the character deserved the negative outcome 
experienced in the story was measured using Raney’s (2005) single item measure, “The 
character deserved what happened to her” on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = 
strongly agree. 
Chapter 7: Results 
This chapter describes the data cleaning process for the main study, explains 
item transformations, confirmatory factor analyses, and reliability testing performed on 
the set of scales. The chapter also presents the manipulation checks for the paragraph 
and video conditions, and presents the findings for the twelve hypotheses and two 
research questions. The results of the hypotheses and research questions are presented 
by theme rather than in numerical order. First, the risk convergence findings (i.e., H1a 
and H1b) are discussed. The next section describes mediation of social distance on the 
relationship between each of the narrative engagement variables and risk convergence 
(i.e., H2-H6 and H8). Additionally, this portion reports H9, which tests how existing 
character PSR relates to strength of character PSI. Then, the moderator effects of 
perceived valence toward the at-risk character on the relationship between the 
parasocial phenomena and the RCM (i.e., H7 and H10) are described. The next section 
details the findings for H11 and H12, which test affective disposition’s role in the RCM. 
Finally, the results of the research questions, which ask about narrative endings and 
duration of risk convergence effects, are described. 
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Data Cleaning 
A total of 351 students were recruited from the Communication department at a 
large, southwestern university to participate in an IRB-approved, two-part study. 
However, this sample size was reduced in the two-step data cleaning process. First, the 
researcher checked participant answers to four ACQs (the same as in the pilot study); 
only 292 participants passed all questions. Second, 20 participants from countries where 
English is not the primary language were removed from the data. This decision was 
made because during the lab-portion of the study, multiple non-native English speakers 
had difficulty translating some of the questions and at least one participant did not 
understand what drinking and driving was. Thus, after the two-step process, the main 
study included 272 students.  
Data Transformations 
Before evaluating the structure of the measurement scales, the data were 
inspected for skewness and kurtosis. Values with extreme skewness and kurtosis were 
transformed to prevent biased parameter estimates and centralize the distribution. Data 
were transformed using the following equation: Y* = (Y + k)(λ) (Fink, 2009). Table 6 
presents the pre- and post-transformation skewness and kurtosis values. See Appendix 
D for variable labels. 
Table 6. Main Study: Skewness and Kurtosis Values Pre- and Post-Transformations. 
Values of k and λ in the Transformation Equation Y* = (Y + k)(λ) 
Variable Pre-Transformation λ  Post-Transformation 
 Skewness Kurtosis  Skewness Kurtosis 
 Statistic S. E. Statistic S. E.  Statistic S. E. Statistic S. E. 
SHORT3 1.52 0.15 0.95 0.29 0.01 1.01 0.15 -0.53 0.29 
SHORT4 3.13 0.15 9.93 0.29 0.01 2.25 0.15 4.11 0.29 
SHORT5 4.92 0.15 25.39 0.29 0.01 4.08 0.15 16.31 0.29 
MED3 2.13 0.15 3.49 0.29 0.01 1.56 0.15 1.00 0.29 
MED4 4.59 0.15 23.79 0.29 0.01 3.38 0.15 11.28 0.29 
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MED5 8.04 0.15 74.67 0.29 0.01 6.52 0.15 45.51 0.29 
LONG3 2.77 0.15 7.12 0.29 0.02 2.19 0.15 3.43 0.29 
LONG4 6.19 0.15 46.17 0.29 0.01 4.49 0.15 21.14 0.29 
LONG5 10.00 0.15 117.33 0.29 0.01 7.81 0.15 67.44 0.29 
RISK1PRE 1.61 0.15 1.41 0.29 0.50 0.77 0.15 -0.64 0.29 
RISK2PRE 1.13 0.15 -0.12 0.29 0.50 0.41 0.15 -1.12 0.29 
RISK3PRE 1.70 0.15 1.56 0.29 0.50 0.98 0.15 -0.36 0.29 
SS1 -1.32 0.15 2.22 0.29 2.00 -0.61 0.15 -0.23 0.29 
DS11R 0.13 0.15 -1.02 0.29 0.50 0.49 0.15 -0.21 0.29 
FAM1 1.37 0.15 0.98 0.29 0.10 0.96 0.15 -0.61 0.29 
FAM2 1.30 0.15 .52 0.29 0.10 0.92 0.15 -0.75 0.29 
FAM3 3.54 0.15 15.35 0.29 0.01 2.50 0.15 5.65 0.29 
FAM4 3.28 0.15 10.21 0.29 0.01 2.93 0.15 7.31 0.29 
FAM5 2.93 0.15 8.30 0.29 0.01 2.45 0.15 4.75 0.29 
PRA4 2.06 0.15 3.12 0.29 0.01 1.64 0.15 1.19 0.29 
PRA6 1.02 0.15 0.11 0.29 0.50 0.66 0.15 -0.68 0.29 
PRA7 1.40 0.15 0.90 0.29 0.25 0.99 0.15 -0.42 0.29 
PRA8 1.55 0.15 1.20 0.29 0.02 1.11 0.15 -0.34 0.29 
PRA10R 1.19 0.15 .84 0.29 0.10 0.70 0.15 -0.42 0.29 
PRA11R 2.37 0.15 5.20 0.29 0.01 1.40 0.15 0.89 0.29 
AFF1 1.21 0.15 1.34 0.29 0.50 0.73 0.15 -0.11 0.29 
PSRC5 1.46 0.15 2.07 0.29 0.50 0.91 0.15 0.16 0.29 
PSICOG4 -1.13 0.15 1.44 0.29 2.00 -0.25 0.15 -0.13 0.29 
PSIAFF8R -1.07 0.15 0.71 0.29 2.00 -0.56 0.15 -0.55 0.29 
REALPL1 -1.58 0.15 5.40 0.29 2.00 -0.88 0.15 0.84 0.29 
REALPL2 -1.06 0.15 1.97 0.29 2.00 -0.63 0.15 0.08 0.29 
REALPL4R -2.11 0.15 7.01 0.29 2.00 -0.78 0.15 -0.61 0.29 
REALPL5R -2.06 0.15 4.78 0.29 2.00 -0.42 0.15 -0.83 0.29 
REALQU1 -1.10 0.15 2.63 0.29 2.00 -0.44 0.15 0.41 0.29 
REALQU2 -1.39 0.15 2.98 0.29 2.00 -0.61 0.15 0.57 0.29 
REALQU3 -1.89 0.15 6.01 0.29 2.00 -0.68 0.15 0.99 0.29 
REALQU4 -1.57 0.15 5.67 0.29 2.00 -0.53 0.15 0.69 0.29 
REALQU5 -1.41 0.15 4.18 0.29 2.00 -0.54 0.15 0.58 0.29 
REALTP3 -1.06 0.15 1.49 0.29 2.00 -0.40 0.15 -0.28 0.29 
REALN1 1.21 0.15 1.30 0.29 0.50 0.66 0.15 0.34 0.29 
REALN2 -1.35 0.15 2.50 0.29 2.00 -0.63 0.15 0.62 0.29 
REALN3R 1.23 0.15 2.10 0.29 0.50 0.54 0.15 0.54 0.29 
REALN4 -1.52 0.15 5.21 0.29 2.00 -0.58 0.15 1.36 0.29 
REALN5 -1.63 0.15 3.75 0.29 2.00 -0.78 0.15 1.06 0.29 
IDT6 1.43 0.15 1.23 0.29 0.25 0.83 0.15 -0.36 0.29 
IDT7 1.26 0.15 1.12 0.29 0.50 0.77 0.15 -0.08 0.29 
IDT8 1.29 0.15 1.28 0.29 0.50 0.78 0.15 -0.06 0.29 
IDT9 1.62 0.15 2.21 0.29 0.25 0.87 0.15 -0.02 0.29 
IDT10 1.04 0.15 0.02 0.29 0.50 0.67 0.15 -0.68 0.29 
TRANS1 -1.26 0.15 2.39 0.29 2.00 -0.34 0.15 -0.07 0.29 
TRANS2R -1.50 0.15 1.75 0.29 2.00 -0.91 0.15 -0.04 0.29 
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TRANS4 -1.80 0.15 4.32 0.29 2.00 -0.73 0.15 0.79 0.29 
TRANS6 -1.28 0.15 1.35 0.29 2.00 -0.55 0.15 -0.42 0.29 
TRANS9R -1.16 0.15 0.63 0.29 2.00 -0.60 0.15 -0.51 0.29 
SD1 -1.22 0.15 0.35 0.29 2.00 -0.85 0.15 -0.57 0.29 
SD2 -1.24 0.15 0.71 0.29 2.00 -0.78 0.15 -0.49 0.29 
SD3 -1.15 0.15 0.38 0.29 2.00 -0.71 0.15 -0.68 0.29 
SD6 -1.63 0.15 1.29 0.29 2.00 -0.93 0.15 -0.86 0.29 
SD2A -1.01 0.15 0.17 0.29 2.00 -0.56 0.15 -0.88 0.29 
SD4A -1.20 0.15 0.64 0.29 2.00 -0.78 0.15 -0.72 0.29 
SD6A -1.16 0.15 0.90 0.29 2.00 -0.61 0.15 -0.59 0.29 
RKPO1 1.67 0.15 1.61 0.29 0.50 0.86 0.15 -0.55 0.29 
RKPO2 1.44 0.15 0.94 0.29 0.50 0.57 0.15 -0.87 0.29 
RKPO3 1.84 0.15 2.23 0.29 0.25 0.40 0.15 -1.44 0.29 
EFF1R -1.77 0.15 2.10 0.29 4 -0.83 0.15 -0.88 0.29 
EFF2R -2.02 0.15 2.76 0.29 10 -0.82 0.15 -1.25 0.29 
EFF3 -3.97 0.15 22.81 0.29 10 -1.00 0.15 -0.94 0.29 
RISKC1 -1.09 0.15 0.54 0.29 2.00 -0.36 0.15 -0.97 0.29 
RISKC2 -1.66 0.15 2.49 0.29 2.00 -0.90 0.15 -0.25 0.29 
RISKC3 -1.28 0.15 1.27 0.29 2.00 -0.53 0.15 -0.77 0.29 
RISKC5 -1.11 0.15 1.53 0.29 2.00 -0.52 0.15 -0.45 0.29 
PSHORT3 1.73 0.15 1.74 0.29 0.02 1.21 0.15 -0.08 0.29 
PSHORT4 3.59 0.15 13.52 0.29 0.01 2.61 0.15 6.01 0.29 
PSHORT5 6.01 0.15 41.78 0.29 0.01 4.42 0.15 20.14 0.29 
PMED3 2.28 0.15 4.30 0.29 0.01 1.72 0.15 1.47 0.29 
PMED4 5.01 0.15 28.57 0.29 0.01 3.59 0.15 13.18 0.29 
PMED5 6.75 0.15 48.96 0.29 0.01 6.09 0.15 37.62 0.29 
PLONG2 1.01 0.15 -0.57 0.29 0.01 0.83 0.15 -0.99 0.29 
PLONG3 2.91 0.15 8.07 0.29 0.01 2.29 0.15 3.91 0.29 
PLONG4 6.04 0.15 42.42 0.29 0.01 4.90 0.15 24.89 0.29 
PLONG5 11.27 0.15 133.64 0.29 0.01 10.32 0.15 109.67 0.29 
Note: k = 0 for all transformations. See Appendix D for a list of variable labels. 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
Confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) were performed using LISREL 9.10 
(Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2013) to inspect the factor structure for each scale. This 
examination of the measurement models made sure that weak items were removed from 
analyses. Each scale was run and assessed individually due to the number of indicators 
compared to sample size. 
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Three fit indices were used to assess model fit: the root mean squared error of 
approximation (RMSEA), the comparative fit index (CFI), and the standardized root 
mean square residual (SRMR). According to Hu and Bentler (1999), the RMSEA 
should be < 0.06, the CFI should be ≥ 0.95, and the SRMR should be ≤ 0.08. However, 
many scholars advise against strict cutoffs when looking at fit indices (Kenny, 2014) or 
disagree as to what the cutoff should be. For instance, Browne and Cudeck (1993) 
suggest that the RMSEA cutoff should be 0.10 and Bentler (1990) suggests a CFI cutoff 
of 0.90. For this study, CFA model fit was considered good if the three indices met 
previously mentioned cutoffs outlined by Hu and Bentler (1999). The model was 
considered adequate if the RMSEA was less than or close to 0.10 (Browne & Cudeck, 
1993), CFI was greater than or close to 0.90 (Bentler, 1990), and SRMR was less than 
or close to 0.08 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Model fit was viewed as sufficient if two of the 
three indices met or surpassed the adequate cutoff values and poor if less than two 
indices met the cutoff values.  
To improve the structure of the measurement scales, some items were dropped 
from analyses. Brown’s (2015) criteria suggest that items with standardized factor 
loadings of at least 0.30 or 0.40 should be kept, but factor loadings closer to 0.70 are 
preferable. Klein (2016) supports a 0.70 cutoff and Brown (2015) acknowledges that 
many scholars view the 0.40 cutoff as too generous. For this study’s measurement 
scales, initially, the standardized factor loading of 0.70 was used as the cutoff. However 
that criterion and even the 0.60 cutoff were too stringent for many of the scales in that 
adopting these cutoff values would have drastically reduced the number of items in each 
measure. Therefore, the standardized factor loading of 0.50 (i.e., the latent factor 
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explains at least 25% of the variance in an item) was applied; items below that cutoff 
were dropped from the scales.  
Modifications to each scale were implemented if they were reasonable and 
theoretically appropriate. For example, the errors of two items that had similar phrasing 
or meaning were allowed to covary (Brown, 2006). The CFA results are described in 
detail below (see Appendix D for item labels) and summarized in Table 7. 
The likelihood of drinking and driving (pretest) scale (measured with 15 items) 
was revised. The initial model fit was poor, χ2 (90, N = 272) = 2,398.91 (p < .001), 
RMSEA = .31, 90% CI [.30, .32], CFI = .55, and SRMR = .19. Items five (assessing 
likelihood of driving a short distance after drinking over 6 drinks), ten (assessing 
likelihood of driving a medium distance after drinking over 6 drinks), fourteen 
(assessing likelihood of driving a short distance after drinking over 5-6 drinks), and 
fifteen (assessing likelihood of driving a long distance after drinking over 6 drinks) 
were problematic. The CFA indicated that the latent factor explained 18%, 9%, 19%, 
and 5% of the variance for these indicators respectively; whereas, the latent factor 
explained 30% to 91% of the variance in the rest of the indicators. Therefore, these four 
items were dropped from additional analyses. 
Then, error covariances were implemented, iteratively, between the errors of 
items one (drive a short distance after 1 drink) and six (drive a medium distance after 1 
drink), one and eleven (drive a long distance after 1 drink), six and eleven, and seven 
(drive a medium distance after 2 drinks) and twelve (drive a long distance after 2 
drinks). Error covariances were then implemented, iteratively, between the errors of 
items three (drive a short distance after 3-4 drinks) and eight (drive a medium distance 
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after 3-4 drinks), three and thirteen (drive a long distance after 3-4 drinks); eight and 
thirteen; nine (drive a medium distance after 4-5 drinks) and four (drive a short distance 
after 4-5 drinks); one and two (drive a short distance after 2 drinks); and eleven and 
twelve. Items with the same drink number in the question (e.g., items one and six) had a 
very similar wording with only the distance changing in each item, so the error 
covariance is justified by the common measurement. For items of the same distance but 
different numbers (e.g., item one and two), the errors were allowed to covary because 
the drink amounts (one and two drinks, respectively) seemed close in range; therefore 
items could have been perceived as quite similar. The final model fit was still poor but 
the indices were closer to the cutoff values, χ2 (34, N = 272) = 372.36 (p < .001), 
RMSEA = .19, 90% CI [.17, .21], CFI = .92, and SRMR = .11. The LISREL software 
suggested additional modifications, which could have reduced the RMSEA further, but 
the error covariances were not theoretically justifiable. 
All personal risk perception (pretest) items were retained. The confirmatory 
factor analysis model was just-identified because the scale only had three items, so fit 
indices were not provided. The latent factor explained 58% to 82% of the variance for 
the indicators.  
 The eight items measuring sensation seeking were retained. Initial model fit 
was poor with only one of the fit indices meeting the recommended criteria, χ2 (20, N = 
272) = 160.86 (p < .001), RMSEA = .16, 90% CI [.14, .18], CFI = .76, and SRMR = 
.08. However, the model improved when the errors of item five (“I like to do 
frightening things”) and item six (“I would like to try bungee jumping”) were allowed 
to covary. Additionally, the errors item seven (“I like wild parties”) and item eight (“I 
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would love to have new and exciting experiences, even if they are illegal”) were 
allowed to covary. These two error covariances were deemed appropriate because the 
connotative meaning of each pair was similar. The revised model fit was adequate, χ2 
(18, N = 272) = 49.35 (p < .001), RMSEA = .08, 90% CI [.05, .11], CFI = .95, and 
SRMR = .05. An additional modification between the errors of items seven and four (“I 
prefer friends who are excitingly unpredictable”) was suggested, which could have 
reduced the RMSEA further, but the error covariance was not theoretically justifiable. 
The social desirability scale (measured with 13 items) was revised. The initial 
model fit was sufficient, with two of the three fit indices within acceptable values, χ2 
(65, N = 272) = 183.33 (p < .001), RMSEA = .08, 90% CI [.07, .10], CFI = .80, and 
SRMR = .07. However, item one (“It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work 
if I am not encouraged” reverse-coded), item three (“On a few occasions, I have given 
up doing something because I thought too little of my ability” reverse-coded), item five 
(“No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener”), item seven (“I'm always 
willing to admit it when I make a mistake.”), item nine (“I am always courteous, even to 
people who are disagreeable”), item ten (“I have never been irked when people 
expressed ideas very different from my own”), item twelve (“I am sometimes irritated 
by people who ask favors of me” reverse-coded), and item thirteen (“I have never 
deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings”) were problematic. The latent 
factor explained between 8% and 20% of the variance in these indicators; therefore, 
these items were dropped from additional analyses. The final model fit improved, with 
all three indices meeting the criteria for a good model fit, χ2 (5, N = 272) = 8.32 (p < 
.001), RMSEA = .05, 90% CI [.00, .12], CFI = .99, and SRMR = .03. 
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All five of the actress familiarity items were retained. The initial model fit was 
poor, with only one of the three fit indices meeting the necessary criteria, χ2 (5, N = 
272) = 91.26 (p < .001), RMSEA = .25, 90% CI [.21, .30], CFI = .88, and SRMR = .07. 
The path from the latent factor to the first indicator was set to one to resolve a metric 
assumption issue. The errors of items one (“I watch her movies”) and two (“I 
watch/have watched TV she is on”) were allowed to covary because the meaning and 
phrasing of two items were similar. The final model fit improved from the original and 
was sufficient with two of the indices meeting the fit criteria, χ2 (4, N = 272) = 25.88 (p 
< .001), RMSEA = .14, 90% CI [.09, .20], CFI = .97, and SRMR = .03. 
The PSR with the actress scale (measured with 12 items) was revised. The initial 
model fit was poor, χ2 (54, N = 272) = 293.07 (p < .001), RMSEA = .13, 90% CI [.11, 
.14], CFI = .82, and SRMR = .08. However, items ten (“I don’t have any feelings about 
her” reverse-coded), eleven (“I am not very much aware of the details of her life” 
reverse-coded), and twelve (“I am not really interested in her” reverse-coded) were 
problematic. The latent factor explained 21%, 22%, and 23% of the variance, 
respectively, in these indicators. The latent factor explained 28% to 64% of the variance 
in the rest of the indicators. Therefore, these three items were dropped from additional 
analyses. The errors of items four (“I find myself thinking about her on a regular basis”) 
and eight (“Sometimes I feel like contacting her personally”); and items four and seven 
(“I look for information in the media to learn more about her”) were allowed to covary 
because the connotative meaning of the two pairs of items was similar. The final model 
fit was sufficient, with two of the three indices meeting the criteria for an adequate 
model, χ2 (25, N = 272) = 118.49 (p < .001), RMSEA = .12, 90% CI [.10, .14], CFI = 
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.91, and SRMR = .06. The LISREL software suggested additional modifications, which 
could have reduced the RMSEA further, but the error covariances were not theoretically 
justifiable. 
All five items of the character valence (post-paragraph) scale were retained. 
Model fit was sufficient with two of the indices meeting criteria cutoffs, χ2 (5, N = 272) 
= 79.49 (p < .001), RMSEA = .23, 90% CI [.19, .28], CFI = .95, and SRMR = .04. 
However, the errors of items four (“I admire Amber”) and five (“I would like to be 
friends with someone like Amber”) were allowed to covary. The final model fit was 
sufficient and an improvement over the initial model, although the RMSEA index did 
not meet the fit criterion, χ2 (4, N = 272) = 52.98 (p < .001), RMSEA = .21, 90% CI 
[.16, .27], CFI = .96, and SRMR = .03. 
The character valence (post-video) scale behaved similarly to the post-
paragraph version of the scale. It had a sufficient model fit with two of the indices 
meeting the good criteria cutoffs, χ2 (5, N = 272) = 41.72 (p < .001), RMSEA = .16, 
90% CI [.12, .21], CFI = .96, and SRMR = .04. No items were dropped from analyses. 
However, the errors of items four (“I admire Amber”) and five (“I would like to be 
friends with someone like Amber”) were allowed to covary because the meaning of the 
items was similar (i.e., you would want to be friends with someone you have esteem 
for). Like the post-paragraph character valence scale, the final model fit was sufficient 
but the RMSEA index did not meet the fit criterion, χ2 (4, N = 272) = 33.67 (p < .001), 
RMSEA = .17, 90% CI [.12, .22], CFI = .96, and SRMR = .04. 
All five items of the affective disposition scale were retained. The CFA model 
performed sufficiently with two of the fit indices meeting the recommended criteria, χ2 
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(5, N = 272) = 20.12 (p < .001), RMSEA = .11, 90% CI [.60, .16], CFI = .97, and 
SRMR = .04. However, the errors of items two (“Amber is a good person”) and five 
(“Amber has good intentions”) were allowed to covary due to similar phrasing and 
connotation. The final model fit improved, with all three indices meeting the criteria for 
an adequate model, χ2 (4, N = 272) = 12.21 (p < .05), RMSEA = .09, 90% CI [.03, .15], 
CFI = .98, and SRMR = .03. Additional modifications that could have reduced the 
RMSEA further were suggested, but the error covariances were not theoretically 
justifiable. 
 The parasocial relationship with the character scale, measured with 13 items, 
was revised. The initial model fit was poor, as none of the fit indices were within 
acceptable values, χ2 (65, N = 272) = 384.77 (p < .001), RMSEA = .13, 90% CI [.12, 
.15], CFI = .81, and SRMR = .09. Items three (“Sometimes, I wish I knew what Amber 
would do in my situation”), seven (“I want to promote the well-being of Amber”), ten 
(“If Amber was a real person, I would give her emotional support”), and thirteen (“If 
Amber was a real person, she would be able to count on me in times of need”) were 
problematic. The latent factor explained 18% to 23% of the variance for these 
indicators, compared to the other indicators in which the latent factor explained 35% to 
62% of the variance. Therefore, these four items were dropped from additional 
analyses.  
The errors of items one (“If Amber was a real person, I could have disclosed 
negative things about myself honestly and fully to her”) and two (“If Amber was a real 
person, I could have disclosed a great deal of things about myself to her”); items nine 
(“If Amber was a real person, I would be able to count on her in times of need”) and 
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eleven (“If Amber was a real person, I could trust her completely”); items eight (“If 
Amber was a real person, I could have a warm relationship with her”) and six (I think 
Amber could be a friend of mine); and items four (“If Amber was a real person, I could 
have disclosed positive things about myself honestly and fully to her”) and two were 
allowed to covary. Each pair shared a similar phrasing and connotative meaning 
between the two items. The final model fit was adequate, with all three indices meeting 
the recommended model fit criteria, χ2 (23, N = 272) = 71.27 (p < .001), RMSEA = .09, 
90% CI [.707, .11], CFI = .96, and SRMR = .04. 
The two subscales for PSI with the character, cognitive PSI (6 items) and 
affective PSI (8 items), were assessed using separate CFAs. The initial CFA model fit 
for cognitive PSI was poor, χ2 (9, N = 272) = 42.34 (p < .001), RMSEA = .11, 90% CI 
[.08, .15], CFI = .86, and SRMR = .07. Items two (“I hardly thought about why Amber 
did certain things she did” reverse-coded), three (“I kept wondering if I knew people 
who are similar to Amber”), and six (“Occasionally, I wondered if Amber was similar 
to me or not”) were problematic. The latent factor explained 15%, 24%, and 9% of the 
variance, respectively, in these indicators, compared to the other indicators in which the 
latent factor explained 27% to 53% of the variance. Thus, the problematic items were 
dropped from further analyses. The CFA model was just-identified because the scale 
only had three items, so fit indices were not provided. 
Affective PSI also had a poor model fit, χ2 (20, N = 272) = 139.03 (p < .001), 
RMSEA = .15, 90% CI [.13, .17], CFI = .58, and SRMR = .11. Items one (“Sometimes I 
really loved Amber for what she did”), four (“Amber left me rather sober and 
unaffected” reverse-coded), five (“I occasionally reacted very emotionally towards 
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Amber”), six (“Sometimes I hated Amber for what she did” reverse-coded), seven (“I 
was hoping that Amber would get “proper punishment” for what she said and did”), and 
eight (“If Amber felt bad, I felt good; If Amber felt good, I felt bad” reverse-coded) 
were problematic. The latent factor explained 0.28% to 20% of the variance in these 
indicators, compared to the other indicators in which the latent factor explained 40% 
(item two) and 53% (item three) of the variance. Therefore, the six problematic items 
were dropped from further analyses. The revised model was under-identified because 
the scale only had two remaining items, so fit indices could not be calculated. 
The self-referencing scale (4 items) was revised. The initial model fit was poor, 
as none of the indices met the suggested fit criteria, χ2 (2, N = 272) = 75.85 (p < .001), 
RMSEA = .37, 90% CI [.30, .44], CFI = .81, and SRMR = .12. Items three (“This story 
made me think about me and my risk of being in an accident involving drinking and 
driving”) and four (“While watching the story, I thought about what it would be like if 
the events in the video happened to me”) were problematic. The latent factor explained 
24% and 21% of the variance, respectively, for these indicators, compared to the other 
two indicators, in which the latent factor explained 66% (item one) and 81% (item two) 
of the variance. Thus, the problematic items were dropped from further analyses. The 
revised model was under-identified because there were now only two items, so fit 
indices could not be computed. 
The main study included four dimensions of perceived realism: plausibility (five 
items), perceptual quality (five items), typicality (three items), and narrative consistency 
(five items). However, after running the CFA narrative consistency was divided into 
two subscales, narrative consistency (three items) and narrative coherence (two items), 
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because the CFA indicated that it was not unidimensional. The subscales were assessed 
separately.  
The initial fit of the plausibility subscale was adequate, χ2 (5, N = 272) = 15.63 
(p < .001), RMSEA = .09, 90% CI [.04, .14], CFI = .99, and SRMR = .03. Items four 
(“Never in real life would what was shown in the video happen” reverse-coded) and 
five (“Real people would not do the things shown in the video” reverse-coded) were 
problematic. Item five was not identified by the model and thus was dropped. Item four 
was removed because of multicollinearity issues. The confirmatory revised model was 
just-identified because the scale only had three remaining items, thus fit indices were 
not available. For the remaining items, the latent factor explained76% (item one), 75% 
(item two) and 77% (item three) of the variance. 
The initial fit of the perceptual quality subscale was sufficient with two of the 
three indices meeting the fit criteria χ2 (5, N = 272) = 22.56 (p < .001), RMSEA = .11, 
90% CI [.07, .16], CFI = .98, and SRMR = .02. All five items were retained. The latent 
factor explained between 52% and 76% of the variance for these indicators. The errors 
of items one (“The visual elements of the video were realistic”) and four (“The scenes 
in the video were realistic”) were allowed to covary. The items shared similar phrasing 
and connotative meaning. The final model fit was adequate with all three indices 
meeting the model criteria, χ2 (4, N = 272) = 13.37 (p < .01), RMSEA = .09, 90% CI 
[.04, .15], CFI = .99, and SRMR = .02. The LISREL software suggested additional 
modifications, but the error covariances were not theoretically justifiable. 
The subscales measuring typicality, narrative consistency, and narrative 
coherence could not be evaluated using a confirmatory factor model. The first two 
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subscales were just-identified as they were each comprised of three items, thus fit 
indices could not be calculated for them. The latent factor explained between 31% and 
55% of the variance for the typicality indicators and between 52% and 62% of the 
variance for the narrative consistency indicators. Narrative coherence had two items, 
yielding an under-identified model for which fit indices were not provided. 
All eleven identification items were retained. The initial model fit was poor with 
only one of the three indices meeting fit criteria, χ2 (44, N = 272) = 255.59 (p < .001), 
RMSEA = .13, 90% CI [.12, .15], CFI = .88, and SRMR = .08. However, the model 
improved when the errors of items one (“I think I understand Amber well”) and four 
(“During viewing, I could really “get inside” Amber’s head”); items one and five (“I 
tend to understand why Amber did what she did”); items five and two (“I understood 
the events in the video the way Amber understood them”); items four and five; and 
items two and four were allowed to covary because the meanings of each item in the 
pairings were similar. The final model fit was good, all three of the indices meeting the 
criteria for an adequate fit, χ2 (39, N = 272) = 125.83 (p < .001), RMSEA = .09, 90% CI 
[.07, .11], CFI = .95, and SRMR = .05. The LISREL software suggested additional 
modifications, which could have reduced the RMSEA further, but the error covariances 
were not theoretically justifiable. 
The transportation scale (10 items) was revised. The initial model fit was poor, 
with none of the indices meeting the recommended fit criteria, χ2 (35, N = 272) = 
256.62 (p < .001), RMSEA = .15, 90% CI [.14, .17], CFI = .67, and SRMR = .11. Items 
one (“While I was watching the video, I could easily picture the events in it taking 
place”), two (“While I was watching the video, activity going on in the room around me 
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was on my mind” reverse-coded), three (“I could picture myself in the scene of the 
events in the video”), eight (“I found myself thinking of ways the video could have 
turned out differently”), and ten (“The events in the video are relevant to my everyday 
life”) were problematic. The latent factor explained 24%, 6%, 20%, 12%, and 11% of 
the variance, respectively, for these indicators, compared to other indicators in which 
the latent factor explained 27% to 53% of the variance. Therefore, the five problematic 
items were dropped from further analyses. The errors of items four (“I was mentally 
involved in the video while watching it”) and nine (“I found my mind wandering while 
watching the video” reverse-coded) were permitted to covary because the phrasing and 
connotative meaning of the items were similar. The final model fit improved to 
sufficient, with two of the indices meeting fit criteria, χ2 (4, N = 272) = 19.52 (p < 
.001), RMSEA = .12, 90% CI [.07, .18], CFI = .95, and SRMR = .04. The LISREL 
software suggested additional modifications, which could have reduced the RMSEA 
further, but the error covariances were not theoretically justifiable. 
The social distance (So & Shen, 2015) scale (6 items) was revised. The initial 
model fit was poor, χ2 (9, N = 272) = 162.52 (p < .001), RMSEA = .25, 90% CI [.22, 
.29], CFI = .77, and SRMR = .10. Item six (“Please rate the level of similarity between 
you and Amber in the following aspect: drug use”) yielded a Heywood case. Therefore, 
the item was dropped from further analyses. The errors of items four (“Please rate the 
level of similarity between you and Amber in the following aspect: risky behavior”) and 
five (“Please rate the level of similarity between you and Amber in the following 
aspect: alcohol consumption”) were allowed to covary because the phrasing and 
connotative meaning of the items were similar. The final model fit improved to 
91 
sufficient, with two of the indices meeting the suggested fit criteria, χ2 (4, N = 272) = 
39.11 (p < .001), RMSEA = .18, 90% CI [.13, .23], CFI = .93, and SRMR = .05. The 
LISREL software suggested additional modifications, which could have reduced the 
RMSEA further, but the error covariances were not theoretically justifiable. 
All six social distance (Bogardus, 1933) scale items were retained. The initial 
model fit was adequate, χ2 (9, N = 272) = 21.52 (p < .05), RMSEA = .07, 90% CI [.03, 
.11], CFI = .99, and SRMR = .03. The software suggested letting the errors of items 
three (How would you feel about “working in the same office with someone like 
Amber?”) and one (How would you feel about having someone like Amber “as a 
neighbor?”) covary, which could have reduced the RMSEA, but the phrasing and 
meaning of the items are not similar enough to justify the covariance.  
All three personal risk perception (posttest) items were retained. The 
confirmatory factor model was just-identified because the scale only had three items, so 
fit indices were not available. The latent factor explained between 73% and 85% of the 
variance in these indicators.  
The confirmatory factor model for the three-item self-efficacy scale was just-
identified too, so fit indices were not provided. The LISREL software warned that the 
theta-delta matrix was not positive definite, indicating the matrix contained a set of 
values that were not possible. Given this issue and that model fit could not be assessed, 
the measure, which was meant to be a control variable, was not used in the analyses.  
The character risk perception scale was revised. The initial confirmatory factor 
model was just-identified because the scale consisted of three items, so fit indices could 
not be calculated. Item one (which asked about the main character’s likelihood of 
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“Injury from drinking and driving”) could not be identified by the model; thus it was 
removed, resulting in a two-item, under-identified model. 
The likelihood of drinking and driving (posttest) scale (measured with 15 items) 
was revised. The initial model fit was poor, as none of the fit indices were within 
acceptable values, χ2 (90, N = 272) = 2,378.57 (p < .001), RMSEA = .31, 90% CI [.30, 
.32], CFI = .57, and SRMR = .19. Items five (assessing likelihood of driving a short 
distance after drinking over 6 drinks), ten (assessing likelihood of driving a medium 
distance after drinking over 6 drinks), fourteen (assessing likelihood of driving a short 
distance after drinking over 5-6 drinks), and fifteen (assessing likelihood of driving a 
long distance after drinking over 6 drinks) were problematic. The CFA indicated that 
the latent factor explained 15%, 9%, 14%, and 3% of the variance in these indicators 
respectively. By comparison, the latent factor explained 25% to 93% of the variance in 
the rest of the indicators. Therefore, these four items were dropped from further 
analyses. 
Then, error covariances were implemented, iteratively, for items one (driving a 
short distance after drinking 1 drink) and six (driving a medium distance after drinking 
1 drink); one and eleven (driving a long distance after drinking 1 drink); six and eleven; 
two (driving a short distance after drinking 2 drinks) and twelve (driving a long distance 
after drinking 2 drinks); three (driving a short distance after drinking 3-4 drinks) and 
eight (driving a medium distance after drinking 3-4 drinks); three and thirteen (driving a 
long distance after drinking 3-4 drinks); eight and thirteen; six and seven (driving a 
medium distance after drinking 2 drinks); one and two; and eleven and twelve. Items 
involving the same number of drinks (e.g., items one and six) had a very similar 
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wording, with only the distance changing in each item, so the error covariance is 
justified. For items of the same distance but different numbers (e.g., items one and two), 
the errors were allowed to covary because the drink amounts (one and two drinks, 
respectively) seemed close in range, making the items quite similar. The final model fit 
was still poor, but the indices were closer to the recommended cutoff points, χ2 (25, N = 
272) = 316.34 (p < .001), RMSEA = .21, 90% CI [.19, .23], CFI = .93, and SRMR = 
.10. The LISREL software suggested additional modifications, which could have 
reduced the RMSEA further, but the error covariances were not theoretically justifiable. 
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Descriptives and Reliabilities 
Reliability coefficients, displayed in Table 8, were calculated based on 
untransformed data. Reliability was calculated using Cronbach’s alpha, the Spearman-
Brown coefficient, and principal component reliability. Scale reliability was assessed 
using Cronbach’s alpha to evaluate internal consistency. Scales with a Cronbach’s alpha 
of 0.70 or greater are considered acceptable (Kline, 1999). Reliabilities for two-item 
scales were calculated using the Spearman-Brown coefficient because it is deemed 
more appropriate for a two-item measure (Eisinga, te Grotenhuis, & Pelzer, 2013). 
Because multiple scales had either a low Cronbach’s alpha or Spearman-Brown 
coefficient, principal component (PC) reliability was also used to assess reliability. The 
PC reliability technique can increase reliability by giving optimal weights to scale items 





, with N representing the number of items in the scale, and E 
representing the eigenvalue of the first PC. For more detail about the process, see 
(Hampson et al., 1987) and Serlin and Kaiser (1976).  
Cronbach’s alpha was low for the initial values of cognitive PSI, affective PSI, 
realism (typicality), realism (narrative consistency), and realism (narrative coherence). 
After examining cognitive PSI’s CFA model, three items were dropped. However, alpha 
reliability did not improve. Six items were removed from the affective PSI scale, 
resulting in a 2-item scale with a Spearman-Brown correlation of .62. After running 
separate CFAs for typicality and narrative coherence, the researcher decided to keep all 
three items for each scale, therefore the reliability did not change. Additionally, because 
narrative coherence was a two-item scale, no items were dropped in the CFA. For the 
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remaining scales with low reliability, the first principal component was used as the scale 
measure in the analyses. When a PC was used as a measure in analyses to substitute low 
reliability composite scales, the PC was used for all other multiple-item scale variables. 
This use of PC variables occurred when testing H4, H6, H7, and H8. All other 
hypotheses and research questions were tested using composite measures. Reliability 
scores and descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 8 and Table 9, respectively. 
Risk discrepancy was calculated by subtracting perceived personal risk from 
perceived character risk. A lower risk discrepancy score indicates that personal risk is 
either close to or greater than character risk (i.e. indicating a high risk convergence). A 
higher risk discrepancy score indicates that there is a large gap between level of 
character risk and personal risk. For analyses requiring PC variables, risk discrepancy 
was calculated by subtracting item 2 of personal risk from item 2 of character risk, 
doing the same with the third items, and then taking the composite scores of the two 
newly created risk discrepancy items. The first items from the character and personal 
risk scales were not used because the character risk CFA recommended removing the 
first item from the measure. The PC component score for risk discrepancy was alpha = 
0.88. 
 
Table 8. Main Study: Reliability Scores of Initial Scales and of Revised Scales 
 Initial values  Post-CFA values 













Like. of DD (pre) 15 .93 .94  11 .94 .95 
Personal risk (pre) 3 .90 .91   N/A  
Sensation seeking 8 .78 .79   N/A  
Social desirability 13 .77 .78  5 .73 .73 
Actress familiarity 5 .84 .87   N/A  
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PSR actress 12 .87 .90  9 .87 .88 
Char. valence (para.) 5 .94 .94   N/A  
Char. valence 
(video) 5 .89 .90   N/A  
Affective disposition 5 .80 .82   N/A  
PSR char. 13 .90 .90  9 .90 .91 
Cognitive PSI  6 .67 .69  3 .67 .67 
Affective PSI 8 .28 .61  2 .62c .62 
Self-referencing  4 .78 .78  2 .85c .85 
Realism: Plausibility 5 .82 .86  3 .90 .91 
Realism: Quality  5 .89 .90   N/A  
Realism: Typicality 3 .66 .67   N/A  
Realism: Narrative 
Consistency 3 .75 .76   N/A  
Realism: Narrative 
Coherence 2 .34 .56  2 .51
c .56 
Identification 11 .91 .92   N/A  
Transportation 10 .75 .78  3 .75 .77 
Social distance (So 
& Shen) 6 .81 .82  5 .79 .81 
Social distance 
(Bogardus) 6 .90 .91   N/A  
Personal risk (post) 3 .93 .91   N/A  
Char. risk 3 .91 .91  2 .81c .80 
Like. of DD (post) 15 .93 .94  11 .95 .96 
Personal risk (delay) d 3 .87 .88   N/A  
Note. All reliabilities were calculated using the untransformed indicators. N = 272; a α 
is the scale reliability (Cronbach’s alpha). bPC is the scale reliability calculated using 
the eigenvalue of the first principal component. c For two item scales, Spearman-
Brown coefficients. are reported. d No CFA run for this variable because delayed 
posttest N = 43. 
 
Table 9. Main Study: Descriptive Statistics for Variables 
Variables M SD Range 
Like. of DD (pre) 2.68 1.52 1-7 
Personal (self) risk (pre) 20.44 26.66 1-100 
Sensation seeking 4.66 1.05 1-5 
Social desirability 3.69 1.12 1-5 
Actress familiarity 1.36 .57 1-7 
PSR actress 2.43 .96 1-7 
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Char. valence (para.) 3.73 1.56 1-7 
Char. valence (video) 3.36 1.19 1-7 
Affective disposition 3.25 1.01 1-5 
Deservedness 2.87 1.65 1-7 
PSR char. 2.93 1.07 1-7 
Identification 2.56 1.02 1-7 
Transportation 5.12 1.03 1-7 
Social distance (So & Shen) 5.56 1.19 1-7 
Social distance (Bogardus) 5.27 1.21 1-7 
Personal (self) risk (post) 17.65 25.02 1-100 
Char. risk 79.42 20.98 1-100 
Like. of DD (post) 2.55 1.53 1-7 
Personal risk (delay) a 19.61 23.14 1-100 
Risk discrepancy 61.77 33.12 -100-100 
Note. All descriptive statistics were calculated using the post-CFA, untranscformed 
indicators. N = 272; a N = 43 for delayed posttest. 
 
Manipulation Checks 
Character Valence Manipulation 
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare character valence in 
the positive and negative paragraph conditions. The Levene’s test was not significant, 
F(1, 270) = 0.87, p = .35. There was a significant difference in valence between the 
positive condition (M = 5.06, SD = .82) and the negative condition (M = 2.42, SD = 
.85), t (270)= 26.06, p < .001 indicating that the paragraph’s valence manipulation 
worked.  
A one-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was performed to test the effect 
of the video conditions on character valence, controlling for paragraph conditions. The 
Levene’s test was not significant, F(2, 269) = 0.85, p = .43. The effect of video 
condition on character valence was significant, F(2, 268) = 36.57, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .21. 
Also, paragraph condition was a significant covariate, F(1, 268) = 23.50, p < .001, 𝜂!! = 
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.08. Controlling for the manipulated valence paragraph condition, post hoc analyses 
using a Bonferroni correction revealed that participants in the apology condition had 
significantly more positive character valence (M = 4.04, SD = 0.10) than participants in 
the uncertain (M = 3.16, SD = 0.12, p < .001) or denial (M = 2.80, SD = 0.11, p < .001) 
conditions. However, the uncertain and denial conditions did not significantly differ 
from each other (p = .07). 
Hypothesis Tests and Research Questions 
Risk Convergence  
H1a predicted that as social distance to an at-risk character decreased, the 
discrepancy between the perceptions of self-risk and character-risk decreased (i.e., self-
risk and character-risk converge). A five stage hierarchical multiple regression was 
conducted with risk discrepancy as the dependent variable. As can be seen in Table 6, 
the first block included background variables: age, sex, sensation seeking, and social 
desirability. The second block included drinker status, likelihood of drinking and 
driving, and experiences with health topic consequences. The third block included the 
paragraph valence conditions and dummy coded variables for narrative type. Because 
this study measured social distance in two ways (i.e., using a modified version of 
Bogardus’ (1933) social distance scale and So and Shen’s (2015) social distance scale), 
both variables were included in the regression. The fourth block included Bogardus’ 
(1933) perceived social distance, whereas the final block included So and Shen’s (2015) 
perceived social distance. Overall, the model explained 25% of the variance of risk 
discrepancy (see Table 10). The adjusted R2 was .21.  
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The Bogardus measure of social distance did not significantly impact the 
discrepancy between risk perceptions when entered into Block 4, Fchange (1, 258) = 3.12, 
p = .08, ∆R2 = 0.01). However, So and Shen’s social distance measure accounted for 
4% of the variance in risk discrepancy when entered into Block 5, Fchange (1, 257) = 
14.18, p = .08. So & Shen’s (2015) perceived social distance had a positive, significant 
relationship with the discrepancy between risk perceptions, B = 7.48, β = .27, p < .001. 
As social distance with an at-risk character decreased, the disparity between character- 
and personal-risk decreased as well (i.e. the risks converge). Thus, H1a was supported 
for the So & Shen measure of social distance, but not for the Bogardus measure. 
Likelihood of drinking and driving (B = -6.52, β = -.30, p < .001) and knowing 
someone who had been arrested for a drinking and driving violation (0 = no, 1 = yes; B 
= 9.56, β = .13, p < .05) were significant predictors of risk discrepancy. 
Table 10. Hierarchical Regression of Social Distance on the Discrepancy between Risk 
Perceptions 
  B SE B β 
Block 1     
 Constant 62.50** 20.18 - 
 Sensation Seeking -4.10* 1.94 -.13 
 Age 0.002 0.60 .0001 
 Sex (1 = male; 2 = female) 6.30 4.27 .09 
 Social Desirability 2.15 1.80 .07 
Block 2     
 Constant 59.30** 18.73 - 
 Sensation Seeking -2.34 1.90 -.07 
 Age 1.18* 0.59 .12 
 Sex (1 = male; 2 = female) 3.61 4.02 .05 
 Social Desirability 2.31 1.68 .08 
 Likelihood of drinking & driving  -7.89*** 1.40 -.36 
 Have you ever been arrested for a 
drinking and driving violation? 
(DUI1) 
-25.98 13.80 -.11 
 Do you know anyone who has 
been arrested for a drinking and 
driving violation? (DUI2) 
9.84* 4.73 .13 
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 Have you or a close friend or 
family member been in a car 
accident involving alcohol? 
(DUI3) 
-8.51* 3.87 -.13 
 Drinks alcohol -9.43 5.85 -.10 
Block 3     
 Constant 58.85** 18.98 - 
 Sensation Seeking -2.36 1.92 -.07 
 Age 1.17* 0.59 .12 
 Sex (1 = male; 2 = female) 3.63 4.03 .05 
 Social Desirability 2.14 1.68 .07 
 Likelihood of drinking & driving -7.86*** 1.41 -.36 
 DUI1 -24.76 13.91 -.10 
 DUI2 8.99 4.80 .12 
 DUI3 -7.99* 3.90 -.12 
 Drinks alcohol -9.12 5.89 -.10 
 Paragraph condition -2.98 3.76 -.05 
 Uncertain dummy coded 2.96 4.66 .04 
 Denial dummy coded 6.24 4.41 .09 
Block 4     
 Constant 42.12* 21.14 - 
 Sensation Seeking -2.05 1.92 -.06 
 Age 1.20* 0.59 .12 
 Sex (1 = male; 2 = female) 2.77 4.04 .04 
 Social Desirability 2.16 1.68 .07 
 Likelihood of drinking & driving -7.90*** 1.41 -.36 
 DUI1 -22.93 13.89 -.09 
 DUI2 8.71 4.79 .12 
 DUI3 -7.49 3.89 -.11 
 Drinks alcohol -8.65 5.87 -.09 
 Paragraph condition -0.84 3.94 -.01 
 Uncertain dummy coded 1.87 4.68 .03 
 Denial dummy coded 4.75 4.47 .07 
 Social distance (Bogardus) 2.92 1.66 .11 
Block 5     
 Constant 12.27 22.09  
 Sensation Seeking -0.10 1.95 -.003 
 Age 0.81 .58 .08 
 Sex (1 = male; 2 = female) 1.68 3.95 .02 
 Social Desirability 0.96 1.67 .03 
 Likelihood of drinking & driving -6.52*** 1.42 -.30 
 DUI1 -17.51 13.62 -.07 
 DUI2 9.56* 4.67 .13 
 DUI3 -6.91 3.80 -.10 
 Drinks alcohol -5.43 5.79 -.06 
 Paragraph condition -1.00 3.84 -.02 
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 Uncertain dummy coded 1.51 4.57 .02 
 Denial dummy coded 5.17 4.36 .07 
 Social distance (Bogardus) 0.29 1.76 .01 
 Social distance (So & Shen) 7.48*** 1.99 .27 
Note. N = 272. R2 = .04 for Block 1, ∆R2 = .16 for Block 2 (p < .001), ∆R2 = .01 for 
Block 3 (p = .01), ∆R2 = .01 for Block 4 (p = .08), ∆R2 = .04 for Block 5 (p < .001). 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; for dichotomous questions: 0 = no, 1 = yes. 
 
Using hierarchical linear regression and the same covariates (with the addition 
of perceived character-risk in Block 2) and blocks as in H1a, H1b was tested to 
determine if perceived self-risk negatively relates to social distance. Overall, the model 
explained 26.9% of the variance in perceived self-risk (see Table 11). The adjusted R2 
was .23.  
Similar to H1a, the modified Bogardus (1933) scale of social distance did not 
significantly affect the discrepancy between risk perceptions when entered into block 4, 
Fchange (1, 257) = 0.04, p = .84, ∆R2 = 0.0001. However, the So and Shen (2015) 
perceived social distance scale accounted for 6.4% of the variance in self risk when 
entered into Block 5, Fchange (1, 256) = 22.47, p < .001. So & Shen’s (2015) perceived 
social distance was a negative, significant predictor of perceived self-risk, B = -7.05, β = 
-0.33, ∆R2 = 0.06, p < .001. As social distance with an at-risk character decreased, self-
risk increased. Thus, H1b was supported for the So & Shen measure of social distance, 
but not for the Bogardus measure. So, like H1a, H1b was supported for the So & Shen 
measure of social distance, but not for the Bogardus measure. Likelihood of drinking 
and driving (B = 4.83, β = .29, p < .001) was also a significant predictor of self-risk. 
Table 11. Hierarchical Regression of Social Distance on Perceived Self-Risk 
 B SE B β 
Block 1     
 Constant 13.26 15.13 - 
Sensation Seeking 3.39* 1.45 .14 
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Age 0.14 0.45 .02 
Sex (1 = male; 2 = female) -1.29 3.20 -.02 
Social Desirability -3.32* 1.35 -.15 
Block 2     
Constant 15.12 15.02 - 
Sensation Seeking 1.79 1.43 .08 
Age -0.84 0.44 -.12 
Sex (1 = male; 2 = female) 0.89 3.04 .02 
Social Desirability -3.34** 1.26 -.15 
Likelihood of drinking and 
driving 
6.17*** 1.06 .38 
DUI1 22.94* 10.37 .12 
DUI2 -3.88 3.58 -.07 
DUI3 1.86 2.94 .04 
Drinks alcohol 6.29 4.40 .09 
 Character-risk perception 0.03 0.07 .03 
Block 3     
Constant 14.57 15.24 - 
Sensation Seeking 1.86 1.45 .08 
Age -0.82 0.45 -.11 
Sex (1 = male; 2 = female) 0.96 3.05 .02 
Social Desirability -3.33** 1.27 -.15 
Likelihood of drinking and 
driving 
6.11*** 1.07 .37 
DUI1 21.89* 10.49 .12 
DUI2 -4.02 3.64 -.07 
DUI3 1.92 2.97 .04 
Drinks alcohol 6.51 4.45 .09 
Character-risk perception 0.03 0.07 .03 
Paragraph condition -0.18 2.85 .00 
Uncertain dummy coded 0.92 3.53 .02 
Denial dummy coded -2.04 3.34 -.04 
Block 4     
Constant 15.90 16.58 - 
Sensation Seeking 1.84 1.46 .08 
Age -0.82 0.45 -.11 
Sex (1 = male; 2 = female) 1.03 3.08 .02 
Social Desirability -3.32* 1.27 -.15 
Likelihood of drinking and 
driving 
6.12*** 1.08 .37 
DUI1 21.73* 10.54 .12 
DUI2 -4.00 3.65 -.07 
DUI3 1.89 2.98 .04 
Drinks alcohol 6.47 4.46 .09 
Character-risk perception 0.03 0.07 .03 
Paragraph condition -0.36 2.99 -.01 
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Uncertain dummy coded 1.01 3.56 .02 
Denial dummy coded -1.92 3.40 -.04 
Social distance (Bogardus) -0.26 1.27 -.01 
Block 5     
 Constant 43.65* 16.96 - 
 Sensation Seeking .003 1.45 .0001 
 Age -0.46 0.44 -.06 
 Sex (1 = male; 2 = female) 2.03 2.96 .04 
 Social Desirability -2.19 1.25 -.10 
 Likelihood of drinking and 
driving 
4.83*** 1.07 .29 
 DUI1 16.64 10.18 .09 
 DUI2 -4.84 3.51 -.09 
 DUI3 1.38 2.87 .03 
 Drinks alcohol 3.45 4.33 .05 
 Character-risk perception 0.04 0.07 .03 
 Paragraph condition -0.20 2.87 .00 
 Uncertain dummy coded 1.33 3.42 .02 
 Denial dummy coded -2.33 3.26 -.04 
 Social distance (Bogardus) 2.21 1.33 .11 
 Social distance (So & Shen) -7.05*** 1.48 -.33 
Note. N = 272. R2 = .05 for Block 1, ∆R2 = .15 for Block 2 (p < .001), ∆R2 = .002 for 
Block 3 (p = .86), ∆R2 = .0001 for Block 4 (p = .84), ∆R2 = .06 for Block 5 (p < 
.001). * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; for dichotomous questions: 0 = no, 1 = yes. 
 
Narrative Engagement and the RCM 
Hypotheses two through six and hypothesis nine focused on the role of 
perceived social distance in the relationship between different engagement variables and 
the discrepancy between perceptions of self-risk and character-risk (i.e. risk 
convergence). H1a and H1b which examined the risk convergence process, were 
supported only in the case of the So and Shen (2015) measure. Although the narrative 
engagement hypotheses were tested with each measure of social distance as the 
mediator, these hypotheses were not supported when using the Bogardus (1933) social 
distance scale. Therefore, the focus of the results centered on the So & Shen (2015) 
measure of social distance. 
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Age, sex, sensation seeking, social desirability, likelihood of drinking and 
driving, experiences with health topic consequences, and paragraph valence and 
narrative ending conditions were included as covariates. Social distance (So & Shen, 
2015) was included as a covariate when the modified Bogardus (1933) version of social 
distance served as a mediator, and vice versa. Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macro was 
used to test the predicted mediations analyses, using a simple mediation based on 5000 
bootstrapped samples and bias-corrected and accelerated 95% confidence intervals 
(BCIa). Effects are significant when the upper and lower bound of the BCIa do not 
include zero. 
The bootstrapping method provides researchers with a more powerful test of 
indirect effects than the more conservative causal steps approach popularized by Baron 
and Kenny (1986). The causal steps process requires four steps to test for mediation: (1) 
total effect must be significant (i.e., the independent variable must predict the dependent 
variable; path c), (2) the independent variable must significantly predict the mediator 
(path a), (3) the mediator must significantly predict the dependent variable (path b), and 
(4) the direct effect must be significant (i.e. the independent variable must predict the 
dependent variable after controlling for the mediator; path c’). With Baron and Kenny 
(1986), a researcher has to conduct three null hypothesis tests prior to testing for 
mediation, whereas PROCESS’s use of bootstrapping allows for a single test of indirect 
effect (Hayes, 2013). Additionally, the causal steps approach does not formally test for 
an indirect effect (the product of a and b) of the mediation, but uses the four tests as 
antecedents to the indirect effect (Hayes, 2013).  
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A final criticism of the Baron and Kenny (1986) method is that they state a non-
significant total effect cannot be mediated. However, Zhao, Lynch, and Chen (2010) 
explain that a total effect is not always a good estimator of an independent variable’s 
effect on a dependent variable and should not be a prerequisite for testing a mediation. 
Relying on the causal steps approach, and after finding a non-significant total effect, 
could lead a researcher to underanalyze his or her data, resulting in Type II error 
(Hayes, 2013). Because of these critiques of the causal steps approach, the 
bootstrapping method of PROCESS was used to test mediations in this dissertation. 
H2 was assessed using PROCESS. H2 predicted that perceived social distance 
toward an at-risk character mediated the relationship between identification with the 
character and the self- and character-risk discrepancy. Perceived social distance 
(indirect effect = -3.44, SE = 1.51) mediated the relationship between identification and 
risk discrepancy, controlling for covariates. The generated bootstrap confidence interval 
(BCa CI [-6.80, -0.85]) excludes zero and the Sobel test confirmed a significant indirect 
effect for identification (indirect effect = -3.44, SE = 1.31, Z = -2.10, p < .05). As can be 
seen in Figure 1 and Table 12, there were significant direct relationships between 
identification and perceived social distance and perceived social distance and risk 
discrepancy. The more identification one felt with the character, the less perceived 
social distance between self and character, and the less risk discrepancy between self 
and character. The direct effect was not significant (B = -3.26, t (257) = -1.31, p = .18) 
but the total effect of identification on risk discrepancy was significant (B = -6.69, t 
(258) = -3.08, p < .01). Therefore, perceived social distance mediated the relationship 
between identification and risk discrepancy; H2 was supported. 
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Figure 1. Mediation of perceived social distance on the relationship between 
identification and risk discrepancy. The direct effect (i.e., unstandardized regression 
coefficient between identification and risk discrepancy, controlling for perceived social 
distance) is in parentheses. ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
Table 12. Model Coefficients for Mediation of Perceived Social Distance on the 
Relationship between Identification and Risk Discrepancy 
  Consequent 
  M (Social distance)  Y (Risk discrepancy) 
Antecedent  B SE  BCa CI  B SE BCa CI  
X 
(Identification) a -0.55*** 0.06 -0.67, -0.43 c' -3.25 2.48  -8.14, 1.63 
M (Social 
distance)  — — — b 6.25* 2.27 1.79, 10.72 
Constant i1 6.80*** 0.64 5.54, 8.07 i2 33.49 28.01 -21.67, 88.66 
  R2 = .56  R2 = .25 
  F(13, 258) = 25.06,  p < .001  
F(14, 257) = 6.19, 
p < .001 
N = 272. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
H3 predicted that perceived social distance toward an at-risk character mediated 
the relationship between transportation with the character and the self- and character-
risk discrepancy. A test of H3 found that perceived social distance (indirect effect = -
1.88, SE = 0.62) mediated the relationship between transportation and risk discrepancy, 
controlling for covariates. The BCa CI [-3.48, -0.90] excludes zero, and the Sobel test 
confirmed a significant indirect effect for transportation (indirect effect = -1.88, SE = 
.67, Z = -2.78, p < .01). Table 13 displays the significant direct relationships between 
transportation and perceived social distance, and perceived social distance and risk 
discrepancy. As depicted in Figure 2, the more transportation experienced, the less 
Identification 
Perceived social 







perceived social distance between self and character, and the less risk discrepancy 
between self and character. Neither the direct effect (B = 3.20, t (257) = 1.66, p = .10) 
nor the total effect of transportation on risk discrepancy were significant (B = 1.32, t 
(258) = 0.68, p = .50). H3 is supported; this is an indirect-only mediation. 
 
Figure 2. Mediation of perceived social distance on the relationship between 
transportation and risk discrepancy. The direct effect (i.e., unstandardized regression 
coefficient between transportation and risk discrepancy, controlling for perceived social 
distance) is in parentheses. *** p < .001. 
 
Table 13. Model Coefficients for Mediation of Perceived Social Distance on the 
Relationship between Transportation and Risk Discrepancy 
  Consequent 
  M (Social distance)  Y (Risk discrepancy) 
Antecedent  B SE BCa CI  B SE BCa CI 
X 
(Transportation) a -0.22*** 0.06 -0.34, -0.11 c' 3.20 1.93 -0.61, 7.01 
M (Social 
distance)  — — — b 8.51*** 2.01 4.56, 12.47 
Constant i1 4.84*** 0.68 3.51, 6.18 i2 -5.14 23.96 -52.31, 42.04 
  R2 = .44  R2 = .26 
  F(13, 258) = 15.57,  p < .001  
F(14, 257) = 6.29,  
p < .001 
N = 272. *** p < .001. 
 
H4 predicted that perceived social distance toward an at-risk character mediated 
the relationship between perceived realism and risk discrepancy. After performing a 
CFA on the realism measure, its dimensions were used as five separate scales to test 
H4. The other dimensions are included as covariates in each analysis. 
Transportation 
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Plausibility. Perceived social distance (indirect effect = 0.01, SE = 0.02) did not 
mediate the relationship between perceived plausibility and risk discrepancy, 
controlling for covariates. The BCa CI [-0.03, 0.05] includes zero, and the Sobel test 
was not significant for perceived plausibility (indirect effect = 0.01, SE = 0.02, Z = 0.51, 
p = .61). As can be seen in Figure 3, there was not a significant direct relationship 
between perceived plausibility and perceived social distance; however the relationship 
between perceived social distance and risk discrepancy was significant. Table 14 shows 
that neither the direct effect of the mediation [B = 0.12, t (253) = 1.73, p = .08], nor the 
total effect of perceived plausibility on risk discrepancy were significant [B = 0.13, t 
(254) = 1.81, p = .07]. These results indicate that perceived social distance does not 
mediate the relationship between perceived plausibility and risk discrepancy. So, H4 
was not supported for plausibility. 
 
Figure 3. Mediation of perceived social distance on the relationship between perceived 
realism (plausibility) and risk discrepancy. The direct effect (i.e., unstandardized 
regression coefficient between perceived realism and risk discrepancy, controlling for 
perceived social distance) is in parentheses. *** p < .001. 
 
Table 14. Model Coefficients for Mediation of Perceived Social Distance on the 
Relationship between Perceived Plausibility and Risk Discrepancy 
  Consequent 
  M (Social distance)  Y (Risk discrepancy) 
Antecedent  B SE BCa CI  B SE BCa CI 
X (Perceived realism: 











M (Social distance)  — — — b .28*** 0.07 0.14, 0.42 
Constant i1 -0.97* .41 -1.78, -0.16 i2 -0.48 0.47 -1.40, 0.44 
  R2 = .41  R2 = .27 
  F(17, 254) = 10.60,  p < .001  
F(18, 253) = 5.28, 
 p < .001 
N = 272. * p < .05, *** p < .001. 
 
Perceptual quality. Perceived social distance (indirect effect = -0.03, SE = .0.02) 
did not mediate the relationship between perceptual quality and risk discrepancy, when 
controlling for covariates. The BCa CI [-0.08, 0.001] includes zero, and the Sobel test 
of the indirect effect was not significant (indirect effect = -0.03, SE = 0.22, Z = -1.42, p 
= .16). As can be seen in Figure 4 and Table 15, the direct relationship between 
perceptual quality and perceived social distance was not significant. However the 
relationship between perceived social distance and risk discrepancy was significant. The 
direct effect (B = -0.05, t (253) = 0.56, p = .57) and total effect (B = 0.01, t (254) = 
0.17, p = .87) were not significant. H4 was not supported for perceptual quality; 
perceived social distance did not mediate the relationship between perceptual quality 
and risk discrepancy.  
 
Figure 4. Mediation of perceived social distance on the relationship between perceived 
realism (perceptual quality) and risk discrepancy. The direct effect (i.e., unstandardized 
regression coefficient between perceived realism and risk discrepancy, controlling for 












Table 15. Model Coefficients for Mediation of Perceived Social Distance on the 
Relationship between Perceived Realism (Perceptual Quality) and Risk Discrepancy 
  Consequent 
  M (Social distance)  Y (Risk discrepancy) 
Antecedent  B SE BCa CI  B SE BCa CI 
X (Perceived 
realism: quality) a -0.11 0.07 -0.26, 0.03 c' 0.05 0.08 -0.11, 0.21 
M (Social distance)  — — — b 0.28*** 0.70 0.14, 0.42 
Constant i1 -0.97* 0.41 -1.78, -0.16 i2 -0.48 0.47 -1.40, 0.44 
  R2 = .42  R2 = .27 
  F(17, 254) = 10.60,  p < .001  
F(18, 253) = 5.28,  
p < .001 
N = 272. * p < .05, , *** p < .001. 
Typicality. Perceived social distance (indirect effect = -0.02, SE = 0.02) did not 
mediate the relationship between perceived typicality and risk discrepancy, controlling 
for covariates. The BCa CI [-0.06, 0.003] includes zero, and the Sobel test of the 
indirect effect was not significant (indirect effect = -0.02, SE = 0.17, Z = -1.39, p = .16). 
As illustrated in Figure 5, there was not a significant relationship between perceived 
typicality and perceived social distance; however, there was a significant, positive 
relationship between perceived social distance and risk discrepancy. As perceived social 
distance between self and character increased, so did the risk discrepancy between self 
and character. Table 16 shows that the direct effect of the mediation was not significant 
[B = 0.10, t (253) = 1.57, p = .10]. Similarly, the total effect of perceived typicality on 
risk discrepancy was not significant [B = 0.07, t (254) = 1.16, p = .25]. So, H4 was not 
supported for typicality. 
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Figure 5. Mediation of perceived social distance on the relationship between perceived 
realism (typicality) and risk discrepancy. The direct effect (i.e., unstandardized 
regression coefficient between perceived realism and risk discrepancy, controlling for 
perceived social distance) is in parentheses. *** p < .001. 
 
Table 16. Model Coefficients for Mediation of Perceived Social Distance on the 
Relationship between Perceived Typicality and Risk Discrepancy 
  Consequent 
  M (Social distance)  Y (Risk discrepancy) 
Antecedent  B SE BCa CI  B SE BCa CI 
X (Perceived 
realism: typicality) a -0.09 .06 -0.20, 0.02 c' 0.10 0.06 -0.03, 0.22 
M (Social distance)  — — — b 0.28*** 0.07 0.14, 0.42 
Constant i1 -0.97* 0.41 -1.78, -0.16 i2 -0.48 0.47 -1.40, 0.44 
  R2 = .42  R2 = .27 
  F(17, 254) = 10.60,  p < .001  
F(18, 253) = 5.28,  
p < .001 
N = 272. * p < .05, *** p < .001. 
Narrative consistency. Perceived social distance (indirect effect = -0.01, SE = 
0.02) did not significantly mediate the relationship between perceived narrative 
consistency and risk discrepancy, controlling for covariates. The BCa CI [-0.06, 0.03] 
includes zero, and the Sobel test of the indirect effect was not significant (indirect effect 
= -0.01, SE = 0.23, Z = -0.31, p = .76). As can be seen in Figure 6, there was not a 
significant direct relationship between perceived narrative consistency and perceived 
social distance. However, the relationship between perceived social distance and risk 











-0.66, p = .51] and total effect [B = -0.06, t (254) = -0.72, p = .47] were not significant. 
H4 was not supported for narrative consistency. 
 
Figure 6. Mediation of perceived social distance on the relationship between perceived 
realism (narrative consistency) and risk discrepancy. The direct effect (i.e., 
unstandardized regression coefficient between perceived realism and risk discrepancy, 
controlling for perceived social distance) is in parentheses. *** p < .001. 
 
Table 17. Model Coefficients for Mediation of Perceived Social Distance on the 
Relationship between Perceived Narrative Consistency and Risk Discrepancy 
  Consequent 
  M (Social distance)  Y (Risk discrepancy) 
Antecedent  B SE BCa CI  B SE  BCa CI 
X (Perceived realism: 
narrative consistency) a -0.02 0.08 -0.18, 0.13 c' -0.06 0.09 -0.23, 0.11 
M (Social distance)  — — — b 0.28*** 0.07 0.14, 0.42 
Constant i1 -0.97* 0.41 -1.78, -0.16 i2 -0.48 0.47 -1.40, 0.44 
  R2 = .42  R2 = .27 
  F(17, 254) = 10.60,  p < .001  
F(18, 253) = 5.28, 
p < .001 
N = 272. * p < .05, *** p < .001. 
Narrative coherence. Perceived social distance (indirect effect = -0.03, SE = 
0.02) did not significantly mediate the relationship between perceived narrative 
consistency and risk discrepancy, controlling for covariates. The BCa CI [-0.09, 0.003] 
includes zero and the Sobel test was not significant (indirect effect = -0.03, SE = 0.02, Z 
= -1.35, p = .18). As can be seen in Figure 7, there was not a significant direct 
relationship between perceived narrative coherence and perceived social distance. 











significant. Table 18 shows that the direct effect of the mediation was not significant [B 
= -0.02, t (253) = -1.03, p = .30]. Additionally, the total effect of perceived narrative 
coherence on risk discrepancy was not significant [B = -0.05, t (254) = -0.62, p = .54]. 
H4 was not supported for narrative coherence. 
 
Figure 7. Mediation of perceived social distance on the relationship between perceived 
realism (narrative coherence) and risk discrepancy. The direct effect (i.e., 
unstandardized regression coefficient between perceived realism and risk discrepancy, 
controlling for perceived social distance) is in parentheses. *** p < .001. 
 
Table 18. Model Coefficients for Mediation of Perceived Social Distance on the 
Relationship between Perceived Narrative Coherence and Risk Discrepancy 
  Consequent 
  M (Social distance)  Y (Risk discrepancy) 
Antecedent  B SE BCa CI  B SE BCa CI 
X (Perceived realism: 
narrative coherence) a -0.10 0.07 -0.24, 0.03 c' -0.02 0.08 -0.17, 0.13 
M (Social distance)  — — — b 0.28*** 0.07 0.14, 0.42 
Constant i1 -.97* 0.41 -1.78, -0.16 i2 -0.48 0.47 -1.40, 0.44 
  R2 = .42  R2 = .27 
  F(17, 254) = 10.60,  p < .001  
F(18, 253) = 5.28, 
p < .001 
N = 272. * p < .05, *** p < .001. 
H5 predicted that perceived social distance toward an at-risk character mediated 
the relationship between self-referencing with the character and the self- and character-
risk discrepancy. Perceived social distance (indirect effect = -1.72, SE = 0.73) mediated 
the relationship between self-referencing and risk discrepancy, controlling for 











significant indirect effect for self-referencing (indirect effect = -1.72, SE = 0.65, Z = -
2.66, p < .01). As shown in Figure 8, the more self-referencing experienced, the less 
perceived social distance between self and character, and the less risk discrepancy 
between self and character. Table 19 shows that the direct effect was not significant [B 
= -2.45, t (257) = -1.72, p = .07]. However, the total effect of self-referencing on risk 
discrepancy was significant [B = -4.17, t (258) = -3.18, p < .01]. Therefore, H5 is 
supported; perceived social distance mediates the relationship between self-referencing 
and risk discrepancy. 
 
Figure 8. Mediation of perceived social distance on the relationship between self-
referencing and risk discrepancy. The direct effect (i.e., unstandardized regression 
coefficient between self-referencing and risk discrepancy, controlling for perceived 
social distance) is in parentheses. p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
Table 19. Model Coefficients for Mediation of Perceived Social Distance on the 
Relationship between Self-Referencing and Risk Discrepancy 
  Consequent 
  M (Social distance)  Y (Risk discrepancy) 
Antecedent  B SE BCa CI  B SE BCa CI 
X (Self-
referencing) a -0.28*** 0.04 -0.35, -0.20 c' -2.45 1.42 -5.26, 0.35 
M (Social 
distance)  — — — b 6.19*** 2.15 1.95, 10.44 
Constant i1 4.29*** 0.60 3.12, 5.46 i2 19.83 22.57 -24.62, 64.27 
  R2 = .51  R2 = .26 
  F(13, 258) = 20.87,  p < .001  
F(14, 257) = 6.31,  
p < .001 











H6 predicted perceived social distance toward an at-risk character mediated the 
relationship between PSI and risk discrepancy, controlling for character valence in 
addition to the covariates used in the other mediation analyses. As explained in the 
method section, the study measured PSI in terms of cognitive PSI and affective PSI. 
Thus, for H6 separate mediation models for each dimension of PSI were conducted, 
while controlling for the other dimension. Additionally, the composite scales of PSI 
indicated low reliability. Therefore, principal component measures were created for the 
PSI measures. In the two mediations involving PSI, the first PC score was used for all 
scale measures.  
Cognitive PSI. Perceived social distance (indirect effect = -0.02, SE = 0.01) did 
not mediate the relationship between cognitive PSI and risk discrepancy, controlling for 
covariates. The BCa CI [-0.05, 0.004] includes zero, and the Sobel test was not 
significant (indirect effect = -0.02, SE = 0.01, Z = -1.19, p = .24). As can be seen in 
Figure 9, there was not a significant direct relationship between cognitive PSI and 
perceived social distance; however, the relationship between perceived social distance 
and risk discrepancy was significant. Table 20 shows that the direct effect of the 
mediation was not significant (B = 0.09, t (255) = 1.61, p = .11), nor was the total effect 
of cognitive PSI on risk discrepancy (B = 0.08, t (256) = 1.29, p = .20), indicating that 
perceived social distance did not mediate the relationship between cognitive PSI and 
risk discrepancy. Thus, H6 was not supported in the case of cognitive PSI. 
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Figure 9. Mediation of perceived social distance on the relationship between cognitive 
PSI and risk discrepancy. The direct effect (i.e., unstandardized regression coefficient 
between PSI and risk discrepancy, controlling for perceived social distance) is in 
parentheses. *** p < .001. 
 
Table 20. Model Coefficients for Mediation of Perceived Social Distance on the 
Relationship between Cognitive PSI and Risk Discrepancy 
  Consequent 
  M (Social distance)  Y (Risk discrepancy) 
Antecedent  B SE BCa CI  B SE BCa CI 
X (Cognitive PSI) a -0.07 0.05 -0.17, 0.03 c' 0.09 0.06 -0.02, 0.21 
M (Social distance)  — — — b 0.26*** 0.07 0.12, 0.40 
Constant i1 -0.81* 0.40 -1.59, -0.02 i2 -0.64 0.46 -1.54, 0.26 
  R2 = .42  R2 = .25 
  F(15, 256) = 12.46, p < .001  
F(16, 255) = 5.33, 
p < .001 
N = 272. * p < .05, *** p < .001. 
 
Affective PSI. Perceived social distance (indirect effect = -0.011, SE = 0.02) did 
not mediate the relationship between affective PSI and risk discrepancy, controlling for 
covariates. The generated bootstrap confidence [-0.04, 0.02] interval included zero and 
the Sobel test was not significant (indirect effect = -0.01, SE = 0.02, Z = -0.51, p = .61). 
As can be seen in Figure 10, there was not a significant direct relationship between 
affective PSI and perceived social distance; however, the relationship between 
perceived social distance and risk discrepancy was significant. Table 21 shows that the 
direct effect of the mediation was not significant [B =-0.08, t (255) = -1.13, p = .26], 
nor was the total effect of affective PSI on risk discrepancy [B = -0.08, t (256) = -1.22, 
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p = .22], indicating that perceived social distance did not mediate the relationship 
between affective PSI and risk discrepancy. Thus, H6 was not supported for either 
cognitive or affective PSI. 
 
Figure 10. Mediation of perceived social distance on the relationship between affective 
PSI and risk discrepancy. The direct effect (i.e., unstandardized regression coefficient 
between PSI and risk discrepancy, controlling for perceived social distance) is in 
parentheses. ** p < .01. 
 
Table 21. Model Coefficients for Mediation of Perceived Social Distance on the 
Relationship between Affective PSI and Risk Discrepancy 
  Consequent 
  M (Social distance)  Y (Risk discrepancy) 
Antecedent  B SE BCa CI  B SE BCa CI 
X (Affective PSI) a -0.03 0.06 -0.15, 0.08 c' -0.08 0.07 -0.21, 0.06 
M (Social distance)  — — — b 0.26*** 0.07 0.12, 0.40 
Constant i1 -0.81* 0.40 -1.59, -0.02 i2 -0.64 0.46 -1.54, 0.26 
  R2 = .42  R2 = .25 
  F(15, 256) = 12.46, p < .001  
F(16, 255) = 5.33, 
p < .001 
N = 272. * p < .05, *** p < .001. 
 
Similar to H6, H9 predicted that perceived social distance toward an at-risk 
character mediated the relationship between PSR with the at-risk character and risk 
discrepancy, controlling for valence, in addition to the covariates used in the other 
mediation analyses. Perceived social distance (indirect effect = -1.37, SE = 0.78) 
mediated the relationship between PSR and risk discrepancy. The BCa CI [-3.48, -0.28] 
excluded zero, and the Sobel test of the indirect effect was significant (indirect effect = -
Affective PSI 
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1.37 SE = 0.68, Z = -2.03, p < .05). As can be seen in Figure 11 and Table 22, there 
were significant direct relationships between PSR with character and perceived social 
distance and perceived social distance and risk discrepancy. The more PSR 
experienced, the less perceived social distance between self and character, and the less 
risk discrepancy between self and character. The direct effect [B = 0.48, t (256) = 0.20, 
p = .84] and total effect [B = -0.90, t (257) = -0.37, p = .71] were not significant, 
meaning this is an indirect-only mediation. 
 
Figure 11. Mediation of perceived social distance on the relationship between PSR 
character and risk discrepancy. The direct effect (i.e., unstandardized regression 
coefficient between PSR and risk discrepancy, controlling for perceived social distance) 
is in parentheses. * p < .05, *** p < .001. 
 
Table 22. Model Coefficients for Mediation of Perceived Social Distance on the 
Relationship between PSR Character and Risk Discrepancy 
  Consequent 
  M (Social distance)  Y (Risk discrepancy) 
Antecedent  B SE BCa CI  B SE BCa CI 
X (PSR character) a -0.18* 0.07 -0.32, -0.04 c' 0.48 2.37 -4.19, 5.15 
M (Social distance)  — — — b 7.59*** 2.03 3.60, 11.59 
Constant i1 5.66*** .77 4.14, 7.18 i2 16.57 27.57 -37.76, 70.89 
  R2 = .44  R2 = .25 
  F(14, 257) = 14.51, p < .001  
F(15, 256) = 5.64,  
p < .001 
N = 272. * p < .05, *** p < .001. 
 
 In addition to introducing PSR with an at-risk character into the RCM, this study 
examined how PSR and PSI with an at-risk character influenced each other. Hypothesis 
PSR character 
Perceived social 







8 predicted that participants’ existing PSR with an at-risk character positively related to 
strength of PSI with the at-risk character. Originally, the researcher intended to filter out 
participants who had not seen the stimuli show prior to the experiment. This filtering 
process was planned to ensure that only PSRs developed prior to the study were tested. 
However, only 66 participants had seen at least one episode of Parenthood, which did 
not allow for enough statistical power to test the hypothesis. Therefore, the relationship 
between character PSR and character PSI (cognitive and affective), controlling for 
episode viewing, was tested with the entire sample, using hierarchical regressions. 
The first block included episodes viewed, exposure to Parenthood storyline used 
in video conditions, and familiarity with the character. The second block included PSR 
with actress, and the PSI variable not positioned as the dependent variable. The third 
block included paragraph valence condition and video conditions. PSR with the 
character was entered into the fourth block.  
The overall model explained 9.8% of the variance for cognitive PSI (see Table 
23). The adjusted R2 was .07. However, PSR with the character did not significantly 
impact cognitive PSI when entered into Block 4, Fchange (1, 262) = 0.97, p = .33, ∆R2 = 
0.003. Thus, H8 was not supported; PSR with the character did not significantly affect 
cognitive PSI with the character. 
Table 23. Hierarchical Regression of PSR Character on Cognitive PSI 
 B SE B β 
Block 1     
 Constant -0.01 0.64 - 
Episodes viewed 0.01 0.07 .01 
Viewed stimuli episode 0.07 0.28 .02 
Familiarity with character -0.10 0.15 -.10 
Block 2     
Constant 0.19 0.62 - 
Episodes viewed 0.003 0.07 .01 
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Using a hierarchical linear regression and the same covariates (with cognitive 
PSI taking the place of affective PSI in block two), H8 was tested to see if PSR with the 
character was significantly associated with affective PSI. Overall, the model explained 
32% of the variance in affective PSR (see Table 24). The adjusted R2 was .30.  
  PSR with the character accounted for 17.1% of the variance in affective PSI 
when entered into Block 4, Fchange (1, 262) = 65.71, p < .001). PSR with the character 
had a positive, significant relationship with affective PSI, B = 0.45, β = .45, p < .001. 
Thus, H8 was supported for affective PSI but not cognitive PSI. Cognitive PSI was a 
positive predictor of affective PSI (B = 0.23, β = .23, p < .001). 
Viewed stimuli episode 0.02 0.27 .01 
Familiarity with character -0.16 0.14 -.16 
PSR with actress 0.02 0.06 .02 
 Affective PSI 0.25*** 0.06 .23 
Block 3     
Constant 0.02 0.62 - 
Episodes viewed -0.01 0.07 -.01 
Viewed stimuli episode 0.06 0.28 .02 
Familiarity with character -0.14 0.14 -.14 
PSR with actress       0.01 0.06 .01 
Affective PSI 0.27*** 0.06 .27 
Paragraph condition     -0.13 0.12          -.07 
Uncertain dummy coded 0.08 0.15          .04 
Denial dummy coded 0.33* 0.14          .16 
Block 4     
Constant 0.05 0.62 - 
Episodes viewed 0.002 0.07 .004 
Viewed stimuli episode 0.05 0.28 .02 
Familiarity with character -0.15 0.14 -.15 
PSR with actress 0.02 0.06 .02 
Affective PSI 0.30*** 0.07 .30 
Paragraph condition -0.11 0.12 -.06 
Uncertain dummy coded 0.07 0.15 .03 
Denial dummy coded 0.31* 0.14 .15 
PSR character -0.07 0.07 -.07 
Note. N = 272. R2 = .01 for Block 1 (p = .36), ∆R2 = .06 for Block 2 (p < .001), ∆R2 
= .02 for Block 3 (p = .09), ∆R2 = .003 for Block 4 (p = .33). * p < .05, *** p < .001; 
for dummy coded variables: 0 = absent, 1 = present. 
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Table 24. Hierarchical Regression of PSR Character on Affective PSI 
Valence and the RCM 
H7 predicted that valence moderated the relationship between PSI and perceived 
social distance. Two moderation analyses were conducted for H7 (one for cognitive 
PSI, one for affective PSI) using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macro for Model 1 with 
 B SE B β 
Block 1     
 Constant -0.78 0.63 - 
Episodes viewed 0.01 0.07 .03 
Viewed stimuli episode 0.22 0.28 .07 
Familiarity with character 0.23 0.14 .23 
Block 2     
Constant -0.76 0.61 - 
Episodes viewed 0.01 0.07 .02 
Viewed stimuli episode 0.21 0.27 .07 
Familiarity with character 0.24 0.14 .24 
PSR actress 0.12* 0.06 .12 
 Cognitive PSI 0.24*** 0.06 .24 
Block 3     
Constant -0.52 0.60 - 
Episodes viewed 0.02 0.07 .04 
Viewed stimuli episode 0.14 0.27 .05 
Familiarity with character 0.21 0.14 .21 
PSR actress 0.13* 0.06 .13 
Cognitive PSI 0.26*** 0.06 .26 
Paragraph condition 0.20 0.12 .10 
Uncertain dummy coded -0.18 0.14 -.08 
Denial dummy coded -0.40** 0.14 -.19 
Block 4     
Constant -0.57 0.54 - 
Episodes viewed -0.04 0.06 -.07 
Viewed stimuli episode 0.19 0.24 .06 
Familiarity with character 0.22 0.12 .22 
PSR actress 0.04 0.05 .04 
Cognitive PSI 0.23*** 0.05 .23 
Paragraph condition 0.06 0.11 .03 
Uncertain dummy coded -0.03 0.13 -.01 
Denial dummy coded -0.19 0.13 -.10 
PSR character 0.45*** 0.06 .45 
Note. N=272. R2 = .04 for Block 1 (p = .01), ∆R2 = .07 for Block 2 (p < .001), ∆R2 = 
.04 for Block 3 (p < .05), ∆R2 = .17 for Block 4 (p < .001). * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** 
p < .001; for dummy coded variables: 0 = absent, 1 = present. 
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5,000 bootstrapped samples using bias-corrected and accelerated 95% confidence 
intervals. The independent and moderation variables were mean centered prior to 
running the moderations because mean centering helps clarify the interpretation of the 
coefficients (Iacobucci, Schneider, Popovich, & Bakamitsos, 2017). 
Cognitive PSI. As displayed in Figure 12 and Table 25, the interaction of 
character valence and cognitive PSI did not have a significant impact on social distance 
[B = -0.04, t (255) = -0.85, p = .39]. Additionally, cognitive PSI did not significantly 
influence social distance [B = -0.07, t (255) = -0.07, p = .18]. However character 
valence did have a significant, negative relationship with social distance; as valence 
increased, social distance decreased [B = -0.18, t (255) = -2.48, p < .05]. Therefore, H7 
was not supported for cognitive PSI. 
 
Figure 12. Moderation model of character valence on the relationship between 
cognitive PSI and social distance. * p < .05. 
 
Table 25. Model Coefficients for Moderation of Character Valence on the Relationship 
between Cognitive PSI and Social Distance 
  B SE t BCa CI 
Intercept i1 -0.76 0.47 -1.62 -1.69, 0.16 
Cognitive PSI (X) b1 -0.07 0.06 -1.33 -0.18, 0.04 
Valence (M) b2 -0.18* 0.07 -2.48 -0.32, -0.04 
Cognitive PSI X Valence (XM) b3 -0.04 0.04 -0.85 -0.12, 0.05 
  R2 = .42 
  F(16, 255) = 12.46, p < .001 
N = 272. * p < .05. 
Cognitive PSI 
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Affective PSI. H7 was not supported for affective PSI either, indicating that 
character valence did not significantly moderate the relationship between affective PSI 
and social distance, as can be seen in Figure 13 and Table 26. Additionally, the 
relationship between affective PSI and social distance was not significant [B = -0.03, t 
(255) = -0.53, p = .60]. The path between valence and social distance remained the 
same for both moderation tests.  
 
Figure 13. Moderation model of character valence on the relationship between affective 
PSI and social distance. * p < .05. 
 
Table 26. Model Coefficients for Moderation of Character Valence on the Relationship 
between Affective PSI and Social Distance 
  B SE t BCa CI 
Intercept i1 -0.82 0.45 -1.80 -1.71, 0.08 
Affective PSI (X) b1 -0.03 0.06 -0.53 -0.15, 0.09 
Valence (M) b2 -0.18* 0.07 -2.46 -0.32, -0.03 
Affective PSI X Valence (XM) b3 0.02 0.05 0.36 -0.07, 0.11 
  R2 = .42 
  F(16, 255) = 12.70, p < .001 
N = 272. * p < .05. 
 
H10 predicted that character valence would significantly moderate the 
relationship between PSR with the character and social distance. The independent and 
moderation variables were mean centered prior to running the moderation analyses. 
However, similar to H7, H10 was not supported. As noted in Figure 14, the interaction 
between PSR with the character and character valence did not significantly impact 
social distance, [B = -0.02, t (259) = -0.52, p = .60]. Additionally, the relationship 
Affective PSI 
Social distance 
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between valence and social distance was not significant as can be seen in Table 27. 
However, PSR with the character was significantly related to social distanced, [B = -
0.18, t (259) = 0.08, p < .05] meaning that as the level of PSR increased, social distance 
to that character decreased.  
 
Figure 14. Moderation model of character valence on the relationship between PSR 
with the character and social distance. * p < .05. 
 
Table 27. Model Coefficients for Moderation of Character Valence on the Relationship 
between PSR with the Character and Social Distance 
  B SE t BCa CI 
Intercept i1 4.85*** 0.73 6.64 3.41, 6.28 
Character PSR (X) b1 -0.18* 0.08 -2.26 -0.34, -0.02 
Valence (M) b2 -0.11 0.07 -1.53 -0.26, 0.03 
Character PSR X Valence (XM) b3 -0.02 0.04 -0.52 -0.10, 0.06 
  R2 = .43 
  F(12, 259) = 17.55, p < .001 
N = 272. * p < .05, *** p < .001. 
 
Affective Disposition and the RCM 
H11 predicted that perceived identification with an at-risk character mediated 
the relationship between affective disposition toward the at-risk character and social 
distance. Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macro was used to test the predicted mediation 
using a simple mediation analysis based on 5000 bootstrapped samples and using bias-
corrected and accelerated 95% confidence intervals. Identification (indirect effect =       
-0.21, SE = 0.04) significantly mediated the relationship between affective disposition 
and social distance, controlling for covariates. The generated bootstrap confidence 
PSR with the 
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interval excluded zero (lower limit = -0.31, upper limit = -0.13). Additionally, the Sobel 
test of the indirect effect was significant (indirect effect = -0.21, SE = 0.04, Z = -4.74, p 
< .001). As can be seen in Figure 15, there was a significant direct relationship between 
affective disposition and identification and between identification and social distance. 
The more positive one’s affective disposition toward a character, the more identification 
experienced, and the less perceived social distance between self and character. The 
direct effect between affective disposition toward the character and social distance was 
not significant (see Table 28), however the total effect of affective disposition on social 
distance was significant [B = -0.15, SE = 0.08, t (258)= -2.03, p < .05]. Thus, H11 was 
supported; identification mediates the relationship between affective disposition and 
social distance.  
 
Figure 15. Mediation of identification on the relationship between affective disposition 
and social distance. The direct effect (i.e., unstandardized regression coefficient 
between affective disposition and social distance, controlling for identification) is in 
parentheses. * p < .05, *** p < .001. 
 
Table 28. Model Coefficients for Mediation of Identification on the Relationship 
between Affective Disposition and Social Distance 
  Consequent 
  M (Identification)  Y (Social distance) 
Antecedent  B SE BCa CI  B SE BCa CI 
X (Affective 
disposition) a 0.37*** 0.07 0.24, 0.50 c' 0.06 0.07 -0.08, 0.19 
M (Identification)  — — — b -0.57*** 0.06 -0.69, -0.44 
Constant i1 3.20*** 0.67 1.89, 4.51 i2 6.59*** 0.70 5.22, 7.96 
  R2 = .40  R2 = .56 











p < .001 p < .001 
N = 272. ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
H12 predicted that perceptions of the at-risk character deserving the 
consequences of her risky behavior mediated the relationship between affective 
disposition toward the at-risk character and personal risk perception. Deservedness 
(indirect effect = -0.30, SE = 0.34) did not mediate the relationship between affective 
disposition and perceived personal risk, controlling for age, sex, sensation seeking, 
social desirability, likelihood to drink and drive, experience with consequences of 
drinking and driving, paragraph valence, video conditions, and character risk. The 
generated bootstrap confidence interval included zero (lower limit = -1.18, upper limit = 
0.21). Additionally, the Sobel test of the indirect effect was not significant (indirect 
effect = -0.30, SE = 0.37, Z = -0.80, p = .42). As can be seen in Figure 16 and Table 29, 
there was a significant direct relationship between affective disposition and 
deservedness; as affective disposition increased, the feeling that the at-risk character 
deserved the consequences of her risky behavior decreased. There was not a significant 
direct relationship between deservedness and personal risk perception. However, there 
was a significant direct relationship between affective disposition and personal risk 
perception. The more positive affective disposition experienced, the more personal risk 
perception increased. Finally, because the indirect effect was non-significant and total 
effect of affective disposition on personal risk perception was significant (B =5.06, SE = 




Figure 16. Mediation of deservedness on the relationship between affective disposition 
and social distance. The direct effect (i.e., unstandardized regression coefficient 
between affective disposition and social distance, controlling for deservedness) is in 
parentheses. ** p < .01. 
 
Table 29. Model Coefficients for Mediation of Deservedness on the Relationship 
between Affective Disposition and Personal Risk Perception 
  Consequent 
  M (Deservedness)  Y (Personal risk perception) 
Antecedent  B SE BCa CI  B SE BCa CI 
X (Affective 
disposition) a -0.38** 0.12 -0.61, -0.15 c' 5.36** 1.73 1.96, 8.76 
M (Deservedness)  — — — b 0.78 0.91 -1.01, 2.58 
Constant i1 5.08*** 1.13 2.86, 7.31 i2 -9.67 17.19 -43.51, 24.18 
  R2 = .17  R2 = .23 
  F(13, 258) = 3.93,  p < .001  
F(14, 257) = 5.40, 
p < .001 
N = 272. ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
Narrative Endings and Duration of Effects 
The first research question explored whether variations in narrative endings 
moderated the relationship between social distance and risk discrepancy. Hayes’ (2013) 
PROCESS macro was used to answer RQ1 by using a simple moderation analysis 
(model 1) based on 5000 bootstrapped samples and using bias-corrected and accelerated 
95% confidence intervals. Because there are three video conditions, the video condition 
variable was dummy coded into two variables (uncertain and denial) and the moderation 
was run twice with the other video condition dummy variable as an additional covariate. 
As displayed in Figure 17 and Table 30, the uncertain video condition did not 










interaction of social distance and video condition [B = -1.70, t (259) = 0.41, p = .68]. 




Figure 17. Moderation of uncertain video condition on the relationship between social 
distance and risk discrepancy. ** p < .01. 
 
Table 30. Model Coefficients for Moderation of Uncertain Video Condition on the 
Relationship between Social Distance and Risk Discrepancy 
  B SE t BCa CI 
Intercept i1 18.45 28.28 0.65 -37.24, 74.14 
Social Distance (X) b1 7.02** 2.42 2.90 2.25, 11.80 
Uncertain Condition (M) b2 -7.84 23.88 -0.33 -54.86, 39.18 
Social Distance X Uncertain Condition 
(XM) b3 1.70 4.13 0.41 -6.44, 9.84 
  R2 = .23 
  F(12, 259) = 6.86, p < .001 
N = 272. ** p < .01. 
 
Figure 18 and Table 31 tell a similar story for the second mediation as the denial 
video condition did not significantly moderate risk discrepancy [B = -7.06, t (259) = -
0.32, p = .75], nor did the interaction of social distance and video condition [B = 2.11, t 
(259) = 0.58, p = .56]. Social distance significantly influenced risk discrepancy [B = 
6.97, t (259) = 2.71, p < .01]. Narrative endings did not significantly moderate the 
relationship between social distance and risk discrepancy. 
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Figure 18. Moderation of denial video condition on the relationship between social 
distance and risk discrepancy. ** p < .01. 
 
Table 31. Model Coefficients for Moderation of Denial Video Condition on the 
Relationship between Social Distance and Risk Discrepancy 
  B SE t BCa CI 
Intercept i1 20.66 29.27 0.71 -36.98, 78.31 
Social Distance (X) b1 6.97** 2.57 2.71 1.91, 12.02 
Denial Condition (M) b2 -7.06 21.78 -0.32 -49.96, 35.84 
Social Distance X Denial Condition 
(XM) b3 2.11 3.62 0.58 -5.02, 9.24 
  R2 = .23 
  F(12, 259) = 7.44, p < .001 
N = 272. ** p < .01. 
 
The final research question (RQ2) examined personal risk perceptions over three 
time points (prior to stimuli exposure, post-exposure, and two weeks after exposure) 
using a repeated measures ANOVA. An a priori power analysis indicated that a sample 
size of 161 participants was necessary to detect a small effect size when setting power 
at .80 and alpha at its traditional .05 criterion. However, only 43 people participated in 
the delayed posttest. This lack of participation was likely due to a number of factors 
(i.e., normal attrition rates, the study being run at the end of the semester and in the 
summer, etc.). Due to the researcher’s time constraints, it was not feasible to reach the 
161 participant mark. The repeated measures ANOVA was conducted, but did not 
reveal a significant effect of the time on risk perceptions, Wilks’ Lambda = 0.99, F (2, 
41) = 0.31, p = .74. 
Social distance 
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Chapter 8: Discussion 
Prior to this project, only two studies (i.e., So & Nabi, 2013; So & Shen, 2015) 
had examined the RCM. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation was to test and 
expand the RCM. This study adds to the literature on this topic by examining the RCM 
with a new health issue and incorporating PSR with the character into the RCM as a 
new narrative engagement variable. The study also considers the influence of character 
valence and affective disposition on risk perceptions. Often narrative engagement 
research focuses on participants’ interactions with likable characters; this dissertation 
investigated how less positive interactions might influence people’s perceived social 
distance and risk perceptions. Additionally, this project explored how narrative endings 
affected risk perceptions and considered the duration of media effects on risk 
perception. This chapter presents a discussion of the dissertation’s research findings, 
and the implications of these findings for the RCM. Also, potential explanations for 
unexpected findings that differed from the proposed hypotheses are discussed. Finally, 
the section will conclude with a discussion of the study’s limitations and directions for 
future research. 
Risk Convergence 
 So and Nabi (2013) proposed the RCM and found support for the theoretical 
arguments of the model. However, the authors did not actually test the convergence 
process the model implies. Instead, they examined narrative engagement variables’ 
effects on social distance and personal risk perceptions. So and Shen (2015) built on 
this research by testing the relationship between narrative engagement variables and the 
perceived self- and character-risk discrepancy with social distance as a mediator. 
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Additionally, So and Shen (2015) actually tested the convergence process to 
demonstrate that discrepancy lessens where personal risk increases, while character risk 
remains stable. When testing risk convergence, So and Shen (2015) developed their 
own measure which operationalized social distance as perceived dissimilarity that fits 
“in line with research on CLT” (p. 10). While that is a valid assertion, the present study 
chose to look at two operationalizations of social distance: perceived dissimilarity (So 
& Shen, 2015) and physical social distance (a modified version of Bogardus, 1933), 
both of which were used in So and Nabi’s (2013) introduction of the RCM. 
In line with So and Shen’s (2015) findings using perceived dissimilarity as a 
measure of social distance (while controlling for the Bogardus measure and other 
variables), this study’s H1a results support the central idea of the RCM: a decrease in 
social distance leads to risk convergence (i.e., the discrepancy between the perceptions 
of perceived self-risk and perceived character-risk decreases). Additionally, the results 
of H1b indicate that the convergence process occurs via an increase in self-risk, rather 
than a decrease in character-risk, further supporting So and Shen (2015). The researcher 
conducted a post-hoc test to check that social distance did not significantly influence 
character-risk. The post-hoc used the same hierarchical regression as H1b with 
perceived character-risk as the dependent variable. Perceived social distance was not a 
significant predictor of perceived character-risk, Fchange (1, 256) = 0.23, p = .63, B = 
0.69, β = 0.04, ∆R2 = 0.001, which provides additional support for the idea that 
convergence occurs through social distance’s significant, inverse effect on self-risk. 
This form of convergence suggests that audiences can overcome their optimistic biases 
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(i.e., tendency to estimate their risk as lower than others’ risk) and adjust their risk 
perceptions to align closer to the character’s risk. 
When testing H1a and H1b with social distance (Bogardus, 1933) and 
controlling for the perceived dissimilarity measure of social distance, the tenets of the 
RCM did not hold. The Bogardus social distance measure was not a significant 
predictor of the discrepancy between risk perceptions (H1a) nor was it a significant 
predictor of personal risk perception (H1b). Interestingly, in the post-hoc analysis with 
character risk as the dependent variable, the Bogardus social distance measure 
significantly predicted character-risk when entered into the fourth block alone, Fchange 
(1, 257) = 6.07, p < .05, ∆R2 = 0.021, and remained significant after controlling for the 
So and Shen (2015) social distance measure, B = 2.52, β = 0.15 p < .05. Therefore, as 
social distance with an at-risk character increases, so does perceived character-risk. 
 In sum, the So and Shen (2015) measure of social distance is a significant, 
positive predictor of risk discrepancy (i.e., is negatively related to risk convergence) 
through social distance’s inverse relationship with perceived self-risk. Whereas, the 
modified Bogardus (1933) measure is neither a significant predictor of risk discrepancy 
nor that of perceived self-risk. However, the Bogardus measure does significantly, 
positively influence character-risk, whereas the So and Shen measure does not. 
The difference in the social distance scales’ function in the RCM may be due to 
how social distance is defined and measured. For example, the So and Shen measure 
operationalizes social distance as level of dissimilarity to the character, whereas the 
Bogardus measure operationalizes social distance as desired physical distance from the 
character. Additionally, the Bogardus measure is often used in inter-group research (So 
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& Shen, 2015), which considers people’s preferred social distance from specific out-
groups or individuals representing an out-group (e.g., a character with bipolar disorder 
is a representative of people with mental illness). Perhaps if the RCM measured the 
character’s group (e.g., people like the character) risk and the viewer’s group (e.g., 
people like me), the Bogardus measure might be more representative of the model. 
Therefore, when testing the RCM, researchers need to consider how they want to 
conceptualize and operationalize social distance. Because the RCM is concerned with 
perceived personal risk, rather than perceived group risk, it may be more appropriate to 
use the dissimilarity measure of social distance when examining risk convergence. 
Additionally, because multiple engagement variables concern character engagement, 
which are more associated with individual, rather than group connection, the So and 
Shen (2015) measure of social distance is justifiable when testing the RCM. 
Narrative Engagement and the RCM 
 Because the first hypothesis, which tested for risk convergence, was not 
supported when using the modified Bogardus measure of social distance, the subsequent 
narrative engagement hypotheses were not supported either because they involved the 
risk convergence process (i.e., the decreasing of the discrepancy of character- and self-
risk). Therefore, the focus of the narrative engagement discussion will involve So and 
Shen’s (2015) social distance measure. 
In addition to supporting risk convergence, this study presents interesting results 
regarding narrative engagement variables, when perceived dissimilarity with the at-risk 
character [i.e., So and Shen’s (2015) social distance measure] serves as a mediator. Four 
of the narrative engagement variables’ relationships with the discrepancy between self- 
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and character-risk were mediated in some way by social distance. The mediations of 
social distance on the identification, transportation, self-referencing, and PSR’s separate 
relationships with risk discrepancy confirm their role in the RCM. As narrative 
engagement increases, social distance decreases, and then risk discrepancy decreases 
(i.e., the character and personal risks converge). However, all five forms of perceived 
realism (H4) and the two aspects of PSI (H6) did not have a significant direct effect on 
risk convergence. Additionally, none of the seven measures had a significant 
relationship with social distance. In the following sections, the researcher discusses the 
role of self-referencing in the RCM, considers why perceived realism did not function 
as expected, and elaborates on the contributions of PSR and issues with PSI in the 
dissertation study.  
Self-Referencing 
Increased self-referencing allows people to feel less socially distant to an at-risk 
character, and social distance, in turn, affects risk discrepancy. This result is important 
to the RCM because self-referencing captures a person’s previous and future connection 
to the health issue, whereas the other engagement variables involve connection with the 
narrative or character. Self-referencing was tested in this model because it involves the 
process of recognizing the importance or relevance of a message but also associates the 
incoming information with past experiences. Therefore, self-referencing indicates that 
social distance and, in turn, risk perception is influenced by more than just involvement 
in the narrative or with the character but also, a viewer’s elaboration of his or her 
personal involvement with the issue. 
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Perceived Realism 
When So and Nabi (2013) first tested perceived realism in the RCM, they found 
similar results of non-significance. However, in the second test of the RCM (So & 
Shen, 2015), social distance completely mediated the relationship between realism and 
the risk disparity. Realism may not have influenced social distance and risk discrepancy 
because it pertains to engagement with the narrative rather than the character. A viewer 
can still perceive high realism while viewing a television show but not reduce his or her 
social distance with a character. Message features (e.g., visual cuts or angles) and 
environmental elements in a show (e.g., physical setting) that are not related to the 
characters can affect the perception of realism. Additionally, So and Shen (2015) found 
that perceived realism demonstrated a weaker association with social distance than 
identification and PSI, both character-related variables. The authors suggest that 
perceived realism plays more of an indirect role in reducing social distance by 
facilitating the strengthening of other forms of narrative engagement (e.g., the more 
realistic a scene feels, the easier it is to be transported or identify with a character). 
Future RCM studies may want to consider perceived realism as an indirect facilitator of 
engagement, rather than a variable that directly influences social distance. 
Parasocial Phenomena 
 This study introduced a PSR with an at-risk character as a potential narrative 
engagement variable in the RCM. As previously mentioned, social distance had an 
indirect-only mediation on the relationship between PSR with a character and risk 
discrepancy. This mediation makes sense, as feeling that a character is akin to a friend 
would logically reduce the social distance between the viewer and character, and, in 
138 
turn, decrease self- and character-risk discrepancy. Based on this evidence, PSR with an 
at-risk character should be included in future RCM studies. Additionally, E-E campaign 
designers should consider cultivating and building on audience members’ PSRs with at-
risk characters so that practitioners can use these bonds to impact personal risk 
perceptions.  
While PSR occurs outside of a media exposure to a character, PSI occurs during 
the exposure (Cohen, 2009). Research demonstrates that PSI and PSR can have a 
reciprocal relationship in which PSI leads to a PSR and that PSR influences a viewer’s 
motivation to see a character again, therefore leading to another media viewing that 
involves a PSI (Klimmt et al., 2008; Schramm & Wirth, 2010). In this study, 
participants’ PSR with an at-risk character positively related to affective PSI with that 
character, but did not significantly relate to cognitive PSI. A reason for this difference 
may be that the scale’s cognitive PSI items focus on the level of engagement with the 
character during viewing (e.g., “I carefully followed the behavior of Amber, asking how 
things would evolve”). Affective PSI however, asks about emotional reactions to the 
character and bonding (e.g., “If Amber felt bad, I felt bad as well; If Amber felt good, I 
felt good as well.”). Similarly, PSR measures look at feelings of friendship and 
similarity. Therefore, it makes sense that affective PSI and PSR would be related, 
especially because PSR is often talked about as an emotional bond to or intimacy with a 
media figure.  
In regard to PSI, measurement issues may have contributed to why the 
hypothesis was not supported and are discussed later in this section. However, social 
distance may not mediate the relationship between PSI and risk discrepancy because the 
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bond between the character and viewer may not have been strong enough to influence 
social distance. Although PSR is a similar concept to PSI, it conceptualizes a stronger, 
more enduring relationship with a character. PSI pertains to the interaction with the 
character during the viewing process. 
Valence and the RCM 
 This study hypothesized that character valence would affect the relationships 
PSI and PSR had with social distance and risk discrepancy. However, both 
hypothesized moderations were not significant. In both PSI models, only the 
relationship between character valence and social distance was significant—as the level 
of positive valence increased toward the at-risk character, social distance decreased. For 
PSR, only the relationship between PSR and social distance was significant. These 
results were not surprising as there are no fully validated scales that incorporate positive 
and negative PSI or PSR. Tukachinsky’s (2010) PSR scale, which measured PSR with 
the character, does not account for non-positive PSRs. Additionally, the PSI-Process 
scale (Schramm & Hartmann, 2008) was used to measure PSI with the character. 
Although the scale considers valence in the relationship, it has not been validated in 
English. PSI and PSR valence toward the at-risk character was measured through a 
positive valence toward the at-risk character measure rather than the PSI and PSR scales 
themselves, which may be a contributing factor for why the valence moderations did not 
work as expected. Perhaps fully validated PSI and PSR scales that measured valence of 
parasocial contact with a character in addition to strength would tell a different story. 
 However, measurement issues may not be the sole reason why the valence 
manipulations did not function as expected. Although the valence conditions were 
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significantly different from each other, when measured prior to video condition 
viewing, the inductions may not have been strong enough to impact narrative 
engagement variables in different ways because valence was established in paragraph 
form, rather than in the actual narrative. With this in mind, the researcher ran a post-hoc 
independent samples t-test to compare character valence (post-video) in the positive and 
negative conditions. The Levene’s test was not significant, F(1, 270) = 0.01, p = .94. 
There was a significant difference in valence between the positive condition (M = 3.64, 
SD = 1.17) and the negative condition (M = 3.10, SD = 1.16), t (270)= -3.82, p < .001 
indicating that the paragraph’s valence manipulation worked even after viewing the 
video. However, valence manipulations may be more effective if a viewer watches a 
series character established over time as either a “good” or “bad” character. The limited 
exposure to the character in this study might have made it difficult to elicit strong 
positive or negative PSI toward the at-risk character. 
Affective Disposition and the RCM 
 Similar to character valence, affective disposition was included in this study to 
see how media users’ emotional feelings toward characters influenced engagement 
variables, and subsequent social distance with that character. Marett (2015) found that 
identification mediated the relationship between positive affective disposition and 
perceived personal risk. In the same article, Marett (2015) posited that more negative 
affective disposition could decrease perceived self-risk via social distance with the 
character.  
In line with Marett (2015), the present study sought to test if identification 
mediated the relationship between affective disposition and perceived social distance. 
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Results indicated that, indeed, identification significantly mediated the relationship; the 
more positive one’s affective disposition toward a character, the more identification 
with the character experienced, and the less perceived social distance between self and 
character. This finding is important because if negative affective dispositions lead 
people to distance themselves from the at-risk character, they could also distance 
themselves from the character’s risky behaviors, resulting in either no perceived 
personal-risk change or else a perceived personal-risk change away from the character’s 
risk.  
 Building on affective disposition research, this study found that deservedness 
did not significantly mediate the relationship between affective disposition and personal 
risk-perception. In line with disposition theory (Raney, 2004), affective disposition had 
a significant, inverse relationship with deservedness. Thus, as participants’ dispositions 
toward the character decreased, their opinion that the character deserved the 
consequences of her risky behavior increased. However, deservedness did not 
significantly influence personal risk perception. Given that the mediation was not 
significant but affective disposition had a significant, positive, direct effect on personal 
risk perception, another mechanism, such as social distance, might affect the 
relationship. As noted in H11, affective disposition had a significant, inverse 
relationship with social distance. Therefore, perhaps social distance mediates the 
relationship between affective disposition and risk discrepancy similar to how it impacts 
narrative engagement variables. A person’s affective disposition toward a character 
incorporates his or her liking of the character and his or her morality judgments of the 
character’s behaviors.  In terms of practical implications, E-E practitioners should 
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consider developing risk storylines for characters the audience has positive affective 
dispositions with because that can impact narrative engagement variables such as 
identification, which, in turn, affects social distance, and, then risk perceptions.  
Character valence and affective disposition are important factors to consider in 
the RCM because not every at-risk character is likeable. To push the theoretical 
framework of the RCM further, the model should incorporate and test predictions about 
how character-type (i.e., protagonist, antagonist) would affect social distance and risk 
convergence in opposite ways.  
This study demonstrates that both character valence and affective disposition 
play a role in the RCM. More specifically, positive evaluations of a character lead to a 
reduction in social distance (in the case of character valence) and increase personal risk 
perceptions (in regard to affective disposition). Thus, to raise viewers’ risk perceptions, 
campaigners should focus on making at-risk characters likeable and good, so that 
audience members evaluate them positively, which, in turn, increases their personal risk 
perceptions. This consideration is important because often television shows might have 
a more negatively valenced character engage in a risky event and get his or her 
“comeuppance.” However, based on the relationships observed in this study, the 
outcome of a risk event with a negative character will not move personal risk 
perceptions in the desired direction (i.e., increase the personal risk perceptions). 
Narrative Endings and Duration of Effects 
 This study sought to discover if storyline differences influenced the relationship 
between social distance and risk discrepancy. The same narrative with three different 
endings (uncertain, denial, and apology) was used as stimuli for this study. The 
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manipulation check revealed that the apology condition (i.e., the character recognizes 
and apologizes for the consequences of her risky behavior) was most positively 
valenced, followed by the uncertain condition (i.e., it is unclear if the character survives 
the accident), and then the denial condition (i.e., the character does not accept 
responsibility for her risky behavior). The apology condition was significantly different 
from the other two conditions, but the uncertain and denial conditions did not 
significantly differ from each other. Additionally, video condition did not significantly 
moderate the relationship between social distance and risk discrepancy, indicating that 
narrative ending type did not significantly affect risk perceptions. Given that the effect 
of social distance on risk discrepancy was not influenced by narrative endings (i.e., the 
character’s outcome), character engagement may be more impactful than narrative 
ending when looking at how narrative features affect personal risk assessments. This 
study’s results support the argument that risk perceptions are less affected by the 
explicitness of narrative consequences related to the risk behavior, but instead, more 
impacted by how the audience feels toward the at-risk character engaging in the 
behavior. This idea has practical implications for how entertainment media can 
influence risk perceptions by telling risk narratives with positively valenced characters 
with whom audiences can engage. Therefore, entertainment-educators should focus 
more on cultivating positive narrative engagement with an at-risk character rather than 
the explicitness of the plot ending (i.e., the character survives v. the character 
recognizes the consequences of his or her actions). 
Finally, this study examined if personal risk perceptions regressed back to their 
original state over time. However, due to the small number of participants in the 
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delayed posttest, this test had lower power and, unsurprisingly was not significant. This 
issue will be discussed further as a limitation. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Multiple limitations of this study are worth noting. First, the strength of the 
video manipulation was an issue in this dissertation study. Although the apology 
condition significantly differed from the other two conditions, uncertain and denial did 
not significantly differ from each other. The null findings for the narrative endings 
research question could be a result of a lack of strength of the manipulation. A potential 
reason why the manipulations were not significantly different was that the researcher 
had to create different narrative endings but still have a balanced portrayal of the 
character so that the paragraph valence descriptions made sense for both the positive 
and negative conditions. Additionally, another issue could have been the length of the 
videos themselves. The researcher increased the duration of each video condition after 
the pilot study, but a longer exposure time with a more developed character-arc might 
have increased the strength of the manipulation. However, in the case of this stimuli 
material, the researcher could not justify cutting longer video conditions out of concern 
for it making the at-risk character unlikable. The at-risk character’s storyline leading up 
to the car crash mainly consisted of actions (e.g., acting out at work, fighting with her 
family) that portrayed the character in a negative light. For future studies examining 
narrative endings, it might be helpful to choose a narrative that has a longer storyline 
(that stretches across multiple episodes) so there is more storyline to play with. 
Additionally, examining the influence of endings without the valence manipulation 
might provide more freedom to a researcher to play with the narrative endings. 
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Second, measurement issues also affected the study. As mentioned when 
discussing PSI and PSR, the parasocial measures did not effectively measure parasocial 
valence, which could be a reason why valence moderations were not significant. Also, 
the self-efficacy measure could not be used in the study given the CFA results. Future 
studies should incorporate self-efficacy and perhaps include a fully validated efficacy 
scale for the risk issue observed. In addition, he risk judgment measures themselves 
posed another measurement issue. Although these measures were adopted from So and 
Nabi (2013), while running the experiment in the lab, the researcher received questions 
from participants about whether they should evaluate the character’s risk based on what 
happened in the stimuli or evaluate what the character’s risk was after going through the 
risk event. Given that the instructions in the study did not specify which risk the 
participant should evaluate, it is probable that participants engaged in different character 
risk assessments. Thus, in future RCM studies, it might be wise to clarify how 
researchers want participants to evaluate character risk. 
A third limitation was not being able to test RQ2 to examine risk duration due to 
low sample size in the posttest. Low sample size was probably due to a lack of 
participant interest and the timing of the study. Although the opportunity to win 
monetary compensation was offered, only a small number of people participated in the 
posttest. Part of this low turn out might be a result of the study’s collection period. The 
study began near the end of a spring semester and continued into the summer. Given the 
two-week delay, by the time spring semester participants were able to take the second 
portion of the study, they were either in final exam week or out of school. Future studies 
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should consider the timing and incentives offered in posttest studies in order to gain a 
sufficient sample. 
There are multiple avenues for future studies relating to the RCM. First, the two 
previous RCM studies only looked at STDs, which are contagious, yet treatable health 
issues. Following the suggestion of So and Shen (2015), this study used a non-
contagious, potentially fatal health issue, and found that the model extends beyond the 
health issue and narratives used in the previous studies. This finding is important 
because it demonstrates that the RCM functions similarly across different health issues, 
lending to more generalizability of the model. Future studies should test the RCM using 
other risk events in order to see how the model functions in other contexts.  
A second opportunity for future RCM studies would be to observe how 
character PSR works in the RCM with a show that has a large fan base. One of the 
reasons Parenthood was selected for this study because it was expected that most 
participants had not seen the show. This minimal exposure allowed the manipulation of 
character valence and storyline, two important components of the experiment. However, 
this lack of exposure meant that few people had pre-established PSRs with the actress 
and character. By using a show more popular with the sample of the study, researchers 
could test how pre-existing PSRs with both the actor and character related to character 
PSI strength.  
Additionally, using stimuli with a more well-known actor would allow 
researchers to see if PSR with an actor plays a role in risk convergence. This study 
demonstrated that character PSI and PSR are related. Logically, PSR with an actor 
might influence character PSI and PSR because a viewer may already have positive or 
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negative bonds with the actor, which, in turn, would affect parasocial variables related 
to the character. Additionally, PSR with an actor could play its own role as a narrative 
engagement variable because the already strong relationship with an actor, might lead to 
a low social distance to the character, and, then, impact risk convergence. For example, 
a moviegoer may choose to see Still Alice, a film about a woman dealing with 
Alzheimer’s Disease because he or she likes Julianne Moore, the actress playing the 
titular character. This bond with the actress may predispose the viewer to have a small 
perceived social distance with that character, and, in turn, converge perceived character- 
and personal-risk perceptions. Further, future studies could examine how social distance 
and risk convergence are influenced if the narrative features a well-liked actor playing a 
negatively valenced at-risk character. The positive PSR with the actor could potentially 
override the negative valence and affective disposition toward the character.  
The RCM has only examined how engagement in fictional narratives influences 
risk convergence. However, how might a personal narrative of a celebrity dealing with a 
health issue influence risk convergence? Studies consistently demonstrate the positive 
effect celebrities’ health disclosures have on health information seeking (Noar, 
Althouse, Ayers, Francis, & Ribisl, 2015). Considering real-life narratives with 
celebrities could introduce other engagement variables into the convergence process, 
such as wishful identification, which is a person’s “desire to emulate the figure” (Giles, 
2002, p. 12). Finally, future studies should continue to examine the duration of risk 
effects over time. Narratives have demonstrated the potential to lengthen risk effects, 
and it would be beneficial to see if the RCM can examine the duration of effects. 
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Conclusion 
This dissertation’s retest of the RCM further strengthens theoretical support for 
the mediating role of perceived social distance on the relationship between narrative 
engagement and risk convergence. This dissertation contributed to RCM research by 
demonstrating that self-referencing and PSR with the character should be tested as 
narrative engagement variables in future RCM studies. Additionally, this study proposes 
considering the roles that valence and affective disposition toward an at-risk character 
may play in the risk convergence process. Although these variables did not work 
exactly as predicted in this study, the results indicate they may impact social distance 
and risk perceptions.  
In this study, narrative endings did not significantly moderate the relationship 
between social distance and risk discrepancy, however, these results are limited to this 
particular stimuli. Future research should continue to examine whether narrative 
endings play a role in the RCM. Finally, researchers should test how RCM relates to 
durable risk perceptions. Overall, this dissertation has offered support for the risk 
convergence model and avenues for future expansion. 
This study supports the idea that entertainment media can play a significant role 
in risk communication. The study’s findings and the general support for the RCM can 
help direct entertainment-educators to use narrative and characters effectively when 
constructing educational health messages. For instance, multiple tests of the RCM show 
how important narrative and character engagement are to the risk convergence process. 
So, health communicators need to embed risk messages that involve the audience in the 
story and with the characters into their narratives.  
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Appendix A: Pilot Study 







































PSR with actress 
This scale is shown if participant selects strongly disagree, disagree, or somewhat 




This scale is shown if participant selects strongly agree, agree, or somewhat agree for 
“I like Mae Whitman.”
 
Valence manipulation 
Participants will be randomly exposed to 1 of 2 paragraph valence conditions (positive 












*Reading check shown on a different page. 
 
Character Valence (post-paragraph) 
 
Video Condition 
Participants were exposed to 1 of 3 (uncertain, denial, or apology) conditions and a 
watching check for each condition.  Video would appear above the following paragraph. 
 
 
Uncertain condition check 
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PSI with character 
 
 
This scale is shown if participant indicates is they find Amber to be somewhat likable, 
likable, or very likable during the video. 
 
This scale is shown if participant indicates is they find Amber to be somewhat unlikable, 




Perceived social distance  
So and Shen Measure 
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Video Condition 
Participants were exposed to 1 of 3 (uncertain, denial, or apology) conditions and a 
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Past exposure to the stimuli 
PSR with character 
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So and Shen Measure 
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Aron et al., 1992 
 
Modified version of Bogardus 
 
 


















Post-likelihood of drinking and driving 
 
 















































Appendix D: Variable Labels 
LIKEDD = Likelihood of drinking and driving. That measure is broken down into 
driving short distances (a few blocks), medium distances (over 10 miles), and long 
distances (over 20 miles). The items for each distance are labeled SHORT, MED, and 
LONG, respectively.  
RISKPRE = personal risk perception (pre-exposure).  
SS = sensation seeking. 
DS = social desirability. 
FAM = familiarity with the actress. 
PRA = parasocial relationship with the actress.  
FEEL = character valence (post-paragraph).  
FEELV = character valence (post-video).  
AFFECT = affective disposition (some individual items are shortened to AFF).  
PSRC = parasocial relationship with the character.  
PSICOG = parasocial interaction (cognitive dimension).  
PSIAFF = parasocial interaction (affective dimension).  
SELF = self-referencing.  
REALPL = perceived realism (plausibility).  
REALQU = perceived realism (quality).  
REALTP = perceived realism (typicality).  
REALNCON = perceived realism (narrative consistency).  
REALNCOH = perceived realism (narrative coherence).  
IDENT = identification (individual items are shortened to IDT).  
TRANS = transportation.  
SD = Social distance (So & Shen, 2015).  
SDA = Social distance (Bogardus, 1933). 
RKPO = personal risk perception (post-exposure). 
EFF = self-efficacy. 
RISKCHAR = character risk perception (individual items are shortened to RISKC). 
 PLIKEDD = Likelihood of drinking and driving (posttest). Similar to the pretest 
measure, the items for each distance are labeled PSHORT, PMED, and PLONG. 
 
